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This is now the sixth Election Analysis report we have produced in five years and the second U.S. Election Analysis Report. 
It has been a privilege to share this journey with the contributors to these reports: many of whom we know well, and many of 
whom we have met through this collaboration.
We were keen for the U.S. 2020 election report’s editorial team to include U.S.-based scholars and so we are delighted to 
be working with Danielle Coombs and Filippo Trevisan. We have also welcomed many new authors to the Election Analysis 
reports this year, and hope that these collaborations continue. 
2020 has been a particularly challenging year for academics, with many of us profoundly affected by the pandemic. 
Remaining productive in research during this time has been a challenge for many in the sector, and so we were concerned 
that many scholars would be unable to contribute this time. However, we were delighted with the response to our invitations 
to contribute, and once again, we are immensely grateful for our contributors’ enthusiasm, commitment and their expertise, 
which shine through the pages of this report.
On behalf of the editorial team, we would like to recognise the financial and moral support of the Centre Comparative Politics 
and Media Research at Bournemouth University, and our great colleagues and student community. We are also very grateful 
for the support of our partners in this project: the APSA Information Technology & Politics Section, the Political Studies 
Association Media and Politics Group and the IPSA Political Communication Research Committee.
We owe a special debt of gratitude to our outstanding Research Assistant Mirva Villa who also helped produce three of our 
previous Election Analysis reports and still agreed to join another project – despite the incredible demands we place upon her 
in a very short period of time. Knowing we could rely on you yet again was crucial!
We are also delighted to be working with three brilliant Graduate Assistants, in Benjamin Simmons, Asvatha (Ash) Babu 
(American University) and Harrison LeJeune (Kent State), who have helped us in promotion and research for this report. 
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This election has raised countless questions and 
talking points, which journalists, academics, 
pollsters, pundits, and politicians alike are all busy 
analyzing. This project, and the report that follows, 
is our collective contribution to making sense of 
the 2020 election. To do this, we have again turned 
to leading academics in the U.S. and beyond – a 
diverse mix of world-leading experts and early 
career researchers – to offer their reflections, 
analysis and early research findings on the election 
campaign, the results, and what they might mean 
for the future of American politics.
Section 1 covers the policy and political 
context of the 2020 campaign. This was, of course, 
dominated by the COVID-19 pandemic that had 
taken over 240,000 American lives by the time 
of the election. But it also proved to be a divisive 
political issue, with incumbent Donald Trump 
and challenger Joe Biden offering different visions 
of how the U.S. should respond to the pandemic. 
The two candidates also offered contrasting policy 
platforms around such issues as abortion, foreign 
policy, immigration, and the environment, each of 
which are taken up by our contributors. 
In section 2 we turn to voters. 2020 saw a 
historic turnout rate of over 65% – the highest 
in over 100 years, and supported by a record 
number of mail-in and early in-person votes due 
to the pandemic. Pre-election polls had raised the 
prospect of a comfortable Biden win, and while at 
the time this report went to print he still looked 
likely to take the electoral college by some margin, 
overall voting patterns also demonstrated the resil-
ience of the Trump vote. Our contributors examine 
the divisions within the American electorate along 
racial, geographic, age, and religious lines, while 
unpacking the increasing polarization around 
certain issues. 
While both leading candidates were white, 
male and in their seventies, they are still fasci-
nating dynamics behind their candidacies, which 
then shaped their campaign strategies. In section 
3, our contributors examine the psychology of 
the candidates and their followers, alongside 
some of the key aspects of their campaign and 
communication strategies. 
Section 4 turns attention to news and jour-
nalism. Throughout Trump’s divisive presidency, 
he has presented the mainstream news media with 
unique challenges. Since becoming president, 
Trump has made over 22,500 false or misleading 
claims, averaging over 50 false or misleading 
claims a day in the final stretch of the election 2020 
campaign. Meanwhile, the mainstream media has 
been subject to unprecedented political assault, par-
ticularly from the White House. By the end of this 
campaign and in an apparent shift from the ways 
in which they covered Trump in the previous four 
years, we saw TV networks cutting off the president 
as he made baseless claims about voter fraud. 
Social media (section 5) was again a key 
battleground. Consistent with his 2016 campaign 
and his last four years in office, Trump sought to 
control the news agenda through his tweets. Yet, 
he now found himself subject to the moderation 
of the platforms, who censored a number of his 
tweets behind misinformation warnings, especially 
in the aftermath of the vote. Meanwhile, Biden’s 
winning campaign spoke of how it ‘turned off 
Twitter’ during stages of the campaign. Scholars 
will be monitoring whether these and other 
developments continue beyond this election cycle 
and are seen in other national contexts.
Political communication does not just exist 
in news and other formal political spaces, but in 
popular culture too. In section 6, contributors 
show how sport, satire, and comedy are not just 
entertainment, but are actively involved in public 
critique during the election. 
We end the report (section 7) with contri-
butions that reflect on the state of democracy in 
the U.S. We do not use the word ‘crisis’ lightly, but 
we believe – alongside historians of fascism and 
authoritarianism – that this election has exposed 
the fragility of liberal democracy in the U.S. As 
we write, the election outcome is disputed, the 
integrity of the voting process is being attacked, 
truth and facts are drowning amidst waves of mis-
information, and the sitting President has warned 
of “violence on the streets” if the vote count is not 
cut short. A poll from Politico/ Morning Consult 
found that 70% of Republicans do not believe the 
presidential election was “free and fair”. These are 
trends that may well outlive Trump’s presidency 
and affect U.S. politics for years to come.
Published within ten days of the result, these 
contributions are short and accessible. Authors 
provide authoritative analysis – including research 
findings and new theoretical insights – to bring 
readers original ways of understanding the 
campaign. Contributions also bring a rich range 
of disciplinary influences, from political science to 
cultural studies, journalism studies to geography. 
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To be totally honest, I thought the 2020 election 
would be a blowout. Not because Joe Biden ran 
a particularly effective campaign (it was fine, just 
fine). Not because Donald Trump ran a particu-
larly ineffective campaign (it was bad, but the 
same type of bad as 2016). But because of the grim 
reality of life in the United States in 2020. 
This has not been a good year, to put it mildly. 
Over 200,000 people have died of the Coronavirus. 
The economy is in shambles. Our children attend 
their schools virtually now. They cannot visit their 
grandparents in nursing homes or, god forbid, the 
hospital. The pandemic has hit the United States 
harder than other wealthy nations because the 
government’s failed public health response. 
And yet the presidential election results are 
basically what I would have predicted in January 
2020. Three states that Trump narrowly won in 
2016 flipped to the Democrat, with a handful of 
other narrow victories as well. Democrats lost a 
few of the House seats that they picked up in the 
2018 wave, and they won a couple of Senate seats. 
Given Trump’s demonstrable unpopularity, that 
was well within the bounds of what one would 
have expected had 2020 been more “normal.”
Two possible explanations present themselves. 
It is possible that Trump was more popular than 
he seemed – that without the weight of the ruinous 
pandemic, he would have sailed to a second-term 
victory. If he came this close, despite all that has 
gone terribly wrong this year, then surely he would 
have done better in a world without the virus. The 
trouble with this explanation is that it requires 
us to disbelieve so many of the apparent facts-
on-the-ground from the past three years. Trump 
was historically unpopular. He presided over an 
improving economy, but did nothing to unite an 
increasingly divided nation. He inflamed partisan 
divisions and gave comfort and encouragement to 
violent white nationalists at home while ruining 
America’s reputation abroad.
The second explanation is that partisan prefer-
ences are now so deeply entrenched in the United 
States (at least when filtered through the prism 
of political geography, in which marginal gains 
and losses in vote share only matter in a select few 
narrowly-divided states) that the entire apparatus 
of political campaigning has no effect on the 
outcome of Presidential elections. This explanation 
is in some ways even more troubling – particularly 
for scholars of strategic political communication 
like myself.
What choices could Trump or Biden have 
made that would have altered this outcome? What 
messages could they have distributed, through 
what media? Were there digital advertisements 
or analog campaign commercials that could 
have moved the needle? Untapped potential in 
bold new policy proposals? Innovations in field 
campaigning? If the lived reality of the pandemic 
did not change votes, hearts, and minds, then it 
is hard to imagine any of the granular strategic 
decisions made by the legitimate political 
campaigns could have.
And the same goes for the digital platforms. 
We spent years pondering how Facebook, Google, 
and Twitter would mediate electoral communi-
cations – both legitimate and illegitimate. Each 
platform made complicated and flawed decisions 
over the course of the election. They attempted to 
tamp down on the spread of misinformation and 
disinformation. They were at times somewhat suc-
cessful, at other times less so. Yet, this explanation 
leaves me to wonder whether any of the platforms’ 
choices mattered to the eventual outcome. Would 
waves of misinformation and unchecked micro-
targeted propaganda have changed the results in 
Pennsylvania or Wisconsin, when the waves of 
hospitalization and empty storefronts did not? It is 
hard to fathom.
At the beginning of every semester in my 
strategic political communication course, I tell my 
students that “the answer to every question I will 
ask you this semester is ‘well, it’s complicated’.” 
I am sure as we delve through the data on 2020 
campaigning in the months and years ahead, we 
will similarly learn that both of the explanations I 
ponder here are too simple – that reality was more 
nuanced and complicated.
But I also recall that my contribution to this 
volume four years ago was titled “The #LolNoth-
ingMatters Election.” I reflected in that essay 
on just how it was possible that a campaign as 
technically shoddy as Donald Trump’s could have 
won. I was baffled then, and I am baffled now. 
If a pandemic of this magnitude leaves the 
mass electorate unfazed, then I have to wonder 
what (if anything) could move them.
The far-too-normal election
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The 2020 U.S. Presidential Election took place 
during a convergence of crises (a pandemic, an 
economic crisis, a systemic racism crisis). Pundits 
argued that COVID-19 will be one of the biggest 
issues affecting the elections. This brief analysis 
focuses on how the pandemic was framed by 
the two candidates in their rally discourses, the 
potential connections to the election results and 
what’s next. 
One pandemic, two realities 
Trump and Biden painted two realities regarding 
the pandemic and what’s at stake. 
Trump consistently downplayed the virus, 
even after getting sick himself. His rally discourses 
from very early on, paint a rosy picture, albeit full 
of contradictions: “But while I’m president, the 
United States we use every tool, and we’ve done it. 
By the way, our country is doing great. We have the 
pandemic should have never been allowed should 
have never been allowed to happen by China,” 
(Oshkosh-Wisconsin-8/17). And while numbers 
kept spiking, Trump kept reassuring Americans: 
“But you know what, without the vaccine, it’s ending 
too. We’re rounding the turn; it’s ending without 
the vaccine. But the vaccine is going to make it go 
quicker. Let’s get rid of it.” (Macon-Georgia-10/16). 
Trump constantly applauds his packed crowds: 
“What a crowd. What a crowd. You see what’s going 
on, on the road all the way up here. We have people 
all the way up.” (Carson City-Nevada-10/18) and at 
different points he mocks Biden for being cautious, 
wearing a mask, holding virtual rallies.
Trump paints Biden as the one who will 
destroy everything: “Joe Biden would terminate 
our recovery, delay the vaccine, prolong the 
pandemic, and annihilate Georgia’s economy” 
(Macon-Georgia-10/16). The election is “a choice 
between a deadly lockdown and a safe vaccine that 
ends the pandemic with or without the vaccine.” 
(Montoursville-Pennsylvania-10/31). 
Biden’s reality is a much bleaker one. In his 
rallies, he emphasizes COVID-19’s toll: “Today, 
unfortunately, America is going to… reach a tragic 
milestone, 200,000 deaths recorded as of today 
because of the coronavirus, 200,000 deaths all across 
this nation (Manitowoc-Wisconsin-9/21). 
He applauds respecting preventive measures: 
“There’s so many of you here, I wish I could go car 
to car and meet you all. I don’t like the idea of all 
this distance, but it’s necessary. I appreciate you 
being safe. What we don’t want to do is become 
super spreaders, but thank you so much.” (Bucks 
County-Pennsylvania-10/24). 
Biden harshly criticized Trump’s handling 
of the crisis; for downplaying the pandemic, 
politicizing and discouraging people from wearing 
a mask, for giving up. For Biden “the first step 
of beating this virus is beating Donald Trump.” 
(Detroit-Michigan-10/31). 
In his rallies Biden promises to end this 
pandemic, without shutting down: “I am not going 
to shut down the country. But I am going to shut 
down the virus.” (Broward County-Florida-10/29).
Finally, in Trump’s discourses the pandemic is 
approached mostly towards the middle-end of the 
discourse, while in Biden’s it is approached from 
the very beginning or first quarter of the speech. 
This focuses the attention on the problem and 
implicitly the vulnerability for Trump. 
COVID-19 and elections results
COVID-19 cases surged before and on election 
day, especially in battleground states. In October, 
for 82% of registered voters supporting Biden, 
the outbreak would be “very important” to their 
vote, compared to only 24% Trump supporters. 
In a CNN exit poll, COVID-19 was ranked the 
third most important for their decision, behind 
the economy and racial inequality. The pandemic 
already affected the election process, resulting in 
a record number of mail-in ballots, and delaying 
the results. 
On November 7, the AP called the race for 
Biden (290 vs. 214 electoral votes). Georgia and 
Arizona who switched from “red” to “blue” (voting 
Republican in prior five presidential elections, and 
both having Republican governors) are also among 
the states with high COVID-19 cases and deaths. 
But Biden did not win by a large margin. Michigan, 
Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, who voted for Trump 
in 2016 (but blue in the four prior elections) voted 
for Biden and were also affected by the pandemic. 
However, it is also true that the states most affected 
by pandemic, remained loyal to either Biden and 
Democrats (California, New York) or Trump and 
Republicans (Texas, Louisiana). Florida also voted 
for Trump (while in 2008, 2016 voted for Obama). 
While other factors beyond the pandemic were 
critical in this election, it seems that where there 
were many illnesses and deaths, Trump’s speech 
focused on the denial of evidence lost to Biden’s 
call to defend ourselves, to solidarity and collective 
care. It also seems that Trump’s pandemic reality 
remained shared by many of his voters. 
Elections are over, the nation is still very divided 
Biden declared his victory as for “We The People,” 
and emphasized this is a time to heal, to unite 
and to listen to science. However, Trump and his 
supporters are yet to officially concede and the 
Trump administration will still handle the national 
pandemic response for the next months. It remains 
to be seen who will dominate the Senate. Currently, 
Republicans seem to lead, but some things might 
still change (e.g. Georgia’s run-off on January 3). 
Equally critical, Americans remain divided in 
their views of COVID-19 and mask wearing (e.g. 
Republicans and Whites are less likely to wear a 
mask) as COVID-19 numbers keep surging. 
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Political emotion and the global pandemic: factors 
at odds with a Trump presidency
Prof Erik P. Bucy 
Marshall and Sharleen 
Formby Regents 
Professor of Strategic 
Communication in the 
College of Media and 
Communication at Texas 
Tech University. Past 
editor of Politics and 
the Life Sciences, an 
interdisciplinary journal 
published by Cambridge 
University Press. Former  
research fellows at the 
LSE and Oxford.
In politics, the ability to emote appropriately and 
in response to changing social, political, and crisis 
conditions is a hallmark quality of responsive 
leadership. I have studied this phenomenon in 
relation to every U.S. president since Bill Clinton, 
and even several earlier presidents through a 
combination of empirical and qualitative methods 
including detailed coding of candidate behavior in 
debates, dial tests of debates, experiments that show 
leader responses to disaster news, eye tracking 
to document visual attention to inappropriate 
displays, and focus groups to capture viewer 
responses to memorable campaign moments. 
Incumbent presidents are expected to show a 
high degree of emotional intelligence. In times of 
threat, an appropriate stance may be to project anger 
and resolve, as George W. Bush did in his masterful 
address ten days after 9/11 to a joint session of 
Congress. Yet sympathy for victims, and for less 
fortunate members of society, is equally important—
as is the ability to reassure citizens in uncertain 
times, particularly during a prolonged conflict or 
ongoing crisis. This quality of leadership is regarded 
as central to an effective management style that job 
announcements for senior administrative posts in 
business and academia now list emotional intelli-
gence as essential. 
As I observed four years ago in the U.S Election 
Analysis 2016 report, Donald Trump does not know 
emotional expressiveness outside a narrow range of 
anger, defiance, and threat — a confrontational style 
of campaigning (and governance, as it turns out) 
that bonds supporters to his cause and holds them 
in line. The approach is limited and does not win 
many new adherents, but it generates considerable 
enthusiasm among followers. This strategy works 
for challengers, who are noted for the aggression 
they show in attempts to unseat the incumbent 
power holder, but it becomes a thin argument in 
the middle of a global pandemic and economic 
downturn where people are out of work and dying. 
Under different conditions, perhaps with a 
vibrant economy and coronavirus vaccine, Trump 
might not have ended up a one-term president. 
But context matters. In 2008, Barack Obama again 
benefitted from his competent response to the 
economic crisis brought on by the collapse of the 
housing market; in 2012, Obama benefitted from 
the quick action he took, and empathy he showed, 
in response to Hurricane Sandy, which hit New 
York and New Jersey hard. Before COVID-19, 
Trump’s presidency had been notably devoid of 
major crises. There were some dust-ups with North 
Korea and Iran, but most political messes, such as 
the government shutdown of 2018 and impeach-
ment over attempts to get Ukraine to investigate Joe 
Biden, were of his own making. 
The 2020 election brought the one enduring, 
externally driven crisis to confront the Trump 
presidency: the COVID-19 pandemic. The virus 
even afflicted Trump himself, First Lady Melania 
Trump, and several of his inner circle. Despite these 
developments, and an international outcry for more 
leadership on the issue, Trump double-downed on 
his characteristic misstatements and blame, first 
promising the virus would soon be eradicated, then 
touting false cures, blaming “Democrat governors” 
for lockdowns, encouraging armed protestors to 
“liberate Michigan” from democratic rule, mocking 
Joe Biden for wearing a mask, and finally declaring 
that he “beat this crazy, horrible China virus.” 
His advice to the country? “Don’t let the 
virus dominate your life.” Rather than expressing 
compassion, the president issued an order, telling 
followers it was time to move on. Surely this 
command reverberated as hollow advice for the 
thousands already reeling from the loss of loved 
ones or millions of once-infected individuals who, 
despite being COVID-free, are still struggling with 
the long-term consequences of a highly infectious 
and persistent disease. 
In the rise to power, particularly in today’s 
overcharged and cluttered media ecology, the 
ability to attract and hold attention appears to 
trump all other considerations. The loudest, 
most gregarious, and socially dominant attention 
seekers are able to command the spotlight as social 
influencers, building a personality driven following 
that translates into political popularity. Detailed 
understandings of public policy, adherence to the 
truth, and even time-honored political norms take 
a backseat to the performative histrionics that drive 
media attention.  But even in an attention economy, 
circumstances beyond the performer’s control can 
take center stage, demanding a response and not a 
performance. In the holding of power, as opposed 
to the pursuit of power, a carefully calibrated 
repertoire of expression and compassion (some of it 
agonic, some hedonic) is required to form alliances, 
maintain order, and reassure an anxious citizenry. 
Although he maintained a loyal following 
despite blatant disregard for the truth, aided and 
abetted by alt.media cheerleading and legacy 
media amplification of falsehoods, Donald Trump 
was a highly flawed incumbent on many levels — 
emotional expression just one of them. American 
democracy can breathe a sigh of relief that his legal 
challenges to lawful voting will not survive judicial 
review and change the election outcome. But 
Trumpism will likely live on. 
Moving forward, a more emotionally literate 
far-right candidate may emerge who again 
threatens the integrity of the system but this time 
may be able to build a broader coalition around 
deeply felt “emotional truths” that again bear little 
resemblance to reality. A society that values respect 
for the law and tradition, not to mention tolerance, 
diversity, and a concern for others, would anticipate 
this eventuality and build more safeguards into the 
system to guard against its demise.
14
The choice between former Vice President Biden 
and President Trump seemed to be a choice 
between either addressing the ongoing coronavirus 
outbreak or the economy. Indeed, exit polls show 
that voters most concerned about the pandemic 
voted for Biden by a 68 point margin and voters 
most concerned about the economy voted for 
Trump by a 65 point margin. 
With the pandemic looming large changing 
nearly every aspect of our lives and as cases rose 
to their highest levels since the pandemic began 
leading up to the election, many predicted large 
wins for Biden. The large margin of victory for 
Biden that many predicted did not happen. Biden 
lost Florida and flipped key states by slim margins. 
Exit polls suggest that the pandemic was the 
number one issue for only 17 percent of voters. 
Among five issues, the economy was the most 
important issue for the largest share of voters at 35 
percent. Yet, the two are not mutually exclusive. 
Data from Opportunity Insights show that 
consumer spending began its freefall as the U.S. 
announced its first COVID-19 case. Consumer 
confidence wanes as coronavirus spreads. Thus, 
economists suggest that we should not expect a full 
economic recovery until after pandemic has passed. 
Biden focused more on effectively addressing 
the pandemic while President Trump focused on 
economic recovery by getting “husbands back 
to work”. Yet, it is women who have experienced 
the most severe effects of this pandemic-induced 
recession with 4 times more women than men 
dropping out of the workforce recently. Female 
labor force participation rates have dropped 2 
percent. Women dominate the high people-skill 
occupations that have been lost to a virus spread 
by people. Fewer high people-skill workers in the 
economy will lengthen the time to recovery and 
will stall wage growth for those who remain in the 
workforce. In today’s economy, America will not be 
able to recover without the skills and abilities and 
experiences that women bring to the workforce. 
An August survey of economists by the National 
Association for Business Economics showed that a 
majority (62 percent) of economists believed that 
Biden would do a better job promoting economic 
growth, in stark contrast to the voters most 
concerned about the economy.  
But economic growth is no longer broadly 
shared by all Americans. The gains from economic 
growth increasingly go to the richest Americans 
and aggregate wealth continues to decline for 
middle income and lower income households. 
Long-run economic trends that promote 
aggregate growth have not benefited many 
Americans especially in places acutely affected by 
outsourcing and automation. The largest swings 
toward the republicans in 2016 happened in the 
Midwest - in areas that have historically relied on 
manufacturing, many of them rural with no other 
industries waiting in the wings. The long-term 
economic realities of the inequality associated with 
technological change and globalization have yet to 
be addressed in any meaningful way. Yet, policies 
that fight against these economic headwinds are 
unlikely to be successful and have a significant 
opportunity cost of diverting funds away from 
policies that would instead help everyone to adapt 
to the economic headwinds.
Health experts suggest that the pandemic will 
be over sometime in late 2021, which means that, 
less than a quarter of the next presidential term 
will be marked by the pandemic. That still leaves 
at least three more years for the next president to 
address the other concerns of American citizens. 
The pandemic is a short-term problem compared 
to larger long-term issues that have plagued many 
Americans – both economic inequality and racial 
inequality. 
Exit polls show that among five issues, racial 
inequality mattered most for 20 percent of voters 
(a higher share than the pandemic and second only 
to the economy). The voters most concerned about 
racial inequality voted for Biden by an 83-point 
margin. A significant portion of voters want a social 
recovery that addresses the long-run systemic 
issues facing minorities and an economic recovery 
that addresses inequalities in our economic system. 
And the two are not mutually exclusive. 
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Confessions of a vampire
You don’t know me. But I know you. I’ve been at 
your neck for about four decades. Feeding. But 
don’t bother looking in the mirror. You won’t see 
me there. Sucking. Not because I’m not there. But 
because you’ve been convinced, that I’m not there. 
You see no teeth marks, no puncture wounds. 
Such details, such evidence of my existence are 
anathema to you. How is this possible? Simple. 
They don’t match the worldview that has been 
formulated for you, by Conservatives and Liberals 
alike. Instead, you imagine me to be Nature, 
perhaps some manner of Fate or, more likely, as 
God’s heaven-sent plan. I like that rationale best. It 
fosters your belief in Free Will even as you accept 
your ultimate impotence. It rouses your faith in 
a pure and fierce individuality even as it cripples 
your facility to examine tangible circumstances. 
What could better serve my never-slaking thirst?
To be perfectly honest, on no occasion do I 
find our little arrangement more charming than 
at election time. That’s when you exercise your 
sacred Choice, assert your dearly held political 
views. On Election Day, that’s when you’re free to 
choose (to lose) between, well, me or me. Ah, I 
can see that you’re puzzled. You haven’t a clue as 
to who I am, nor about what I speak. Very well, 
then. I’ll elaborate.
Call me, for the sake of whimsy, Count von 
Hayek. I hail from the tranquil shores of Lac 
Léman. Mont Pèlerin. Nothing ghastly or Transyl-
vanian. I am no ghoul in the trivial sense, lurking 
in dark shadows. I am a button-down variety of 
fiend, my powers not preternatural but pecuniary. 
At present, they feature a fearsome three: debt, 
derivatives, dividuation. Of these, you understand, 
albeit imperfectly, only one. Debt. You are in it. 
No need to demur. You are, one way or another. 
Or, more feasibly, in multiple ways. There is no 
shame in it. You are indebted by design. Unless you 
belong to my fortunate 1%, debt is your lot—and 
my lifeblood. To be straightforward, you work to 
feed me. My financial entrepreneurs see to that, 
monetizing your debts as surely as owners starve 
laborers. Wage-slave or debt-slave are of a piece: to 
enrich me, I impoverish you. We play the game of 
accumulation by dispossession, you and I. And only 
I know the rules. And only I make the rules. And 
only I know such a game is afoot. And there is no 
other game in town. So take one guess at who is 
winning. Eight men—my happiest minions—hold 
as much wealth as the poorest half of the planet: 
3.6 billion people. In the land of the free and the 
home of the brave, 40 million live in poverty, 18.5 
million in extreme poverty, and 5.3 million in 
absolute poverty.
A more recent trick of mine is derivatives. 
Don’t trouble your mind. You’ve no hope of 
understanding them. Not even the stockbrokers 
do, except as tools for swindle. These are bets 
made upon bets—and then often betted on 
again—packaged and repacked into confounding 
instruments of finance bundled to obfuscate. Fre-
quently, your debts are the fodder. Remember that 
2008 subprime mortgage crisis? Such a romp. And 
what “correctives” came about as a result of that 
“catastrophe”? Well, since 2008, the share of the 
global wealth held by my disciples has increased 
from 42.5% to 50.1%. Nowadays, a gratifying 70% 
of the world’s working-age population owns just 
2.7% of global wealth. Yes, as I always say, nothing 
like a good worldwide financial meltdown to 
convince people being sucked dry, four decades of 
blue-collar Republican voters say, to clamor to be 
sucked drier. I daresay, at this point, you are utterly 
perplexed. Rest assured, however, that you never 
profit from derivatives. These devices are a casino 
game for the super-wealthy. A means by which 
they wager for more super-wealth. Atop the global 
wealth pyramid, to be sure, is no place for the 
limited brainpower of the commoner.
Yet never question your utility. My latest and 
most telling innovation hinges entirely on you. 
Dividuation. What is that? Well, take your most 
cherished word, “individual,” and remove from it 
the prefix: “in.” What’s left? Dividual. That which 
can be divided. Thanks to me, that’s you. When 
browsing the web, sending an email, cruising social 
media, reading this, you are surveilled constantly, 
parsed endlessly, influenced perpetually. Why? 
So Big Data can sell your component penchants, 
pastimes, quirks, and obsessions to buyers, 
innocent and nefarious, who care little about 
undivided, whole, individual you. Confused? 
Incredulous? Good. You are neither merchant nor 
customer in this transaction, merely raw material. 
You’ve become my ne plus ultra of person dwindled 
into merchandise.
So, by all means, vote away! Whether making 
America great again ... again ... or building back 
better, until you get me off your throat, I will relish 
watching you rearrange the deck chairs on your 
Ship of State.
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COVID-19 and the 2020 election
During public health crises, politicians often 
become crisis managers.  Some politicians try to 
increase popularity by becoming the hero who 
enters the situation to help people but politicizing 
the issue in the process.  While politicians do not 
create public health crises, they are responsible for 
performing an effective crisis response.  Politicians 
use the “crisis performance” for political gain or to 
limit the political harm from the crisis.  Support 
is gained when politicians are perceived as heroes 
for their crisis management performances.  We 
can judge crisis manager performance along four 
criteria found in the crisis management research: 
(1) be quick with action, (2) be consistent with 
messages, (3) be honest about the crisis, and (4) 
show concern for the crisis victims.  COVID-19 
created a public health crisis and the need for 
political leaders to become crisis managers.  In 
the United States, an election later in the year 
increased the pressure to perform as an effective 
crisis manager. Trump’s COVID-19 crisis response 
was widely criticized in the news media for failing 
to take the advice of medical experts and Trump 
showing more concern about the economy than for 
the safety of the U.S. population.  Expert analysis 
(how crisis experts evaluate the crisis management 
effort) suggests Trump failed on each of the four 
crisis management criteria.  Trump was slow to 
respond to the crisis with a lack of testing and 
protective equipment.  The response was inconsist-
ent on key concerns including the wearing of face 
masks and drugs to be used to treat the virus.  The 
response was viewed more as stonewalling than 
being honest and Trump showed little compassion 
for victims.  
  But did Trumps’ questionable performance as 
a crisis manager seem to affect voters?  Beginning 
in July, U.S. polling data related to COVID-19 con-
sistently found that registered voters were far more 
disapproving than approving of Trump’s handling 
of COVID-19.  In the summer of 2020, on poll 
showed the disapproval to approval was 55% to 
39%.  By October of 2020, the polls indicated dis-
approval to approval was 61% to 35%.  Voters were 
being influenced by the rising COVID-19 death 
tolls attributable to an ineffective crisis response.  
Registered voters favored Trump’s Democratic rival 
Joe Biden by 17 points for the person they wanted 
handling the pandemic.  In Pennsylvania, a key 
state in the upcoming Presidential election, 52% 
of registered voters trusted Biden to handle the 
pandemic compared to 32% for Trump (Voters).  
Two-third of registered voters polled by Powered 
felt Trump failed to take appropriate action while 
62% distrusted what he says about the virus.  
The week before the election, 56% of likely in 
Pennsylvania voters are reported as saying it was 
more important to control the virus than to restart 
the economy compared to 38% favoring restarting 
the economy. The numbers did not change 
significantly even after Trump contracted the virus. 
These numbers reflect a feeling that Trump had 
failed on the crisis manager evaluative criteria.  
However, we need to consider how Trump’s crisis 
management messages politicized COVID-19.   
Polling data can hide important details if we 
only examine the total numbers.  It is instructive 
to look more closely at how the COVID-19 polling 
numbers vary between Republicans, Democrats, 
and Independents.  This closer look can expose 
how an issue becomes politicized; viewed through 
partisan lenses.  Democrats consistently rated 
Trump low for his COVID-19 response with 92% 
disapproving of how he has handled the situation 
and only 5% approving.  Independents express less 
disapproval at 35% and 61% approval.  Repub-
licans reported only 23% disapproval and 74% 
approval of Trump’s handling of the virus.  The 
numbers reflect how in politics, the evaluation of 
the crisis manager is in the eye of the beholder—
will follow partisan lines. Moreover, the polling 
data found while Democrats viewed COVID-19 
as an important concern, Republicans did not 
see as an important issue (Poll).  Though experts 
being cited in the news media deemed the crisis 
response a failure, Trump supporters were willing 
to believe Trump’s claim that he was doing a great 
job.  The closer examination of the polling data 
indicates the COVID-19 crisis management was 
not a problem among Trump supporters.  Trump’s 
reality has him doing a great job managing the 
crisis and his supporters largely accepted that 
reality.  Furthermore, the crisis management effort 
was galvanizing the opposition and was a minor 
factor among independents (more approved than 
disapproved).  Even though COVID-19 had killed 
more than 200,000 citizens and cases were rising 
quickly prior to election day, pre-election and 
exit polls indicate the virus had a minor effect on 
the election results.  The virus simply reflected 
pre-existing party preferences.  
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President Trump promised a COVID vaccine by 
Election Day: that politicized vaccination intentions
In the weeks leading up to the presidential election, 
President Trump promised Americans on several 
occasions that a vaccine for the novel coronavirus 
would be ready for public use by Election Day. The 
Trump campaign saw accelerated vaccine devel-
opment as an important campaign talking point 
– featured in battleground state campaign ads, and 
touted on several occasions at the first presidential 
debate. Vaccine experts – including the adminis-
tration’s CDC director Robert Redfield – cautioned 
that this timeline was unrealistic. Although 
Operation Warp Speed enabled the manufacture 
of vaccines prior to the conclusion of clinical trials, 
with the hope of beginning the distribution process 
within one day of approval, experts projected 
widespread availability months after Election Day. 
Nevertheless, the President’s decision to link 
vaccine development to the election fueled concerns 
the administration might pressure regulators to 
cut corners in the approval process. Some scientists 
worried that the administration might attempt 
to ease emergency use authorization (EUA) 
guidelines, which allow vaccines in development to 
be administered to vulnerable populations before 
approval for widespread use, in order to facilitate 
distribution in October. The administration 
exacerbated these concerns by placing substantial 
pressure on the FDA to permit doctors to treat sick 
people with the plasma of recovered coronavirus 
patients; a promising, yet presently unproven way 
to fight off the virus more quickly. Likewise, HHS 
spokesperson Michael Caputo, who formerly served 
on the President’s 2016 election campaign, was met 
with scorn after he accused government scientists of 
prolonging the pandemic in order to advance their 
personal and political ambitions. 
The administration's decision to tie vaccine 
development to the election politicized elites 
discussion of vaccines on the campaign trail. In an 
interview with CNN in early September, Vice Pres-
idential candidate Kamala Harris stated that she 
“would not take [President Trump’s] word” that a 
vaccine developed before election day would be safe 
and effective. Worryingly, elite partisan disagree-
ments about vaccine-related issues are also reflected 
in Americans’ intentions to receive a coronavirus 
vaccine, once it becomes widely available. 
In demographically representative surveys of 
mass level politicization in vaccination intentions 
(see the red and blue lines Figure 1). For reference 
(in gray), I include an indicator of monthly media 
attention to vaccine politicization -- i.e., the total 
count of newspaper and television stories coverage 
of President Trump’s Election Day vaccine promise.
I find that, at the onset of the pandemic in 
April 2020, over 70% of both Republicans and  
Democrats indicated that they would be willing to 
receive a vaccine. However, as the pandemic pro-
gressed, Republicans’ intentions declined gradually, 
potentially a result of waning concern about the 
severity of the pandemic – before reverting back 
to early-pandemic levels (75%) on the eve of 
Election Day. One could argue Republicans’ fall 
resurgence could be due in part to an uptick in 
concern about the pandemic, amid a “Fall Wave” of 
new infections. Polling averages, however, suggest 
very little change in public pandemic concern from 
mid-August to mid-October. 
Alternatively, and consistent with the possi-
bility that vaccination intentions became highly 
politicized, this shift coincides with President 
Trump doubling down on his promise of a vaccine 
within “a few weeks” (i.e., in the first Presidential 
Debate), as well as Vice President Pence’s assertion, 
in the Vice Presidential Debate, that Senator 
Harris’ skepticism about the safety of a vaccine 
approved by the Trump administration might 
“undermine public vaccine confidence.” The shift 
also follows a major spike in media attention to 
President Trump’s Election Day vaccine promise 
(see: gray shaded line).
Democrats, on the other hand, remained 
enthusiastic in their vaccination intentions 
throughout the summer; with over 80% reporting 
that they planned to vaccinate by June. However, 
Democrats’ intentions began to drop off in the last 
week of August; just days after President Trump 
referred to the FDA as “deep state” actors seeking 
to prevent Americans from receiving a corona-
virus vaccine, and put pressure on the agency to 
authorize unproven therapeutics.  
Democrats’ enthusiasm for the vaccine dropped 
off sharply in the coming months, amid increasing 
elite polarization about vaccine-related issues and 
media attention to President Trump’s Election Day 
promise. By October, just 67%. This means that the 
partisan subgroup once most likely to vaccinate 
experienced the steepest decline in vaccine inten-
tions, from late summer into early Fall.
These results, while correlational, nevertheless 
caution that playing politics with vaccine devel-
opment can have important and negative public 
health consequences. 
While Democrats’ substantial dropoff in vac-
cination intentions may have been offset, to some 
degree, by Republican enthusiasm, Americans’ 
intentions to vaccinate remained concerningly low; 
decreasing from 74% in April to 67% in October. 
Because current epidemiological estimates suggest 
that as many as 70% of Americans must develop 
immunity to COVID-19  in order to put the virus’ 
spread into decline, either by getting vaccinated, 
or by contracting and recovering from the virus, 
politicization may extend the amount of time it 
takes to achieve herd immunity against the disease. 
Ironically, then, it may be that the President’s 
decision to guarantee a vaccine before Election 
Day, aimed at promising a speedy return to “life as 
usual”,  has actually prolonged the time it may take 
to recover from the pandemic.
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Figure 1. COVID-19 vaccination intentions by partisanship (April - October 2020)
Note. Combined N = 4,002.. Mean levels of vaccine refusal across survey waves. Respondents were asked to report 
whether they are “very likely,” “somewhat likely,” “not too likely,” or “not likely at all” to “request to be vaccinated” 
against COVID-19 “when a vaccine for the novel coronavirus becomes widely available.” Respondents were also asked 
a standard (branched) partisan identification question (with those “leaning” toward the Democratic or Republican 
parties coded as Independents). Responses were collected via Lucid Theorem’s online opt-in internet service, which used 
quota sampling to target demographic representativeness on respondents’ age, race, gender, educational attainment, 
income, partisan identification, and residential region. I apply post-stratification weights to account for any remaining 
differences  between the sample and U.S. population on the basis of age, income, educational attainment, gender, and 
race. Media volume data reflect all U.S. newspaper articles and television closed caption data where the terms “Trump,” 
“vaccine,” and (“before Election Day” or “by Election Day”) co-occur in the same piece. Media data were obtained via 
ESCO-host. 
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The enduring impact of the Black Lives Matter 
movement on the 2020 elections
The outcome of the 2020 United States presidential 
election may have been determined nearly six-
months earlier with the confluence of nationally 
politicized medical and racial events. 
In May 2020, the world was in the midst of 
the global COVID-19 pandemic. The United States 
had surpassed every other country in confirmed 
coronavirus cases and was on lockdown as locally 
mandated “stay at home” orders were issued. Then 
George Floyd, a 46-year-old unarmed black man, 
died at the hands, or knee, of now-fired Minneapo-
lis Police Officer Derek Chauvin. For eight minutes 
and 46 seconds, the world turned its attention to 
social media channels and television broadcasts 
to watch recorded video of Floyd’s cries of “I can’t 
breathe” growing faint, handcuffed and pinned 
under Chauvin’s knee. 
For Blacks, Floyd’s death was just another 
loss to systemic racism. But for the general public, 
the video taken by 17-year-old Darnella Frazier 
was proof positive of the intersection of police 
brutality, racial inequality, and social justice. The 
recording of Floyd’s death was a lens that revealed 
the harsh realities of Black life in America. For 
some, Floyd’s death and the media attention 
it garnered brought forth comparisons to the 
tragedy of Bloody Sunday, March 7, 1965. Both 
horrific events in Black history that influenced 
public opinion about the need for social and 
political reform. The events of Bloody Sunday gave 
people an in-your-face picture of the realities of 
segregation and police brutality in America. In 
parallel, George Floyd’s death also gave voice and 
credibility to many non-Black, oppressed people 
that Black lives, or at least in this case one Black 
life in the form of George Floyd, did matter. 
Social Advocacy and Political Action
In the midst of the pandemic, hundreds of 
thousands of protesters took to the streets to assure 
their voices were heard. Chants of “Black Lives 
Matter” filled the air in over 150 cities. According 
to a Pew Research study, the BLM movement saw a 
67% approval rating from May through June. It was 
through this movement that political and social 
justice allies like the NAACP, Divine Nine and 
National Pan-Hellenic Council (historically black 
fraternities and sororities), and similar organiza-
tions developed voter registration initiatives (like 
The Electoral Justice Project) to encourage voter 
turnout in hopes of changing the de facto support 
of police brutality against Black people.
Melinda Messineo, a Ball State University 
professor and sociologist, observed how the 
pandemic gave people the ability “to pause and 
hear the argument (for police reforms, racial and 
social justice, and political accountability) in a way 
that they hadn’t heard of before.” She added, “By 
protesting under the pandemic conditions, people 
were going out there, risking their own lives in 
a way that they didn’t have to before.” In spite of 
the groundswell of support from a majority of the 
American public, many on the political right were 
not as amenable to change. The pushback further 
set the political stage for clarion calls for reform.   
Election Night (week)
The first votes in the U.S. election were cast shortly 
after midnight in Dixville Notch, a small township 
in New Hampshire. Former Vice President Joe 
Biden, a Democrat, took all five votes for president. 
The clean sweep gave news broadcasters on three 
cable news channels pause, leading a few of them 
to jokingly ask if this vote was anecdotal evidence 
of a “blue wave” about to sweep across America. 
The answer was quickly realized when 16 of the 
21 votes cast by residents from Millsfield, New 
Hampshire, were for President Trump, Biden 
received five votes. The final total 16 votes for 
Trump and 10 for Biden. The early vote in two 
small New Hampshire towns did not evidence a 
fast approaching “blue wave,” but it was foreshad-
owed the many ebbs and flows that marked the 
election. New Hampshire would offer a glimpse 
of our divided nation. A nation wrestling with its 
social, racial, and political identity, and with each 
state election result, a collective anxiety would rise 
depending on one’s political affiliation.  
For four days, the nation held its collective 
breath, hoping the other side would not win. 
Phrases like, “We have to be patient,” “Transpar-
ency is going to be key,” “No rush in counting 
the votes,” “Take time to count the votes in PA,” 
and “The votes are coming in, but still need to be 
counted” were commonplace in media discourse. 
Around 11:25 a.m. EST. on Saturday, November 
7th, media organizations called Pennsylvania 
for Biden. He was awarded its 20 electoral votes 
raising his total over the 270 electoral college votes 
required to win the race. 
Conclusion 
In the end, nearly 160 million votes were casts for 
the presidential candidates. For President-elect 
Joe Biden and the first Black female, Vice 
President-elect Kamala Harris their winning 
collation of Black and brown people and their 
big tent inclusive policies were a driving force in 
turning out over 48,032,772 absentee voters in a 
socially distant world. During Biden’s first speech 
as president-elect, he made several important ac-
knowledgments affirming, “the African American 
community stood up again for me. They always 
have my back, and I’ll have yours.” Additionally, 
he declared his commitment to, “achieve racial 
justice and root out systemic racism in this 
country.” These tenants align with the early BLM 
movement and should serve as paths for the 
healing of our America.
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Where do we go from here? The 2020 U.S. 
presidential election, immigration, and crisis
Four years ago, I sat down to collect my thoughts, 
days after Donald Trump was elected U.S. 
president. Like many, I was shocked at the election 
results and, given my interest in international 
migration, concerned about how Trump would 
approach immigration. I ended my essay on 
immigration and the 2016 presidential election 
by asking, “Where do we go from here?,” and 
lamenting the dark days ahead for those interested 
in humane immigration policies. Now that the 
2020 U.S. presidential election is behind us (sort 
of), I find myself again asking, Where do we go 
from here?
After the turmoil of the 2020 election, it is 
difficult to recall, let alone thoughtfully reflect 
on, how each candidate approached immigration 
in their campaigns. The COVID-19 pandemic, 
ongoing protests against police brutality and racial 
injustice, and fears of post-election mayhem across 
the United States all but crowded out immigration 
as a 2020 campaign issue. The main issue for 
voters depended on where they sat on the political 
spectrum, and the most pressing topics of this 
election revolved around whether all votes would 
be counted and whether the losing side would 
respond with violence. 
What, though, did each candidate actually say 
about immigration? Trump’s campaign website 
did not reference details about his platform on 
its landing page, but the immigration portion 
of his ‘Promises Kept’ presented a laundry list 
of accomplishments that curbed immigration 
and ‘protected our borders,’ reiterating the 
argument that immigrants were sources of crime 
and insecurity. The Biden campaign addressed 
immigration under ‘Joe’s vision,’ centering 
immigrant families (separated at the border by 
Trump or torn apart by ICE raids) and positioning 
the United States as a nation of immigrants. With 
both a reiteration of the Biden-Obama approach 
to immigration and a detailed plan for Biden’s 
first 100 days as president, his campaign focused 
on the consequences of immigration policies for 
immigrants, marking a sharp distinction from 
the Trump campaign’s focus on how immigration 
impacted (and hurt) ‘Americans.’
In reality, I suspect, few voters visited either 
candidate’s website to learn about their positions 
on immigration. After four years of Trump’s 
unrelenting effort to transform the U.S. approach 
to immigration, to gut the refugee resettlement 
program, and to reconfigure immigration’s place 
in U.S. national identity, it is hard to imagine 
voters who were unsure about how each candidate 
approached immigration. In 2020, immigration 
was simply not a campaign issue.
The absence of attention to immigration in 
the 2020 campaign is somewhat ironic, given 
how much media attention the topic demanded 
during Trump’s presidency. What has received less 
media attention, however, are the profound shifts 
in migration trends that migration scholars like 
Douglas Massey have noted. The early decades of 
the twenty-first century have seen fundamental 
changes in the nature of and rhetoric about 
immigration to the United States, especially 
from Latin America: a shift from young Mexican 
men seeking work to Central American families 
seeking refuge and from optimistic globalism to 
defensive populism as the dominant framework 
for approaching immigration as an issue. While 
U.S. public opinions toward immigrants have been 
largely unchanged in recent years, reconfigura-
tions in who comprises that immigrant population 
and how that population is politically framed have 
been profound.
As I drafted this essay, the news that Biden 
had won the 2020 U.S. presidential race scrolled 
across my phone. Those invested in immigrant 
rights and humanitarian commitments will meet 
this news with sighs of relief and renewed hope for 
the future. Biden, though, has his work cut out for 
him if he plans to undo Trump’s dismantling of the 
U.S. immigration system, as he has promised. Not 
only will Biden need to rebuild the infrastructure 
supporting refugee resettlement and take swift 
action to address the humanitarian crisis at 
the U.S.-Mexico border, but he will encounter 
a set of immigration policies out of step with 
current migration flows to the United States and 
a Congress unwilling to work across party lines. 
The last round of comprehensive immigration 
reform in the United States was in 1986. Much has 
changed about immigration, and about Congress’s 
interest in bipartisan legislation, since then. While 
Biden can reverse some of Trump’s damage with 
his own executive orders, managing immigration 
via executive order is not sustainable. If Biden 
really wants to address the issue of immigration, 
he will need to create bipartisan support for 
comprehensive immigration reform – a task that 
will require a commitment to building bridges and 
working across political divides that Washington, 
DC, has not seen in many years. While I want to 
be optimistic about what Biden can accomplish 
vis-à-vis immigration, Trump’s policies and 
rhetoric have caused long-term damage to not 
only U.S. immigration policies but also national 
dialogues around immigration, belonging, and 
who we are as a nation. A progressive path forward 
concerning immigration will be incredibly hard 
work, but at least it no longer seems impossible.
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Abortion will continue to be a key issue in U.S. 
politics, with the nation divided on what role the 
government should have in reproductive rights. 
In a Pew Center poll from August 2020, 46% of 
President Donald Trump’s supporters and 35% 
of challenger Joe Biden’s supporters described 
abortion as a very important factor in their voting. 
In terms of the presidential race, for some 
voters, the election has been a referendum on 
abortion. In his last term, President Donald 
Trump instituted various changes that have 
hindered reproductive rights. He reintroduced 
the “global gag rule,” meaning U.S. government 
funds will not go to foreign groups that provide 
or inform about abortions, and similarly within 
the U.S., federal family planning dollars cannot 
go to organizations that provide or inform about 
abortions. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
recently signed the “Geneva Consensus Declara-
tion,” which asserts that there is no international 
right to an abortion.  Joe Biden has pledged to 
rescind the “global gag rule,” but has wavered on 
other policy matters like the Hyde Amendment 
which means that taxpayer money cannot be 
used to fund abortions except where there is rape, 
incest, or danger to the mother, a policy that 
impacts low-income women in particular. 
With the passing of eminent Supreme Court 
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the month before 
the election, the stage was set for abortion to 
be at the forefront of the pre-electoral period. 
Republican politicians were determined to replace 
Ginsburg before the election, even though nine 
months before the 2016 election, they obstructed 
President Barack Obama’s Supreme Court 
candidate, Merrick Garland. The president’s 
nominee, Amy Coney Barrett, joined the Supreme 
Court just before the election took place. In his 
2016 campaign, President Donald Trump promised 
to install judges who would overturn the landmark 
Supreme Court case that legalized abortion 
nationally, Roe Vs Wade, and in the confirmation 
hearings for Amy Coney Barrett, there was much 
speculation about how she might rule if Roe vs 
Wade was challenged in court. Barrett’s record on 
rulings in the federal court related to abortion is 
mixed, and it remains unclear how she would rule 
in a case to overturn Roe Vs Wade.
This pre-election maneuver means that the 
political outlook for Roe vs Wade is far more 
precarious than it has ever been, and this has been 
bolstered in some states where amendments for 
the 2020 election are undermining reproductive 
rights. In Louisiana, an amendment was passed 
which creates language in the state constitution 
stating that abortion is not a right. The amendment 
passed by 62% of the vote, and it lays groundwork 
so that if Roe vs Wade is ever overturned, abortion 
will definitely be illegal in the state of Louisiana. 
Twenty-two states in the U.S., including Louisiana, 
have already banned abortion after 20-24 weeks of 
pregnancy except in cases of life or health endan-
germent. These amendments create confusion 
about whether abortion is available or not. Other 
states have voted down amendments that sought 
to restrict reproductive rights. In Colorado, 60% 
of voters rejected a law that would have made 
abortion illegal after 22 weeks of pregnancy 
(except in life endangerment) and also would have 
criminalized doctors for performing them. These 
differing results suggest the U.S. is a nation divided 
in beliefs about abortion.
America’s views about abortion, however, 
have remained steady over the last 50 years. 50% 
of Americans believe that abortion should be legal 
in certain circumstances, 29% believe it should be 
legal under any circumstances, and 20% believe 
it should be illegal. Only 0.5% of Americans 
believe that abortion is one of the most significant 
problems in the country. The majority believe 
that abortion should be legal under most circum-
stances, which begs the question, why has the 
anti-abortion movement gained such ground?
A consistent campaign by anti-abortion 
movements has sought to place sympathetic politi-
cians in office. One take-away from this election is 
that there has been a significant surge in Republi-
can women in office, many of them anti-abortion 
in their views. Abortion, however, has also become 
a rallying cry for pro-choice campaigners; for 
example, the unexpected numbers of Democratic 
voters in Georgia might be in part because of the 
efforts of Planned Parenthood, which helped to 
execute a get-out-the-vote campaign for Demo-
cratic candidates up and down the ballot. 
Overall, the 2020 election has yielded mixed 
results for anti-abortion movements. If Roe vs 
Wade is taken to the Supreme Court, it is unclear 
what the result will be, and there are more an-
ti-abortion politicians in office. It is clear however 
from statistical analysis of views on abortion and 
the result in Colorado that a ban on abortion is 
not what most Americans want, and if the race for 
the presidency was a referendum on abortion, the 
result is not what anti-abortion movements would 
have hoped for. 
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The 2020 election was like no other, with an 
incumbent president like no other. It has revealed 
the United States to be a deeply divided country, 
where Democrats and Republicans profess fear and 
even hatred of each other, a country struggling to 
recognize one another’s basic humanity. Erasure, 
fear and violence are things that transgender people 
have long known to be deeply rooted in America. 
According to the Human Rights Campaign, a 
not-for-profit LGBTQ+ advocacy group, over the 
last five years at least 127 transgender people have 
been murdered in the United States. The highest 
number of murders has been recorded in 2020 —
34 at the time of this writing — and the vast 
majority of those killed are Black and Latinx trans 
women. According to a survey conducted by the 
National Center for Transgender Equality, 47% 
of Black transgender people and 30% of Latinx 
transgender people “reported being denied equal 
treatment, verbally harassed, and/or physically 
attacked in the previous year because of being 
transgender.” The deputy executive director for the 
National Center for Transgender Equality, Rodrigo 
Heng-Lehtinen, is quoted on the organization’s 
website saying, “Transgender people – and particu-
larly Black and Latina transgender women – are 
marginalized, stigmatized and criminalized in our 
country. They face violence every day, and they 
fear turning to the police for help.” These attacks 
on people simply because they do not conform 
to the gender binary as imposed on them at birth 
have been institutionalized at the highest level 
of American government, making this election a 
referendum on, among many other things, whether 
we as a country recognize the very existence of 
transgender and gender non-binary people. 
In the last four years, the Trump admin-
istration has continuously undone progress 
in transgender rights enacted by the Obama 
administration. Beginning on inauguration day, 
the administration eliminated any mention of 
LGBTQ+ people from the White House, Depart-
ment of Labor, and Department of State websites. 
This symbolic erasure signaled the administra-
tion’s intent to repeal advances in transgender 
rights across education, housing, employment, 
and healthcare. 
In February 2017, the Departments of 
Education and Justice reversed Obama adminis-
tration guidance that extended Title IX protections 
to transgender students. The Department of 
Education, in May 2020, issued a letter going so 
far as to say that including transgender female 
athletes in high school sports violates Title IX. 
President Trump began his assault on transgender 
people serving in the military with a tweet on 
July 26, 2017, “the United States Government 
will not accept or allow Transgender individuals 
to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.” In 
April 2019, the military implemented its ban on 
transgender people serving in the armed forces. 
Another attack occurred in July 2020 when the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development 
reversed anti-discrimination laws protecting 
homeless transgender people seeking shelter and 
other federally funded housing services. In August 
2020, the Department of Health and Human 
Services instituted a rule that according to Roger 
Severino, the director of the Office for Civil Rights 
at the Department of Health and Human Services, 
as quoted in The New York Times, “was ‘equivalent 
to housekeeping,’ and that the federal government 
was ‘updating our books to reflect the legal reality’ 
that sex discrimination language does not explic-
itly refer to the legal status of transgender people.” 
In effect this ruling states that transgender people, 
as a defined category, do not exist and therefore 
are no longer protected from discrimination by 
doctors, hospitals, or insurance companies.
Throughout his campaign, President-Elect Joe 
Biden promised to fight for LGBTQ+ rights. The 
Biden campaign website specifically calls out the 
concerns of transgender people.
Donald Trump and Mike Pence have given hate 
against LGBTQ+ individuals safe harbor and 
rolled back critical protections for the LGBTQ+ 
community. By blocking the ability of transgender 
individuals to openly serve their country, denying 
LGBTQ+ people access to critical health care, 
proposing policies allowing federally funded 
homeless shelters to turn away transgender people 
and federally funded adoption agencies to reject 
same-sex couples, and failing to address the epidemic 
of violence against transgender people—particularly 
transgender women of color—the Trump-Pence 
Administration has led a systematic effort to undo 
the progress President Obama and Vice President 
Biden made. 
The simple willingness to name transgender 
people is a marked difference between the 
outgoing administration and the incoming Biden 
administration. Language has power. As bell hooks 
wrote, “Sensitivity to language is responsibility to 
language, and respect for its power to call forth 
whatever is summoned by its use.” 
The election of the Joe Biden is a big win for 
transgender rights. For many, it undoubtedly feels 
like steadying the ship after a long, deadly storm. 
While it is a win worth celebrating, it cannot undo 
the trauma caused by four years of unrelenting 
attacks, efforts by the Trump administration to sym-
bolically and legally eliminate transgender people. 
Ending the policy of erasure: transgender issues in 2020
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U.S. presidential politics and planetary crisis in 
2020
First, context. 2020 will set temperature records 
(again), as scientists give 2030 as the deadline to cut 
greenhouse emissions by ~50% to avoid ‘dangerous’ 
global warming. Wildfires ravaged Australia, 
Amazonia, and Western North America. Hurricane 
season exhausted the Roman alphabet for names. 
And there is a global pandemic. COVID-19’s 
impacts on poor, Black, and other marginalized 
communities demonstrate the ecological crisis is not 
just ‘environmental’ but ‘social.’ The Trump effect 
is not to create something new, but to expose, and 
exacerbate, existing conditions.
It is remarkable the greatest emissions reductions 
in three decades of international climate policy come 
as the global system experiences its greatest crisis 
in decades. Also remarkable is how the pandemic 
created breathing room for the Paris climate regime, 
at its most critical point since inception. 2019 saw 
negotiators punting again on commitments to reduce 
emissions (climate mitigation) and ensure com-
pensation (climate finance) for climate adaptation 
and development. Ironically COVID-19 has helped 
keep negotiations on life support, with the annual 
conference postponed to 2021.
Recall 2009, after Obama’s election. Optimism 
carried to climate negotiations in Copenhagen, 
where many hoped for more progressive U.S. 
leadership in the renegotiations of the Kyoto 
accords, which faltered due to U.S. ambivalence and 
antipathy under Clinton and Bush. Instead, Obama 
submarined negotiations by subverting protocols, 
arranging backdoor deals to avoid binding commit-
ments for wealthy polluters, thereby alienating and 
antagonizing developing countries, who scuttled 
the talks.
There is thus more than a symbolic connection 
between this election, delivering Joe Biden, defender 
of Obama’s legacy, and the formal withdrawal of 
the U.S. from the Paris Agreement on November 4, 
four years after Trump’s victory and ratification of 
the non-binding Paris Agreement, modeled after 
Obama’s initial Copenhagen design. One major 
difference between 2020 and 2008? There can be no 
such unrestrained optimism this time.    
We must resist illusions Biden will willingly 
advocate climate issues, as made clear during the 
primaries. His path to nomination was rightward 
of all serious contenders, particularly on climate 
and energy. Biden consistently rejected a Green 
New Deal (GND), offering tepid support for his 
own watered-down policy. And despite unscripted 
remarks against oil (quickly backtracked), Biden 
has long aligned interests with fossil capital, deeply 
embedded in his home state of Pennsylvania which 
delivered the election. 
All this was clear before. Now, two more points 
are salient. First, Democrats are (still) failing to ar-
ticulate a cohesive and effective message around the 
GND. Beyond fissures between neoliberal, ‘third 
way’ establishment Democrats and their social 
democratic challengers, lies a core contradiction 
of modern progressivism: that carbon energy has 
fueled the greatest expansion and accumulation of 
capital the world has ever seen, thereby producing 
the greatest crisis the planet has ever known.
Another issue lies in exit polling on the 
pandemic. With 230,000+ deaths and 100,000+ new 
infections/day, it is alarming that 31% of respond-
ents said the U.S. response has been “somewhat” 
and 17% “very well.” How should we expect this 
48% of the electorate to respond to a climate crisis 
that requires a complete overhaul of society?
Though much rides on the remaining Senate 
races, at best is a slim Democratic majority and a 
Democratic house majority slimmer than 2018. 
Biden’s main priority must be undoing the past 
four years of damage. While environmentalists 
advocate a swath of feasible reforms, very little can 
be expected from Congress. Even if (and when) 
bipartisan climate/energy/economy policy comes, 
expecting “Green” legislation in four years would 
undermine the original’s ambitions, hence calls for 
a GND “decade.” The judiciary also dashes hopes 
of change through the courts. While youth climate 
cases may inspire new discourses and actions 
regarding climate harms, U.S. environmentalists 
cannot expect textualists to recognize these claims.
Within institutional politics, ecological justice 
advocates should stake as much possible on matters 
resonating with Americans now:  economic 
inequality, racial injustice, universal healthcare 
and education. Strong priorities must be given to 
human rights, civil liberties and responsibilities, 
and dismantling the carceral state, especially as 
struggles for ecological justice shift to the streets 
and sites of extraction. For sources of hope and 
visions for the future, we should look to grassroots 
organizing of frontline communities and work-
ing-class people, especially of color, who delivered 
an end to the Trump regime, if not his legacy.
Whatever prospects for GND, a decade is too 
long to merely ‘reform’ the capitalist system. Even 
if we cut emissions by half by 2030, the struggle for 
a ‘just’ climate future will be difficult. Vision lies 
with movements demanding social and environ-
mental justice, via nonviolent direct actions, and 
just transition to a sustainable alternative (e.g. 
climate strikes, anti-fossil campaigns, food sov-
ereignty). One recent source of hope comes from 
Chile, where protests demanding socio-economic 
rights and an end to neoliberalism paralyzed 
the country, causing the government to cancel 
the COP25 climate negotiations (later moved to 
Madrid). Just last month, Chileans voted 4-1 to 
rewrite their constitution. 
With much still to be determined, Chile may 
suggest how institutional change can come from 
below. But the scope of climate justice must go 
beyond what we should expect a Biden Adminis-
tration, GND or no, to achieve within four years.  
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Joe Biden and America’s role in the world
Although it did not get a lot of attention in the 
2020 presidential campaign, the future role 
America will take in the world is a question 
of fundamental importance for its U.S. global 
leadership. We already have an idea of how 
President Trump articulates the U.S. role abroad 
through his “America First” agenda. What might 
we expect from a Joe Biden administration? How 
has he talked about what America’s role in the 
world should be, and what might we expect from 
a Biden administration concerning this issue in 
word and deed? 
Vice President Biden’s campaign rhetoric 
suggests he would revitalize America’s commit-
ments abroad and return to a leadership role 
maintained by Republicans and Democrats in 
the post-World War II era. I have long argued 
that American exceptionalism underwrites the 
discourse and debates concerning America’s 
role in the world. All presidents and presidential 
candidates espouse the language of American 
exceptionalism. Where they have differed is how 
the enact that discourse. In American history that 
enactment comes through in two different narra-
tives: the exemplar narrative and the intervention 
narrative. The exemplar narrative was fundamental 
to U.S. foreign policy rhetoric in the 19th and early 
20th centuries. Exemplarists maintain America 
best demonstrates it leadership through the power 
of its example. America models institutions, 
behaviors, and practices domestically to influence 
the affairs of the world. However, exemplarists 
warn about intervening in the affairs of the world, 
particularly in Europe. If the U.S. involves itself 
in the affairs of other nation-states the problems 
of those countries could come home and harm 
U.S. politics. Therefore, it is best to stay out of 
global affairs unless it is our direct interest to do 
so. Interventionists assert the U.S. just cannot rely 
on its example to influence the affairs of the world. 
The U.S. must demonstrate its leadership through 
increasing free trade, involvement in international 
organizations, and actively promote its ideals and 
values abroad. Since the end of the World War 
II, Republicans and Democratic presidents have 
fused the exemplar and interventionist narratives 
together to make their case the U.S. must maintain 
and extend its leadership role. According to these 
presidents, engagement and intervention abroad 
protects us at home, which allows the power of 
America’s example to flourish. At the same time, 
economic prosperity and improving domestic 
institutions gives American presidents credibility 
to promote similar values abroad. 
Donald Trump’s presidency marks a break 
from that fusion rhetoric. Trump’s “America 
First” rhetoric privileges the exemplar narrative 
and emphasizes non-interventionism in today’s 
global environment. A Joe Biden presidency, in my 
estimation, will reverse this trend and return to 
rhetorically fusing the exemplar and intervention 
narratives to justify global leadership abroad. 
There are a couple of places one can find this in 
Biden’s campaign discourse concerning America’s 
role in the world. First, Biden has consistently 
maintained that U.S. global leadership begins 
with our domestic example. However, the Trump 
administration’s rhetoric and policy have increased 
racial tensions, exacerbated wealth inequality, 
failed to control the COVID-19 pandemic has 
gravely harmed the power of America’s example. 
To restore American leadership abroad, Biden 
argues—consistent with his post-World War II 
Democratic predecessors—the United States must 
re-engage at home, rebuild its domestic institu-
tions, reduce racial tension and wealth inequality, 
and get control the pandemic. Improving that 
example, striving for a “more perfect union” at 
home, Biden asserts gives America more power to 
lead the world in fighting global problems.
A second prime example can be found in how 
the Biden campaign talks about relationships with 
other nations and international organizations. 
For example, Biden’s running mate Kamala Harris 
asserted in the vice-presidential debate that foreign 
policy is built upon relationships. For U.S. lead-
ership to continue, Harris argued, the U.S. must 
maintain and keep its word to its friends, while 
keeping America’s adversaries in check. Harris 
accused the Trump administration of betraying 
its friends and embracing adversaries. Biden has 
gone further by speaking about how he would 
restore friendly relations with NATO allies, rejoin 
the World Health Organization, the Paris Climate 
Accords, and the Iran nuclear deal, stop the trade 
war with China, and confront America’s adversar-
ies in Russia and North Korea. Biden’s discourse 
suggests he would restore America’s leadership by 
maintaining and extending the post-World War 
II liberal international order that Republican and 
Democratic presidents rhetorically supported for 
75 years.
Ultimately, if Joe Biden becomes president, 
America’s role in the world will be fundamentally 
altered. Donald Trump’s America First exemplarist 
rhetoric will be replaced by a foreign policy 
rhetoric that focuses on improving the power of 
America’s example as a means to assert its leader-
ship abroad, while at the same time re-engaging, 
restoring, and resetting its relationships with 
nation-states and international organizations 
across the world. 
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Election night on November 3, 2020, and the days 
that followed proved to be hours of high drama. 
Throughout Joe Biden adopted a patient, mature 
and statesmanlike posture emphasizing that it 
was his objective to unite the nation and bring the 
country together, once he had been inaugurated. 
This is also the approach we can expect 
President Biden to adopt in the conduct of Ameri-
can’s foreign relations. Just as President Trump did 
his utmost to divide the American people and sow 
fear and mutual distrust, Trump made an almost de-
liberate effort to fall out with America’s closest allies 
in both Europe and Asia and antagonize further 
countries such as China where relations had been 
on a downward course for several years already.  
We can expect the Biden administration to steer a 
cooperative, multilateral and much more stable and 
predictable course. Biden will attempt to engage 
with both allies and foes and will not to be tempted 
to pursue an isolationist or protectionist policy. 
Biden is aware of both the advantages of glo-
balization but also its economic pitfalls and risks. 
The new president can be expected to attempt 
re-juvenating America’s global leadership position 
by, for instance, rejoining the Paris Climate Treaty 
and the World Health Organization and, under 
certain conditions, the nuclear deal with Iran. 
Biden is aware of the importance of upholding 
the rules-based global order and finding a new 
consensus on crucial global governance issues. 
Most likely he will attempt to seriously reform 
the World Trade Organization and perhaps even 
consider re-joining the Transpacific Partnership 
(TPP), an economic organization with mostly 
Asian memberstates, which Trump had withdrawn 
from during his first few days in office. 
For reasons of space, in the following I will 
focus on America’s most crucial relationships: the 
ones with Europe and China. 
Transatlantic Relations
During the Trump administration, Europe-
an-American relations deteriorated to an almost 
unprecedented extent. Unlike Trump, however, 
Biden is aware of the weight European (and Asian) 
allies bring to the table and how this strengthens 
America’s standing and influence in global affairs 
a great deal. While the Biden administration will 
also urge Europeans to spend more on defense, it 
will not question the importance of NATO. Biden 
will not try to divide the Europeans among them-
selves in order to weaken the European Union 
(and by implication the process of creating a more 
politically united European continent). Trump 
mistakenly believed that this would provide him 
with an advantage in U.S.-EU trade negotiations. 
There is a good chance that Biden may attempt 
to revive the negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) which had been 
started by the Obama administration but had been 
quickly abandoned by Trump. Biden’s balanced and 
well-grounded mature personality will also ensure 
that a lack of chemistry and political difficulties with 
individual European leaders will not lead to the 
personalization of the entire transatlantic relation-
ship and result in public bickering and griping as 
was frequently the case under Trump. 
The Biden administration will not pay particu-
lar attention to the so-called “special relationship“ 
with the UK. Perhaps influenced by his Irish 
background, Biden was not impressed by Prime 
Minister Boris Johnson’s willingness to sacrifice 
the preservation of an open border between the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland in order to 
obtain a more advantageous Brexit deal with the EU. 
China
While the country was deeply divided during 
the Trump administration, there existed a rare 
consensus regarding the necessity of a tough policy 
toward China. It is unlikely that this will change 
quickly under the new administration. In view of 
the many doubts about Biden’s toughness during 
the election campaign, he can hardly afford to 
come across as being ’soft’ on China. Still, similar 
to embarking on a new re-set policy with the EU 
(as well as possibly toward Russia and some other 
difficult countries), a new, more constructive 
approach toward China can also be expected. 
Biden’s China policy will be more nuanced, 
less focused on personal relations with Xi Jinping 
(or for that matter other strongmen in world 
politics) and more focused on re-establishing 
bilateral and multilateral communication and 
consultation channels with Beijing. It will be a 
significantly less volatile and more predictable 
approach. Biden, however, will put a much greater 
emphasis than Trump on human rights and will 
expect China to be much less assertive in the South 
China Sea, toward Taiwan and within the context 
of the ’Belt and Road’-initiative. 
Biden will also look for more opportunities to 
cooperate with China on issues like climate change, 
relations toward Iran’s nuclear policy, and perhaps 
a common approach to African development 
issues. He will not hesitate to explore other areas of 
common interest either, such as developing a global 
cooperative framework for dealing with the Covid-19 
crisis. Biden will also be interested in re-establishing 
a bilateral political and economic/trade dialogue 
with Beijing (while also continuing the new U.S.-EU 
Dialogue on China). While not being as keen on 
re-locating important supply chains back to the U.S. 
as Trump, Biden will not hesitate to pursue a similar 
strategy if he feels that China continues to play 
unfair. America’s trade deficit in goods with China, 
intellectual property theft matters, and reciprocal 
market access issues will also be areas of great 
concern for him. It is unlikely, however, that Biden 
wishes to unleash a “new Cold War“ with China.
President Biden’s foreign policy: engagement, 
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Presidential primary outcomes as evidence of levels 
of party unity
After the early primary contests, Joe Biden’s 
candidacy looked like it was in trouble. However, 
by April 8 Bernie Sanders conceded marking the 
earliest end of an open primary since 2004. Despite 
the large number of entrants, the Democratic 
Party was relatively unified. To show this is the 
case, I compare the 2020 Democratic primary 
to both parties’ primaries in 2016. The relatively 
higher unity displayed by the Democrats gives an 
indication of where the parties may be headed in 
the years to come.
Let us begin by considering 2016 for both 
parties. Each contest extended into the summer. 
However, the contests were quite different as 
Hillary Clinton faced a single opponent while the 
field was much more divided among Republicans. 
For much of the race, there was not one clear 
alternative to Donald Trump.
Like the 2016 Republican Primary, the 
2020 Democratic Primary consisted of a record 
number of entrants, thus making for an interesting 
comparison. Here too we observe relatively more 
unity within the Democratic Party: Biden won 
support of 51.8% of primary voters, while Trump 
won 44.9%— the lowest of any nominee since 
Michael Dukakis in 1988. Moreover, the votes were 
spread more evenly across several candidates in 
the Republican primary. We can compare the three 
contests in Figure 1, which displays the vote share 
for each candidate who received at least 1%. 
Another way to examine the unity of the 
two parties involves utilizing a measure common 
in other fields to gauge diversity such as E. H. 
Simpson’s Measurement of Species Diversity.” 
published in Nature in 1949. For our purposes, I 
have recoded it so that higher values mean more 
“unity”—it would be 1.0 if all voters voted for the 
same candidate (the minimum value is 0.0 if votes 
were evenly divided across many candidates). In 
2020 Democrats received a score of 0.5, compared 
to 0.45 for Republicans in 2016. To put recent 
contests in perspective, Figure 2 traces this 
measure back to 1976 for both parties. The open 
circles represent years with competitive primaries, 
the black circles represent years when a sitting 
president was eligible for re-election—for example, 
President Obama in 2012 and President Trump in 
2020. The left-hand panel displays the Democratic 
Party and the right-hand panel the Republican 
Party. In each panel, the line represents the trend 
for open primaries.
Two conclusions emerge from the figure. First, 
the primary electorate in both recent Democratic 
contests displayed more unity than the 2016 
Republicans. Second, at least by this measure, 
the two parties have been moving in the opposite 
direction since 1976: The Democrats have become 
more unified and the Republicans less so. Another 
way to look at the data is to note that even though 
there was an unprecedented number of entrants 
competing for the Democratic nomination in 2020, 
the party was only slightly less unified than in 2016 
and was slightly more so compared to 2008. There 
is little evidence that the Democratic primary 
electorate is hopelessly divided.
The data presented here is consistent with 
other evidence that indicates the Republicans are 
more internally divided than Democrats—both 
among elected officials and the public. A factional 
candidate like Trump was able to narrowly win 
the nomination without majority support in the 
party, while in a similarly large field in 2020 the 
Democrats coalesced rather quickly around a 
consensus candidate. This lack of internal cohesion 
among Republicans may also help explain the lack 
of governing success that Republicans have had 
this century—for example, beyond tax cuts and 
judges, the Republicans have little to show from 
their two years with unified control of government 
and it would be difficult to classify George W. 
Bush’s presidency as a success. 
Whether these trends continue moving 
forward is, of course, an open question. And 
while time may prove me wrong, my hunch is 
that despite some of the handwringing that has 
emerged immediately following the election about 
the Democratic Party’s “underperformance,” 
chances are that over the next few election cycles 
the party remains relatively unified. As for the  
Republicans in 2024, it seems reasonable to 
imagine that the internal divisions will continue 
to exist, and that a protracted and fractious fight is 
reasonably likely scenario.
 
Figure 1. Vote share for candidates receiving 1% or more of the vote.
Figure 2. Unity for primary voters by party, 1976–2020.
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A movable force: the armed forces voting bloc 
Early polls suggested there may be dramatic swings 
in voting behavior for a few key voting blocs on 
November 3rd. The most shocking prediction 
came in August from a Military Times Poll (in 
partnership with the Institute for Veterans and 
Military Families) suggesting that former Vice 
President Biden was four points ahead of President 
Trump with active duty military members. For 
comparison, a similar poll in 2016 gave Trump a 29 
point lead over Clinton with active duty military 
members.  In the end, exit polls in 2016 suggested 
that veterans voted overwhelmingly for Trump 
by 27 points.  Active duty military members and 
veterans are an institution of the Republican party 
leading many Democrats to ignore this voting 
group turning their attention toward others. A 
31-point swing in the veteran voting bloc would 
suggest a significant crack in the base of the Re-
publican party and an opening for the Democrats. 
Still, veterans are a small share of the voting 
populace at just 6.6 percent of the adult population 
in the U.S. Both the Democratic and Republican 
parties might logically set their sights on and 
allocate a greater share of scarce campaign 
resources toward larger growing demographic 
groups such as the Hispanic population - nearly 
2.5 times larger than the veteran population (about 
16 percent of the adult population). Yet, when 
margins of victory are thin, small voting blocs can 
have an outsized impact.
In 2016, Trump’s margin of victory was the 
closest in Michigan, winning by just 13,080 votes. 
With nearly 600 thousand veterans in Michigan 
(8.2 percent of the adult population), even a slight 
narrowing of the veteran gap in voting behavior 
could have moved Michigan to Clinton in 2016. 
Similarly, veterans comprise 8.6 percent of the adult 
population in Wisconsin at well over 300 thousand 
veterans in the state; Trump won Wisconsin in 
2016 by a slim margin of just 27,257 votes. 
Reports of President Trump’s disparaging 
remarks referring to fallen service members that 
echoed his attacks against the late John McCain 
may have created the opening Biden needed to 
sway veterans. But President Trump’s support 
among military members showed signs of 
slipping well before. Polls show President Trump’s 
approval rating among active-duty military had 
been slowly declining since he first took office. 
Despite the decline, active-duty military members 
approval ratings remained higher than the general 
population in 2018. By 2019, approval ratings 
among active-duty military dropped further to 
be on par with the nation with military members 
expressing concerns that Trump does not listen to 
military leadership. Biden was well positioned to 
seize this opportunity. “Joe Biden is someone who 
has always been a champion for service member, 
veterans, and their families. It’s deeply personal to 
him as the father of an Iraq War veteran,” said Will 
Goodwin, the director of government relations for 
the group VoteVets. 
Many may be too quick to discount veterans 
as an immovable monolithic voting bloc. The 
military population has been changing slowly over 
time with more women and minorities in their 
ranks including at the highest levels of leadership. 
The nation’s perceptions of military members 
and of veterans is outdated. Many non-veterans 
are surprised to find out that veterans out-earn 
non-veterans, on average, largely because they 
are more highly educated and more skilled than 
non-veterans. These misperceptions can hinder 
veterans in the workforce, but it can also lead 
political strategists and political hopefuls astray if 
they are too quick to discount them. Not Biden. 
In the closing months of the election, Biden took 
the time to hold roundtables with veterans in key 
swing states such as Pennsylvania. 
Ultimately, exit polls in 2020 suggest Biden 
did not win the veteran vote, potentially further 
discouraging the Democratic party from future 
efforts to sway this demographic group. But 
Biden did narrow the veteran gap from a 27-point 
advantage to Trump in 2016 to just 7 percentage 
points in 2020, a 20 point swing! By narrowing this 
gap, Biden likely gained about 70,000 additional 
votes in Michigan, 43,000 in Wisconsin, 60,000 in 
Arizona, 82,000 in Georgia, and 97,000 in Penn-
sylvania. As the nation waited for Pennsylvania 
to finish counting votes moving on to counting 
absentee ballots from military members (used 
to waiting to have their ballots counted), reports 
came out that Biden won 4 out of 5 military ballots 
in Allegheny County (Pittsburgh). 
When narrowing margins can win elections, 
neither political party should discount any voting 
bloc – yet, small voting blocs can only have a big 
impact if the larger voting blocs of the political 
base remain stalwart. 
Source: Pixabay, Pexels
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Guns and the 2020 elections
The 2020 elections were dominated by three 
overriding issues that no one could have antic-
ipated before the start of 2020: the COVID-19 
pandemic, the worst economic downturn since the 
Great Depression, and an explosive Black Lives 
Matter movement. One might have thought that 
these crisis issues would have pushed the gun issue 
well down or even off the 2020 election agenda. 
In a certain respect that was true. Owing to the 
pandemic, 2020 was the first election year since 
2012 that a statewide gun reform measure failed to 
appear on any state ballot. The cause had nothing 
to do with any lack of enthusiasm on the part of 
gun safety advocates. Rather, the process of collect-
ing petition signatures to place referenda on state 
ballots was short-circuited by health restrictions. 
Despite this, however, guns and gun controversies 
infused each of the dominant national issues. 
Measures enacted to combat the spread of 
the virus provoked a sharp and sometimes armed 
response from right-wing groups. In the spring 
and summer of 2020, armed protestors showed up 
in several state capitals to express opposition to 
pandemic lockdown policies they believed to be 
unnecessary and a violation of their rights.
Firearms-expressed anger extended beyond 
public protests, including, in one alarmingly 
extreme case, a foiled plot hatched by at least 
fourteen so-called militia members in Michigan to 
kidnap that state’s governor, Democrat Gretchen 
Whitmer, in reprisal for her administration’s 
anti-virus measures. A similar plot was uncovered 
against Virginia’s Democratic governor, Ralph 
Northam. A series of legally dubious police 
shootings of Black people around the country were 
the proximate motivation for widespread protests, 
coalescing under the Black Lives Matter movement 
banner. The country also witnessed an increase 
in shootings and homicides, especially in urban 
areas—an increase attributed, at least in part, to the 
interruption of programs devised to reduce gun 
violence because of the adverse economic effects of 
the pandemic. That increase was notable given that 
crime in virtually every other category continued 
to decline. Hovering over the entire fall election 
were fears of an armed presence during election 
time amidst the rallying of right-wing armed 
groups who spread alarm that the elections would 
be somehow hijacked by opponents of Republican 
President Donald Trump.
All of this occurred in the context of mass 
demonstrations around the country, which in a few 
instances led to violence, including a few incidents 
of armed violence. Yet despite some incidents of 
violence, the opposite was the case. According to 
a study by the nonprofit Armed Conflict Location 
and Event Data Project, of the 7750 protests held in 
all fifty states from May to August 2020, 93 percent 
were non-violent. Violent protests were defined 
as those that involved interpersonal clashes or 
property damage. One notable shooting instance 
occurred in Kenosha, Wisconsin, when an armed 
17-year-old counter-protestor shot three people, 
killing two. President Trump failed to condemn 
armed counter-protestors and expressed sympathy 
for the Kenosha shooter. He also sought to paint 
the demonstrations in dire terms, playing on fears 
of a breakdown of law and order. Democratic pres-
idential nominee Joe Biden denounced violence on 
all sides and urged calm.
The other notable trend spurred by the climate 
of uncertainty and concerns over violence was an 
upsurge in gun sales. The spread of the pandemic 
prompted an increase in gun sales, a seemingly 
puzzling response, given that firearms bear no 
relationship to viral infection. Gun purchases were 
also spurred by fear surrounding the racial justice 
protests and counter-protests.
As for gun groups, as of election day 2020 
the National Rifle Association had spent $23.4 
million on the campaign overall, roughly a third 
of that spent in 2016. Of that, $16.2 million went 
to the Trump campaign, less than the over $31 
million it spent on Trump in 2016. The gun safety 
group Everytown for Gun Safety spent $21.1 
million in 2020.
Second Amendment rights re-entered the 
political debate with the nomination of Amy Coney 
Barrett to the Supreme Court. The most revealing 
piece of information about her view on gun rights 
came from a dissenting opinion she wrote in a 2017 
court of appeals case upholding a law that barred 
felons from obtaining guns. In her dissent, Barrett 
relied on a narrow and historically inaccurate view 
of old gun laws. That, plus her self-proclaimed 
“Originalist” philosophy signal that Barrett’s 
addition to the high court will undoubtedly provide 
a firm five-member majority for striking down gun 
laws formerly held constitutional.
Despite polls showing that large majorities 
of Americans feared Election Day violence, there 
was none—the election itself went off without any 
violence or disruption. A few scattered vote-count-
ing protests emerged in the days after election 
day. Trump supporters were disappointed at the 
outcome, but the process unfolded as intended. 
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Can Biden’s win stop the decline of the West and 
restore the role of the United States in the world?
Many commentators argued that the 2020 election 
was the most important presidential election since 
FDR’s victory during World War II. In fact, the 
most important election was that of 2016. That was 
the turning point, which marked the dawn of a 
new era, of the New World Disorder: the unravel-
ling of the U.S.-led postwar liberal institutionalism; 
the decline of American influence and soft power 
across the world; the undermining of established 
alliances and institutions (UN, NATO); regional 
power vacuums rapidly covered by ethnocentric 
authoritarian regimes such as Xi’s China, Putin’s 
Russia, and Erdogan’s Turkey, which are now 
engaging in a New Cold War against the West.
By no means did the decline of the West start 
in 2016. Its roots lie in the Bush Administration’s 
flawed strategy of quasi-imperial overreach after 
9/11; the catastrophic wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, which destabilised the Middle East and led to 
the emergence of ISIS (which, in turn, led to waves 
of refugees and home-bred Islamist terrorism 
in Europe). Coupled with the timid handling of 
the 2008 financial crisis, which only increased 
structural inequality, left intact global networks of 
tax evasion, and hit the West’s middle and working 
classes, these phenomena ultimately led to the 
wave of radical populism that produced Trump 
and Brexit in 2016.  
Thus, the West has been undergoing structural 
disintegration for many years, even before Russia 
unleashed a campaign of political interference 
and misinformation across the West, and China 
launched its neo-colonialist expansion.
Can the 2020 Biden win stop this decline and 
erosion of Western liberal democracies?
This looks unlikely. Biden’s victory was not 
a cathartic one. The 2020 election could have 
marked a turning point had there been a massive, 
national wave against the politics of Donald Trump 
– a moral, ideological, and cultural defeat of the 
politics of fake news, absurd conspiracy theories, 
and civil strife. Rather, what the 2020 election does 
signify is the consolidation of Trump’s politics 
into a movement. It formalizes the division of 
the United States into two separate universes that 
hardly communicate with each other, mirroring 
similar (albeit less acute) patterns in Europe.
Global power is not simply a matter of 
military might or assertive foreign policy (China 
and Russia possess both), not even vast economic 
growth and technological leadership (China 
possesses those, too). Postwar U.S. leadership 
was ultimately embraced and owned by other 
Western countries because of the combination of 
those assets with cultural alignment: America’s 
commitment to freedom, civil liberties, justice 
and the rule of law; equality and the successful 
integration of diverse demographic groups; an 
institutional system of checks and balances; a 
model of capitalism that, for a long period, worked 
for the middle classes; intellectual and creative 
excellence; and infrastructural investment leading 
to a better quality of life. The American Dream 
was constructed and broadcast across the world 
by Hollywood, then by the advertising agencies of 
Madison Avenue, and then by the libertarian tech 
innovators of Silicon Valley.
To the rest of the world, the United States 
increasingly looks like a broken, battered doll. This 
is not about U.S. foreign policy per se, but about 
domestic dysfunction. Widening inequalities and 
rural poverty; crumbling infrastructure; tragic mis-
management of the COVID19 pandemic; a campus 
culture that defies reason and stifles freedom; 
latent racism; a fragmented and fragile election 
system; perhaps above all else, a fundamental crisis 
of values and a collapse of the moral consensus 
regarding the value of science, truth, and tolerance: 
these are just some of the things that people across 
the world who used to look up to the United States 
now see; things that make them doubt about the 
value of liberal democracy itself, of which the U.S. 
had been the beacon for decades.
When Joe Biden and Kamala Harris finally 
manage to formalize this messy victory, and when 
they manage to get through what is likely to be 
an ugly and disorderly transition during which 
anything could happen, they would then have to: 
• Lead the effort to scale back China’s authori-
tarian clampdown in Hong Kong, its territorial 
expansion in Nepal and the South China Sea, 
its neo-colonial practices in Africa, and more 
pertinently, its campaign of infiltrating Western 
institutions (including universities);
• Stop Russia’s campaign of misinformation, 
confusion, and interference;
• Repair ties with European allies and restore 
faith in NATO, which includes disciplining – 
possibly expelling - Erdogan’s Turkey, which has 
become a rogue state in Europe, Caucasus and 
the Middle East;
• Lead global coalitions on the Sustainable De-
velopment Goals (SDGs), enact urgent climate 
action, and help build resilience against extreme 
weather phenomena;
• And do all that amidst a global pandemic that 
has highlighted the structural weaknesses, and 
dependence on national whims, of multilateral 
institutions such as the World Health Organiza-
tion, leading to the revival of nationalist fantasies.
A mission impossible, if there ever was one.
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There are many reasons this election is historical, 
two being the high turnout and the close result. 
Joe Biden has won the popular vote, by a narrow 
margin, and the Electoral College to become the 
46th President of the U.S. However, and independ-
ent of the final outcome, it is clear that Trump 
performed better than opinion polls expected 
and won more votes in 2020 than in 2016. The 
projected widespread rejection of his presidency 
has hardly taken place. Providing Trump departs 
the White House with a degree of credibility 
intact, it is probable that him and his America first 
vision will remain a strong force in the American 
political scene. 
So, why didn’t voters reject Trump heavily? 
Permanent campaigning literature suggests newly 
elected governments and particularly newly 
elected presidents strive to retain the support of 
their electoral base, while building trust with the 
wider electorate, in order to secure a second term. 
Thus, from a political branding perspective, they 
tend to employ a communication strategy aiming 
to promote an effective brand consisting of six 
elements: values, reassurance, aspiration, unique-
ness, simplicity and credibility. The latter seems 
to be of crucial importance since it requires that 
a president’s credibility depends heavily on the 
capacity to deliver on pre-election promises. As 
Trump failed to be re-elected, it would appear he 
failed to promote and protect his brand complete-
ly. However, this is not the whole story, examining 
his tenure from a political branding perspective 
allows us to better understand his political and 
electoral resilience. 
In 2016, Donald Trump came to office on 
the back of campaign which made key pledges 
including large tax cuts; implementing protec-
tionist trade policies by imposing tariffs, mainly 
on China; limiting immigration by building a 
wall on the U.S.-Mexico border; and repealing 
the Obamacare Act. Four years later, there is 
evidence that he managed to keep a great deal 
of these promises. The Trump administration 
cut taxes for most American businesses bringing 
the top corporate income tax rate down from 
35% to 21%, though it had pledged a 15% tax 
rate. Moreover, although the rich seem to have 
benefited the most by receiving over 50% of the 
total tax savings, most Americans saw their taxes 
burden reduced. Furthermore, Trump delivered 
on his promise to engage in a trade war with 
China, imposing tariffs on several products, 
withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
and renegotiating other trade agreements. In 
addition, he has so far constructed approximately 
400 miles of border barriers, thought this falls 
short of the promise to close the entire 1000 
miles of border. Lastly, even though he failed 
to dismantle the Obamacare, he never stopped 
trying to undermine it.  
In any case and independent of his actual 
governing record, most of his supporters share 
the view that Trump delivered on his pledges. 
According to a pre-election opinion survey of 
the New York University conducted by YouGov, 
the great majority of those who voted for Trump 
in 2016 believed that the president broke fewer 
than on one in five pre-election pledges. Most 
importantly, this notion appeared to be strongly 
associated with their tendency to vote again for 
Trump in 2020. 
Hence there is evidence Trump seems to have 
retained the trust of most of his support base.  It 
is indicative that, as the exit poll suggests, from 
those who voted for Trump in 2016, 92% said they 
remained loyal in 2020. Therefore, we can safely 
claim that Trump managed to retain his credibility 
in the eyes of the great majority of his backers and 
hence turn, to some extent, the public agenda in 
his favor. The same exit poll showed that when 
given the choice of five issues, only 17% of the 
electorate prioritized the coronavirus pandemic 
as the most important issue facing the country. 
By focusing on the economy, Trump managed 
to control what factors were considered by his 
supporters when they cast their ballots.
Trump voters were most concerned with the 
economy (82%) and rebuilding the economy ‘even 
if it hurts efforts to contain coronavirus’ (76%), 
as well as law and order (71%). Biden supporters 
prioritized racial inequalities (91%), coronavirus 
(82%), containing the virus even if it hurts the 
economy (80%) and health care (63%). With 
extreme polarization regarding the record and 
style of the candidates across their supporters 
it is difficult to see how a Biden presidency can 
reconcile the differences. Trump’s strategy proved 
insufficient to secure him a second term. But it 
reflects two different visions for America, one 
of economic protectionism and closed borders, 
the other protecting the health of the people and 
promoting social unity. The latter may prove 
the biggest challenge given that just under half 
the electorate support Trumpism and so those 
ideas will likely remain a powerful force in the 
American politics.
A divided America guarantees the longevity 
of  Trumpism?
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Cartographic perspectives of the 2020 U.S. election
The 2020 U.S. presidential election did not only 
see a competition of two political opponents. It 
also was a competition by the media for catching 
the attention of larger audiences. Some of the most 
prominent news organizations excelled in their 
visualization capabilities compared to previous 
elections, with cartographic representations often 
being a central part of this effort.
Never had there been such a large diversity 
of – often interactive – mappings while the results 
came in. The long wait for confirmed (or at least 
relatively certain) outcomes from the different 
states helped to put these visualizations in the 
spotlight. As the wait went on, the different types 
of visual representations themselves also became 
part of discussions, especially in social media. 
This helped making wider audiences aware of the 
caveats that conventional mapping methods have 
in visualizing election outcomes.
In the context of U.S. elections, it was the 
incumbent president himself who demonstrated 
such a lack of map reading skills in the aftermath 
of the 2016 election. After his election victory he 
distributed conventional maps of the results to 
journalists in order to demonstrate his presumable 
landslide win across the country.
Conventional mapping techniques show data 
from a geographical perspective. For election 
outcomes this means that they show vote shares 
plotted onto the distribution of land area. This 
usually leads to sparsely populated rural areas being 
over-represented. In contrast, dense urban areas 
with an often significantly different demographic 
are obstructed from these maps, therefore providing 
misleading representations of an election outcome.
A different way of showing elections is the 
use of so-called cartograms where areas are 
transformed by certain (often social) indicators. 
The most commonly used cartograms usually 
show a proportional representation of population 
distributions. This can be achieved in manifold 
ways, as the wide range of visualizations during 
this election demonstrated.
This contribution shows three different 
cartographic perspectives of the election outcome: 
Shown here are one conventional map and two 
variations of cartogram depictions that demon-
strate how the change in perspective provides 
unique new insights. The different visualizations 
show how using different base-maps can result in 
changing narratives for election outcomes.
At the time of writing (Nov 9, 2020) no final 
results were fully declared, although most states 
had completed counting between 95 and 100 per 
cent of the votes. Therefore, only minor changes 
in this overall picture provided here are to be 
expected (putting possible legal challenges to these 
outcomes aside).
The upper two maps both use a gradual color 
scheme to highlight the different vote shares of the 
candidate with the respective highest vote share 
in a state (therefore being on track to winning 
all the state’s votes in the Electoral College). In 
the conventional map projection (top) this does 
resemble a significant dominance of the votes 
for the Republican Party and Donald Trump as 
the incumbent president across large parts of the 
country. Yet changing the base-map to a popu-
lation-weighted cartogram (middle) where each 
state is proportional to the number of people who 
live there, this impression becomes relativized. 
The dominance of the Democratic Party with their 
candidate Joe Biden in some of the most populous 
states becomes apparent, while the Republican 
vote in the mid-western and central parts looks 
much less dominant due to the respective small 
populations there.
The display of the vote shares also shows 
how politically divided the USA have become: 
in around 16 states the vote share of the winning 
candidate lies in the range of between 45 and 
55 per cent, showing how relatively close the 
outcome has been. When the final results have 
been released, this pattern will become even more 
visible at larger scales. This will only be the start of 
trying to understand the full spatial patterns that 
defined this highly unusual presidential election. 
A geographical analysis will be a crucial part of 
identifying some of the underlying causes for such 
a polarized country. It will be crucial for the forth-
coming presidency to understand these patterns 
when it comes to finding solutions to mending a 
highly divided society.
The final map (bottom) is the most accurate 
picture of the actual political outcome of the 
election. Here each hexagon represents a federal 
state. This was then resized according to the total 
number of votes that this state has in the Electoral 
College, the assembly which elects the next 
president. While the legal battle over the election 
outcome might continue for a while and could 
change some of the political landscapes drawn in 
these maps, it seems unlikely that this map is going 
to change significantly. What it shows is that the 
majority of electors in the Electoral College are 
mandated to vote for Joe Biden to become the 46th 
president of the United States of America.
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Almost nothing about the 2020 presidential 
election seemed like business as usual. Re-
cord-breaking turnout during the height of a 
pandemic. Widespread concerns about the legiti-
macy of the outcome even before the first vote was 
cast. The steepest quarterly decline in U.S. GDP in 
modern history. Ongoing and widespread protests 
for racial justice. Nonetheless, one thing about the 
2020 election was not at all unique: the consisten-
cy of individual voter behavior.
In the 1940 presidential election, when the 
first ever over-time study of voter preferences was 
conducted, the researchers were surprised to find 
that fully 92 percent of their sample remained 
consistent in their voting preferences throughout 
the presidential campaign. In other words, people 
knew where they stood before the presidential 
campaign began, and the campaign changed few 
people’s minds about which candidate to support. 
Over seven decades later, we know that 
this pattern is not uncommon or unique to that 
era. For example, despite the novelty of Donald 
Trump’s 2016 candidacy and campaign, the same 
pattern was clear; around 90 percent of voters 
supported the candidate of the same party in 2016 
that they had supported in 2012.
What about 2020? To analyze who switched 
and why in the 2020 election, we utilized a 
national panel study that interviewed voters in 
October 2016, shortly before the election, and 
then again in October of 2020, immediately before 
the 2020 election. This random probability sample 
was collected by the National Opinion Research 
Center at the University of Chicago. By comparing 
people’s reported vote preferences at both points 
in time, we can estimate the number of vote 
switchers in the recent election. In addition to 
identifying the number of “switchers,” we asked 
those who reported a different preference in 2020 
to explain their change of heart relative to their 
2016 vote. 
As shown in Table 1, around 90 percent of 
those who voted for Trump in 2016 also supported 
him in 2020. Given the extreme loyalty of Trump’s 
base, this probably would not surprise anyone. 
But more importantly, it is entirely consistent 
with previous elections under far more mundane 
conditions, long before concerns about mass polar-
ization emerged. Interestingly, Democratic voters 
were even more consistent, with over 94 percent of 
those who voted for Clinton in 2016 also voting for 
Biden in 2020. Likewise, the percentage of those 
vote switchers who defected to the candidate of 
the other major party remained tiny, at around 4 
to 7 percent, with a slight advantage to Biden in 
converting more Republican voters than Trump 
converted Democratic voters.
We asked these switchers to explain in 
their own words why they changed their minds. 
Overall, most switchers were motivated by dislike 
of the opposition rather than enthusiasm for the 
candidate they supported:
“I don’t like Trump. But I am terrified of what a 
Biden or Harris presidency would do to our nation.” 
“I’m not voting FOR Biden. I’m voting AGAINST 
Trump.” 
“Anyone. But. Trump.”
“The way Donald Trump is acting as a president is a 
disgrace for the entire human race.”
“I don’t like Biden. He is a weak candidate.”
What is perhaps most noteworthy about Table 1 
is what happened to the roughly five percent of 
voters who supported third-party candidates in 
2016. Regardless of partisan leanings, the stakes 
of the election outcome were perceived to be far 
higher in 2020 than in 2016. As shown in Table 1, 
the split among third party voters favored Biden. 
The explanations offered by those who switched 
from being third-party supporters in 2016 to 
supporters of one of the major parties in 2020 
reflected their sense of the increased salience of 
their choice, and their fear of wasting their votes 
on a minor party candidate:
 “Voting outside of the 2 party system is almost like 
not voting at all.” 
“A vote for a Libertarian is a lost vote.”
“Can’t in good conscience vote for Trump, and a vote 
for the green party is a wasted vote.”
Although third-party voting is generally a small 
percentage in most elections, it was particularly 
tiny in 2020. Given the razor-thin margins in 
some states in 2020, this change may well have 
made a difference.  
As the authors of The People’s Choice first 
highlighted, vote “switchers” hold formidable 
leverage over the outcome of presidential elections, 
since their realignment simultaneously takes a vote 
away from one party and adds a vote to the other. 
We have yet to determine whether unusually high 
turnout in 2020 benefitted Trump or Biden or both 
equally. But Biden clearly gained a slight edge by 
means of shifting more Republicans than Trump 
did Democrats, and by attracting more voters who 
supported a third-party candidate in 2016. 
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Table 1. Individual vote preferences in 2020 as a percentage of vote preferences in 2016







Republican (Trump) 90.2% 6.7 3.1




Note: Based on a representative national probability sample of n=1091 panelists who 







The 2020 U.S. election was characterized by 
extreme polarization and by the harsh personal 
battle between the two candidates. Above all, the 
pandemic had a severe impact on the elections 
bringing about a full reshuffle of the election 
agenda, posing new stakes and dilemmas to the 
voters, such as the protective measures against the 
virus, the role of public health and the accessibility 
to it. This electoral battle has ended with Biden 
winning more votes than any other in the history 
of the American elections. 
While it is remarkable these elections 
recorded the highest voter turnout since 1900, it 
is worth saying they completely divided American 
society. This is evidenced through the hard fights 
of both electoral camps, the enormous differ-
ences in important political topics, such as the 
accessibility to public health, and conflicting per-
spectives over the characters of both candidates. 
Nevertheless, something more structural divides 
American society that is better revealed through 
a closer reading of the qualitative characteristics 
of the exit polls: For Americans earning less than 
$100,000 the result was in favor of Biden; For 
those earning more than $100,000, Trump won 
54%, Biden 43%. Biden also gained 60% of those 
living in cities with more than 50.000 inhabitants; 
66% of those who voted for the first time, 76% 
of those who voted for the candidate that could 
unite the nation, 61% of the LGBT community, 
72% of those who believe abortions should be 
legal, 80% of those who put tackling coronavirus 
above the economy, 70% of those who support 
Black Lives Matter and 64% of those who believe 
that wearing a mask is an act of social respon-
sibility. On the other hand, Trump won 54% of 
those living in semi-urban/rural areas, 78% of 
the opponents of Obamacare, 75% of those who 
believe abortions must become illegal, 76% of 
those who put economy above the pandemic, 71% 
of those who chose to vote for whom they con-
sidered to be “the strongest leader”, and 85% of 
those who oppose Black Lives Matter. Such data 
reveal political divisions are better understand by 
considering social and cultural factors. 
Despite the incredible polarization, Biden 
emerged with 4 million+ more votes. The polls, 
although smeared shortly after the ballot closed, 
eventually showed a trend. After the closing of 
the ballot, there was confusion about where the 
results were leading. The first results were positive 
for Trump; analysts and staffs acted as if they had 
forgotten just a day before YouGov reported the 
intention to vote for those who had not yet voted 
at 69% for Trump. But for the majority who had 
already voted, support for Biden stood at 66%. 
This is exactly why as time passed the Democrats’ 
percentages grew and the States gradually changed 
color. If counting of postal votes’ was completed at 
the same time as the rest, the agony wouldn’t have 
been as fierce. Probably the initial panic is largely 
due to the memories of the 2016 elections. 
Trump may have gained more votes compared 
to previous elections, but eventually he was 
defeated due to his platform and character. Despite 
exit polls record showing the economy (35%) 
as the most important factor influencing voter 
choice, other vital issues played a significant role 
in Trumps’ defeat, such as racial discrimination 
(20%), managing the pandemic (17%), the health 
care system (11%), and institutional deregulation. 
Trump’s challenger was an uncharismatic, 
indifferent in terms of communication, politically 
centered, aged candidate, who was favored by the 
outgoing President’s absurd pandemic manage-
ment, and the peculiar electoral campaign imposed 
by new health regulations. Biden made fewer 
appearances for a very long time with an excellent 
excuse. This is the candidate that Trump failed to 
beat in the debates, which play a crucial role in the 
American elections, and nor did Trump manage to 
control the agenda.
The result was that Trump became the 
third one term President of the United States of 
America since World War II. Trump’s campaign 
was supported only by his family members; Biden 
was endorsed by Obama, Sanders, Cortez, most 
members of his party, and a huge network of 
public figures, that staffed the VOTE movement, 
and supported a big anti-Trump wave. What 
the Democrats did not do as successfully as the 
Republicans, was the door-to-door campaigning. 
The Republicans ignored to a large extent the 
coronavirus measures and became particularly 
active in canvassing.  
Trump’s electoral victory in the 2016 U.S. 
elections was not an ‘accident’, or the result of 
having an unpopular politician like Hillary Clinton 
running against him. Trump won because he gave 
voice to a frightened, xenophobic and introvert 
America, that did not assimilate the challenges of 
globalization; it dreams of a national and isolated 
capitalism, and finds itself in a nationalist frenzy, 
feeling constantly persecuted. This is America at a 
historic crossroad. The “symptom”, Trump, lost the 
election. The causes remain. Could it be that the 
main stake in these elections was not the economy, 
as exit polls showed, but democracy itself?
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We can define trust as a form of confidence or 
faith in others. It implies a reliance on others. In 
democratic societies, elections and adhering to 
the results of elections are built on trust. Trust 
that the system is fair, that it represents the will 
of the people and that the election means that the 
agendas of the winner can be achieved, at least in 
some small measure. None of this applies to the 
2020 U.S. election. It was an election built on a 
turbulent and unsettling lack of trust, not only of 
the results but of the system as a whole, and just as 
important, a distrust in the future.
There is now a profound lack of trust in the 
U.S. political system. Trump did not create the U.S. 
constitution. What he did, however, was reveal its 
fundamental flaws. Trump’s presidency revealed 
its antidemocratic origins arguably more clearly 
than any President. It began with the 2016 election 
which he lost by almost 3 million votes but won 
because of the Electoral College, an institution 
designed specifically to blunt the popular will of 
the people. Then Trump’s use of presidential power 
showed clearly that the U.S. was a flawed Republic 
not a functioning democracy. A Republic founded 
by white men of property in large part to ensure 
the continued rule of white men of property. Over 
the years, democratic accountability has reformed 
this basic structure, but Trump showed even 
this transformed constitution, with  an imperial 
Presidency and a spineless Senate, could be used 
to run roughshod over democratic norms. Trump 
was the revenge of the bewigged grandees who 
ideally wanted a Rome of Cicero rather than an 
America of Obama.
Trump was a massive stress test of the U.S. 
constitutional system. The system clearly failed. 
The divided powers of Congress, the Presidency 
and Supreme Court, long heralded as a way of 
dispersing power, was a comforting illusion of less 
partisan times. The federal system was revealed 
as flawed and inadequate. The Supreme Court is 
now filled with political hacks. Three of its current 
members, Roberts, Kavanaugh and Barrett, served 
on the Bush legal team that contested the 2000 
Gore v. Bush result. A significant number of the 
jurists espouse an originalism doctrine, made 
famous by former Supreme Court Justice Scalia, 
that harks back to those self-same white men of 
property as their only reliable legal guide. Trust in 
the Supreme Court, once the most revered branch 
of government, has plummeted. That this flawed, 
undemocratic institution may be the arbiter of 
2020 election only adds to the distrust.
Distrust is heightened by the separate political 
universes inhabited by Americans. A 20 million 
Fox-viewing audience, for example, sees Biden 
as a socialist and Trump as a national savior only 
criticized because of the bad faith of “fake news.” 
A significant number of Americans, however, see 
Trump as an existential threat to the  Republic. The 
election results will not move the opinions or basic 
beliefs of either side. Distrust is heightened by the 
very flawed nature of voting in the U.S. The voting 
system with its lumbering inefficiencies, gerryman-
dering, discriminatory voting requirements and 
downright harassment, are all designed to suppress 
the vote. 
The lack of trust in the system as a whole is 
compounded by the fact that no one group feels 
dominant. That raises the stakes from  compromise 
with opponents to their subordination. The 
Republic is turning into a super-nasty, zero-sum 
game with each group seeking to maximize its 
advantage while in power. The Republican Party 
acted like a predatory political elite in pressing 
home its partisan advantages while performing 
minimal governance. Barrett’s nomination to the 
Supreme court was rushed though in a matter of 
weeks while millions of Americans still waited for 
legislation to provide much needed relief from the 
pandemic induced recession. 
And we have lost trust with ourselves. One 
poll found in 1997, 64 percent of Americans had 
trust in the political decisions of their fellow 
citizen. By 2020 it was below 34 percent.
There is distrust of the future. The U.S. was 
long admired for its optimistic belief in the future. 
The rosy assumption that the arc of justice arced 
inexorably upwards, that the future could be 
and should be brighter than the past, was long 
a hallmark of the U.S. That optimism has been 
shattered. The long decline in the real wages of 
middle-income Americans, the dispiriting and 
sapping experience of endless wars in foreign 
lands and the threatening rise of China have all 
weakened American optimism in the future. 
The Trump era was a present of constant anxiety 
between an invented past and a fearful future. It 
was an exhausting period of permanent indigna-
tion that will continue long after the last votes are 
counted.
Election results are important. And they can 
herald a change. But the difficult job of rebuilding 
trust in the system, in the Republic as a whole and 
indeed in the future will likely take more than just 
one Presidential election, especially one with no 
clear cut and agreed mandate for change It will 
require a major constitutional overhaul. Republics 
do not suddenly die; they wither and atrophy from 
their unwillingness to adapt their constitutions 
from an idealized past to an anxious present. But 
to do that, we need to trust each other.
An election in a time of distrust
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Polarization before and after the 2020 election
In this election, American democracy has been 
threatened by a bitter polarization with deep 
historical roots. Many Americans may despair of 
conciliation across this divide. The prominent 
academic Richard Sennett, writing a day before 
the election in the British left-liberal newspaper 
The Guardian, suggested that Trump’s base in 30% 
of the electorate is, as a whole, “extremist”, 
characterised by “sneering aggression” and 
“viciousness” towards other Americans, and 
will become even more extreme if he loses. Yet 
although there’s no denying the hatred on display 
at times, a more differentiated understanding of 
his support is necessary.
The study of tea party supporters in Louisiana 
by the sociologist Arlie Hochschild, most of whom 
went on to vote for Trump in 2016, makes it clear 
that there are thoughtful and decent individuals 
amongst those who have supported him. A con-
siderable number of those who vote for Trump do 
not like him. And a significant number of Obama 
voters switched to Trump in 2016, some of whom 
must have stuck with him this time (see Edison’s 
exit poll). They are presumably mostly outside the 
30% base, sitting somewhere in the other 18% or 
so who also voted for him. 
In 2016 some might have hoped that Trump’s 
support would fold as his unfitness to lead the 
nation became evident. It has instead become clear 
that a durable body of public feeling has 
consolidated in support of Trump and of what his 
supporters feel that he stands for. Despite the 
tumult of his administration, his approval ratings, 
though relatively low, have been unusually stable 
across his term, and even with the polls underesti-
mating his position, he was still seen as capable of 
winning the election. 
This consolidation is, as a recent study has 
shown, part of a global movement of centre-right 
parties towards ‘illiberal democracy’, with their 
larger blocs of supporters in more entrenched 
positions. In the U.S. this has heavily reinforced 
the two-party system. Since the 1990s, red-or-blue 
leaning has climbed way above all other variables 
(including race, religion and education) to be the 
strongest predictor of political position on core 
issues. The strengthening of affinity with the 
Republican Party across over 40% of the electorate 
was probably intensified or accelerated by the 
emergence of more radical tendencies in the 
Democratic Party, so was part of a dynamic that 
we can call ‘interactive’ or ‘cumulative’ extremism. 
But the overall process of party-based polarization 
began long before Sanders.
So, approval of Trump has been more closely 
tied to Republican sympathies than it has been for 
other Republican Presidents. This may be surpris-
ing, since his own sympathies are promiscuous, as 
seen in his periods of support for the Democrats. 
It does however help to explain why he has not lost 
more votes amongst those who dislike him. The 
size and resilience of Trump’s support seems to be 
the product of the blending of Trump’s perverse 
charisma, which is quite complex psychologically, 
and an increasingly strong party identification 
amongst ‘GOP’ supporters. 
What underlying needs in the American 
people does all this relate to? Along with others, I 
have suggested we see Trumpism as a mobilization 
of the capacity, which exists in us all, to imagine 
ourselves as magically immune to fear and 
weakness, to vulnerability of any sort (including to 
viruses). This defence against anxiety (technically 
a ‘narcissistic’ one) is often expressed, in different 
ways, by idealized visions of the nation and its 
leader as a protective shield. For many, especially 
in the core ‘base’, this appears to be still at the 
heart of their outlook. 
But there is another key theme, also linked to 
the narcissistic defence: strong antipathy towards 
those fellow Americans seen as the main source 
of all threats. At the extremes, this is, as Sennett 
observes, an intense hatred, expressed by a sort 
of postmodern McCarthyism, in which a kalei-
doscope of liberals, socialists and others are cast 
as enemies. For others, it may be less venomous 
and not delusional, but still run deep as a bedrock 
of antagonism, shaped by traditional Republican 
distrust of the state and by more contemporary 
populist tirades against elites. 
Mitigating the polarization will involve 
looking more closely and respectfully at the 
outlooks, feelings and perceptions of many of 
those lodged along this axis of negativity. Even 
when congealed as antagonistic masses on either 
side of a deep divide, people do differ, in crucial 
ways, as empathic inquiry can reveal. Moreover, 
the process of polarization involves a complex 
dynamic between different groups, all of which 
should consider how their own behaviours may 
be experienced as provocations or denigrations, 
and so contribute to an escalatory process. 
Prominent academic, Mark Lilla, has urged 
Democrats to reflect on whether their own 
pre-occupations with ‘identitarian’ politics have 
helped to create today’s polarization. While it is 
necessary to be realistic about the depth of the 
antagonisms, and the tenacity of the delusions 
which can be involved, a more detailed analysis 
of Trump’s base and its penumbra may offer 
alternatives to Sennett’s pessimism.  
43
The political psychology of Trumpism
Nearly 1 in 2 American voters gave Donald Trump 
a thumbs-up.
That’s a big news story of the 2020 election, 
even as Joe Biden has become the 46th president 
of the United States. Close to 50 percent of voters 
walked proudly, ambivalently or even reluctantly 
across the moral shards he hurled on democracy’s 
floor and said they didn’t care.
Over the course of President Trump’s term, 
norms have been shattered with the same impunity 
that F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Tom and Daisy Buchanan 
smashed things in a fictional region of Long Island 
not far from the area Trump actually grew up. As 
a multitude of journalists have chronicled, Trump  
eviscerated the sacred norms of democracy, 
including denouncing legitimate government 
investigations, using his office to try to force a 
foreign nation to tarnish his opponents, imper-
iling the independence of different government 
branches, vitriolically upbraiding opponents, 
and repeatedly making outrageously false claims 
about electoral malfeasance that undermined the 
legitimacy of a presidential election. 
The question is why so many voters, particu-
larly the White working class who put him over 
the top in 2016, cast their ballots for him. Some 
reasons can be readily understood. Trump tangibly 
addressed the powerlessness, social alienation, 
and economic wounds many white working-class 
Americans experienced, a function of globali-
zation, automation and a raft of sociological 
problems from marital stress to opioid addiction. 
By promising to end punishing pro-global policies 
of previous administrations (another misleading 
claim, given some of the gains achieved by NAFTA 
under Clinton, as well as Bush’s and Obama’s 
salvaging auto plants), Trump could reasonably 
expect to be rewarded by blue collar voters in 
2020. But he didn’t create many infrastructure jobs, 
manufacturing wages did not rise significantly, 
and the empirical effects of tariffs in reviving old 
industries or increasing Rust Belt unemployment 
is decidedly underwhelming. So, on economic 
grounds, it wasn’t rational for working class Whites 
to reward Trump with a 2020 vote.
Thus, we must look to venerable symbolic 
politics research, which takes us to a richly 
empirically-documented root of Trump’s support, 
explaining why so many White working class 
voters turned again to him in 2020. Political 
science research shows his support had deep 
roots in White anxiety -- in his promise to offer 
a symbolic return to the cultural preeminence 
Whites experienced during the 20th century; his 
harvesting a sentiment– not founded in economic 
facts or his own statements, some of which 
denigrated his supporters, in the manner of an 
out-of-touch cult leader, that their traditions were 
under siege and would be preserved; and a racial, 
ethnic animus against immigrants and people of 
color that he embraced and repeatedly primed, 
enabling his supporters to bask in the feeling that 
their president would preserve, protect, and defend 
them, even as the best investigative journalism in 
the land showed the ones he protected, preserved, 
and defended were himself and his family.
Indeed, there is evidence that even though his 
voters knew his claims were false, they continued 
to support him anyway, so angry were they at the 
elite establishment. When populist sentiments 
have reached a point that many voters are willing 
to believe the political leadership “does not appear 
to govern on its behalf,” they become resentful, 
convinced the system has no legitimacy. As Hahl 
et al argue, those who feel aggrieved and morally 
entitled are willing to take their symbolic protest to 
the point of favoring candidates who they know are 
“lying demagogues,” to assert a voice they believe 
has been stifled. In this way reducing the concept 
of a good citizen to an angry, resentful voter.
Alas, political psychology is a complex 
construct, voters are complicated, and it looks 
as if some, though perhaps not most, blue 
collar workers in Rust Belt states may well have 
completed their ballots with a slightly leftward 
slant when it came to the presidential election, 
in line with the political science concept that 
elections act as thermostats that reset the temper-
ature of the country. Polling research shows that 
union members voted more strongly for Biden, 
feeling that he identified more with their plight, 
as he channeled their anger at the system into 
hope for change rather than demonization of the 
non-white other.
2020, for all its turbulent complexity, has set a 
self-correcting mechanism in motion. The nation 
has shifted course before, famously in 1860. As 
Abraham Lincoln’s Secretary of State William 
Seward is quoted as saying during this period, 
with optimistic implications for today, “There was 
always just enough virtue in this republic to save it; 
sometimes none to spare”.
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White evangelicals and white born again Christians 
in 2020
In 2016, more white evangelicals voted for Donald 
Trump than had voted for the Republican in any 
election since 2004 (The Hill). In 2020, exit polls 
estimated support among white evangelicals at 
about 76%—5% off of the 81% exit poll estimate 
in 2016. What do these numbers tell us about the 
political divide in American religion? On one 
hand this stunning divide might show signs of 
modest decline in this age of hyper polarization. 
On the other hand, this exit poll measure greatly 
exaggerates the political divide along religious lines 
and care must be taken in the 2020 postmortem to 
capture religious diversity more accurately.
To begin, these numbers are stunning 
because it is difficult to find large groups within 
the American public in which the partisan split 
is so stark. 76% and 81% rival the split among 
Democrats and Republicans—and “white evan-
gelicals and white born-again Christians” are a 
fairly large group, 27% of the electorate according 
to the exit poll. These groups are very, very rare. 
In fact, the ONLY SOCIAL group that bests this 
partisan split in the exit poll is race. The 2020 exit 
poll estimated 87% of black voters supported Biden 
and were about 12% of the electorate. Only 66% 
of Hispanics supported Biden. Sex, age, union 
membership, and so on are nowhere near these 
levels of division. What gives?
First, it is telling that race is the only rival 
split in the exit poll because white evangelicals 
are, well, WHITE. The exit poll designation is 
a Frankengroup—a group created by political 
analysts that does not occur in nature. This is 
problematic because much of the partisan divide 
in this item is about race, not religion. Yet many 
pundits analyze the percent of white evangelicals 
that vote for the Republican as if it confers the 
approval of a religious group. To be sure the racial 
divisions elsewhere in American society are very 
much a part of religious life, but the exit poll 
item confounds race and religion by using the 
question about race to create the group, “white 
evangelical or white born-again Christian.” Tobin 
Grant (Professor of Political Science at Southern 
Illinois University, Carbondale) estimates that if 
evangelical and born-again Christians were NOT 
divided by race in the exit poll item, the percentage 
voting for the Republican would be closer to 50% 
than 80%. Many black voters are evangelical or 
born-again Christians.
But even if race were removed, the “evan-
gelical or born-again Christian” designation is 
also problematic. Unfortunately, again, no such 
group exists in nature. The Southern Baptist 
Convention is an American denomination with 
institutional structure and whose members share 
history and governance. Many Southern Baptists 
answer in the affirmative to the exit poll question 
about whether one is an evangelical or born-
again Christian, but they share little history or 
governance with other groups that also answer in 
the affirmative. 
Academics studying religion and politics also 
combine groups in order to analyze evangelical 
protestants, but they attempt to do so in ways that 
capture inter-denominational cooperation and 
preserve broader religious differences (e.g. theolog-
ical differences). Unfortunately this more rigorous 
approach requires a battery of survey questions 
about the specific church and denomination each 
individual attends. Tobin Grant also estimated 
support for Republican candidates among evangel-
icals using a more rigorous measure of evangelical 
affiliation (and again, no racial question) and 
arrives at a number closer to 60%. This number is 
somewhat higher than the one obtained by only 
removing race as a criterion, reflecting ongoing 
racial divisions within American religion. But the 
main point is that the political divide in evangel-
icalism—let alone within American religion—is 
much lower than the exit poll item implies.
Perfect alignment between religion and 
partisanship would pit religious and non-re-
ligious groups in existential political battles. 
Unfortunately analyses of the exit poll item 
identifying white protestants make it seem like 
that frightening reality is nearly at hand. It is 
important to remember, however, that a portion 
of what appears to be a religious divide is a racial 
divide. This divide is also terribly important and 
it is also terribly important to be able to identify 
it as a racial divide. In addition, the artificial 
group formed using the survey prompt to identify 
“evangelicals or born-again Christians” also seems 
to underestimate the amount of political diversity 
among real evangelical groups. And of course there 
are many religious groups in American society 
besides evangelicals (and those groups tend to be 
even more politically diverse)—and so over-reli-
ance on the exit poll item creates a false dichotomy 
between evangelical and born again Christians 
and the non-religious. To conclude, the religious 
divide in American politics is terribly important 
and more analyses are needed before we can feel 
confident about where things stand in 2020.
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Angry voters are (often) misinformed voters
Emotions have always been central to politics 
but over the last several decades the American 
political environment has grown increasingly 
hostile such that anger toward political opponents 
is often now the default political feeling. National 
polls—as well as my own surveys—fielded during 
the 2020 election in the United States suggest we 
may have reached a boiling point; Republicans 
were very angry at Joe Biden and his supporters, 
while Democrats expressed outrage at Donald 
Trump and the people who support him. This 
anger could be problematic for many reasons but 
the heightened emotional atmosphere surrounding 
the 2020 U.S. election served to undermine truth 
and facts by further injecting misinformation and 
misperceptions into the campaign. 
Political anger during the 2020 U.S. election 
encouraged misinformation and false beliefs to 
thrive. Anger is a powerful motivator of political 
behavior and exacerbates many of the negative 
characteristics of partisanship and political iden-
tities. For example, angry voters are more likely to 
consume news and information from like-minded 
partisan outlets that often spread false and 
misleading political content. Anger also enhances 
partisan biases when people evaluate political 
information, which makes them more prone 
to believing information unsupported by facts 
or evidence. So how exactly did political anger 
increase exposure to and belief in misinformation 
about the candidates and election in 2020?    
Anger Encouraged Partisan Media Use and 
Engagement
The rise of anger in American politics today 
has likely contributed to the loss of faith in 
high-quality sources of information, as well as 
the growing popularity of hyper-partisan sites 
online and on social media. If people are angry 
at mainstream media, they will look elsewhere 
for political information and increasingly they 
are turning to partisan pages on Facebook that 
only further reinforce that anger. Research my 
colleague and I are conducting on the popularity 
of hyper-partisan political pages on Facebook 
mirrors reporting by Kevin Roose at The New York 
Times indicating that the most engaged (likes, 
comments, shares) political pages on Facebook 
tend to be highly partisan and very conservative. 
In many cases, we find that engagement with posts 
on the most popular conservative pages outpaces 
posts from popular mainstream pages by a ratio of 
more than 5 to 1. While we know few people use 
these partisan sites or pages exclusively, several 
of these pages have amassed large audiences and 
many have several million followers. The problem, 
of course, is that these sites do not adhere to 
journalistic standards, are designed to trigger 
emotional responses in their ideological audiences, 
and often spread false or misleading content. To 
make matters worse, this false, emotional content 
gets shared at a greater rate than less emotional, 
true information. It is clear that anger amplified 
partisan content online—some of it false—reaches 
far beyond its original or intended audience. 
Looking at this through the lens of anger helps 
illustrate why highly emotional conspiracy theories 
like Qanon or Hunter Biden and Burisma received 
so much traction online in 2020.
Anger Promotes Belief in Political Misinformation
Anger also enhances existing partisan biases when 
people are exposed to political information, which 
helps explain some widespread misperceptions 
during the 2020 campaign. Angry individuals are 
more likely to process information—including 
false information—in a way that is consistent with 
their existing political attitudes or beliefs, leaving 
them more susceptible to believing misinformation 
that is damaging to political opponents. Given that 
much of the political misinformation in circulation 
during the 2020 election was designed to elicit 
anger, it is unsurprising that so much misinforma-
tion was taken as true. 
To better understand the intersection of 
anger and misinformation in the 2020 election, 
I fielded a nationally representative, multi-wave 
survey that asked voters whether they believed 
several false statements and conspiracy theories 
about the two candidates for president. These 
included well known conspiracies theories about 
Qanon and the coronavirus, as well as prominent 
claims about Hunter Biden and Donald Trump’s 
health. What I found was astounding. In every 
instance—across more than ten false claims about 
both candidates—the more anger people felt about 
the candidates, the more likely they were to believe 
the false statements. For instance, anger at Joe 
Biden was by far the strongest predictor—even 
outweighing partisanship—of whether respond-
ents believed false claims about Joe and Hunter 
Biden’s involvement in Ukraine. Angry voters 
were even more likely to believe these claims over 
time—essentially doubling down on their beliefs 
as the election approached. This was true for both 
Republicans’ and Democrats’ belief in claims about 
Biden and Trump. 
While there remains much debate about 
the long-term implications of misinformation, 
including whether misperceptions affect political 
behaviors like voting, the pattern from the 2020 
U.S. election was unmistakable: angry voters were 
significantly more likely to be exposed to and 
believe political misinformation.   
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A Black, Latinx, and Independent alliance
African Americans, Latinx, and Independents were 
the critical margin of victory for President-elect 
Joseph Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala 
Harris when the state of Pennsylvania called the 
contest in their favor just before noon on Saturday, 
November 7, securing enough Electoral College 
votes to win the presidential election. In a close 
and deeply divided partisan race in which nearly 
160 million voters in the United States—a record 
number of American voters—participated, it was 
the swing constituency of independents along 
with Black and Latinx voters who helped to put 
the Biden-Harris ticket over the top, both in the 
popular vote and in key battleground states. 
According to national exit polling data 
conducted by Edison Research, political independ-
ents (the approximately 43% of voters nationally 
who self-identify as such according to Gallup) 
favored Biden-Harris 54%-40%. Four years 
ago, Donald Trump had a 4-point edge among 
non-aligned voters. In 2008, Barack Obama won 
them by 8 points. The 14-point margin among 
independent voters was the most for a presidential 
candidate since 1988, when Republican nominee 
George H. W. Bush won independents over 
Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis by the 
same margin. 
Jacqueline Salit, President of Independent 
Voting, the nation’s largest network of independ-
ent voters seeking to reform the political process, 
observed, “Independents are a volatile community 
of voters. They elected two successive ‘outsider’ 
presidents, in the hopes of establishing a new 
direction, something other than the status quo. In 
this cycle, they elected a consummate insider who 
says he can bring unity and balance to govern-
ment in a time of crisis. Their impact was huge. 
But no one should interpret this vote as a pledge 
of party allegiance [for the Democratic Party]. If 
anything, it’s a vote that says, ‘get us out of this 
partisan sinkhole.” Salit added, “If you were to 
combine the independent voter community with 
the African American and Latino communities, 
both of which heavily influenced the outcome, 
you’d have the makings of a potent third force that 
defies political categories.” 
This all-important margin is evident both 
at the national level in the popular vote and in 
the states that put the Biden-Harris ticket over 
the top. At this point in the national vote count, 
nearly 22 million independents cast votes for 
Biden-Harris and 16.2 million voted for Trump-
Pence. Biden’s independent margin is 5.7 million 
votes, well over his 4 million vote lead in the 
overall national vote count.
It was also the independent vote that provided 
the Democratic ticket with a margin of victory 
in two of the three pivotal Rust Belt states that 
Trump won in 2016: Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. 
Independents in Pennsylvania chose Biden-Harris 
by 8 points, 51%-43%. Specifically, 689,000 
independents in Pennsylvania cast ballots for the 
Democratic ticket as compared to 581,000 for 
Trump. This margin of 108,000 votes among in-
dependent voters exceeds Biden’s 41,200 vote lead 
in Pennsylvania overall. Meanwhile, Biden won 
Wisconsin independents by 55%-41%, outpolling 
Trump by 580,000 to 433,000. There, Biden’s lead 
among independents is over 147,000 votes, well 
more than the 20,500 votes that constitute his 
margin of victory in the state.
Just as African Americans in South Carolina 
propelled Biden to the Democratic Party nomina-
tion in the summer, so did black voters and Latinx 
voters come out in force for the Biden-Harris 
presidential ticket. Upwards of 87% of black voters 
supported Biden-Harris nationally, and in critical 
states, such as Arizona, Latinx voters came out 2 
to 1 in their favor (but fell shy in Florida where 
Latinx voters favored Biden just above 50% over 
Trump). Across the country young and first-time 
voters bolstered the President and Vice Presi-
dent-elect, fueled in much part by the Black Lives 
Matter movement. 
Together, Black, Latinx and Independent 
voters also elected the first female-Black-South 
Asian (Afro-South Asian) vice-presidential 
candidate. Harris’ history-making accomplish-
ment grew on the barriers broken by Dr. Lenora 
Fulani in 1988 as the first woman (and African 
American) on the ballot in all fifty states in 1988 
running for president as an independent and 
President Obama in 2008 as the nation’s first 
black president. In 2020, we see the makings of a 
potentially powerful Black, Latinx, and independ-
ent alliance, or as Salit puts it, “a potent third force 
that defies political categories.”
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In 2016, Hillary Clinton’s candidacy was marred 
by past sexual assault allegations against her 
husband, former President Bill Clinton. Hillary 
defended her husband, making it hard for her to 
fully assert that she, as the nomenclature goes, 
“believes women.” In 2020, there is a renewed call 
to believe women. This time it is less about assault 
accusations against the nominees. Rather, part of 
this call dates back to a moment in 1991 and how 
that moment reverberates today and affects voters, 
especially Black women. 
In 1991, Clarence Thomas was nominated 
to the U.S. Supreme Court. Anita Hill accused 
Thomas of workplace sexual harassment. A 
three-day, televised hearing included Hill testifying 
in graphic detail in front of an all-male, all-white 
Senate Judiciary Committee. After Thomas’s 
confirmation, women’s anger contributed to a 
record-breaking number of women winning 
elections, making 1992 the “Year of the Woman.” 
The chairperson of that 1991 committee was Joe 
Biden. Biden was criticized for his handling of the 
hearing and mistreatment of Hill. Biden expressed 
“regret,” though Hill largely rejected this as an 
apology because “an apology, to be real and sincere, 
has to take responsibility for harm.” Biden didn’t 
publicly take responsibility until a 2019 interview. 
After this interview, as well as a phone call with 
Biden before his campaign announcement, Hill 
said she thinks Biden has evolved. In September 
2020 she announced she would vote for Biden.
Anger and rage can be powerful motivators. 
Rebecca Traister wrote about the “revolutionary 
power of women’s anger,” and spoke about the 
relevance of Hill’s experiences in contemporary 
politics. Dr. Brittney Cooper wrote about the 
power of Black women’s eloquent and righteous 
rage. Modern parallels echo the 1992 wave of 
female engagement after female marginalization: 
fallout from sexual assault allegations against 
President Donald Trump, Hollywood producer 
Harvey Weinstein, and Supreme Court Justice 
Brett Kavanaugh resulted in events like the 
Women’s March, the #MeToo movement, and a 
record-breaking number of women elected to 
Congress in 2018.
Anger and rage can fuel revolutions, but 
change also requires demonstrable outcomes. 
Believing Black women means meeting them 
where they stand. Dr. Cooper stresses the need 
to know what wrong was done to Black women 
and get “a clear sense of how the harm can be 
repaired…[and focus on] what Black women 
actually need.” 
Hill made her desired repair work clear when 
voicing support for Biden. She said the issue 
is bigger than her: it’s “about the survivors of 
gender violence.” She wants to work with the next 
president on issues of sexual harassment, gender 
violence, and gender discrimination, and believes 
Biden, not Trump, will hear her. In response to 
Hill’s announcement, Dr. Cooper tweeted, “Pretty 
clear drawing of lines here by Anita Hill about why 
it needs to be Biden over Trump. And if y’all say 
you trust Black women then you should read this 
article and listen to her.” In response, another user 
tweeted, “She’s skipping over black issues and going 
over to women’s issues.” To which Dr. Cooper 
responded, “Black women’s issues are Black issues.”
As a disenfranchised group based on their 
gender and race, Black women’s intersectional 
identities face challenges and oppression that are 
distinct from White women or Black men. Black 
women were cut off from the suffragist movement, 
and gender equity issues were sidelined during the 
Civil Rights Movement—prompting Malcom X to 
unequivocally state, “The most disrespected person 
in America is the black woman.” Therefore Black 
women need different repair work.
Hill’s endorsement of Biden probably did not 
cause a wave of new Biden support. According to 
CNN exit polls, 94% of Black women in 2016 and 
91% in 2020 voted for the Democratic nominee—
more than any other race-gender group in either 
election. Even Kamala Harris’s VP nomination did 
not spur a large uptick in Biden support. Rather, 
Harris’s nomination helped recognize Black 
women as the long-standing bedrock of Demo-
cratic support, and prompted Black women to use 
their influence in the community to “overperform 
in getting out the vote.” Hill’s endorsement also 
had the power to energize Black women’s mobi-
lization efforts, which was crucial in 2020 when 
COVID-19 heavily restricted retail politics and 
forced Black people, who have been disproportion-
ately affected by COVID-19, to assume “personal 
risks to line up and vote in many states, especially 
where Republican efforts to suppress mail-in 
voting are successful.”
Polarization and negative partisanship are 
likely to endure, making mobilization all that more 
important. Black women are vital to the Democrat-
ic Party’s mobilization efforts. Therefore, it is crucial 
that the party meet Black women where they stand 
with more than platitudes every election year. The 
party needs to hear Black women, believe Black 
women, and invest in Black women’s repair work. 
49
The sleeping giant awakens: Latinos in the 
2020 election
2020 has been a year for the record books and the 
presidential election is no exception. During this 
electoral cycle, we saw states, once considered 
reliably red, like Arizona, Florida, Texas, Georgia, 
and Pennsylvania, become battleground states. It is 
no coincidence that these states have experienced 
record Latino population growth (roughly half 
of all U.S. population growth between 2010 and 
2019). Latino population increases resulted in 
a subsequent growth of eligible Latino voters in 
Arizona (+8%), Nevada (+10%), Florida (+9%), 
and Texas (+8%). In Florida, Latino voters 
accounted for a record setting 17% of registered 
voters. Simultaneous electoral eligibility declines 
among non-Hispanic whites magnified the 
electoral outcomes of the Latino population surge. 
Non-Latino whites in battleground states saw eli-
gibility fall dramatically: Arizona (-12%), Nevada 
(-18%), Florida (-13%), Texas (-12%). On balance, 
this means that the Latino vote was pivotal in the 
statewide partisan shifts of 2020.
Turnout and engagement 
Despite their population surge, Latinos have long 
been accused of “punching below their weight” 
when it comes to voter turnout. At the time of 
going to press, final turnout tallies had yet to be 
released, but NALEO estimates that Latino turnout 
would increase by 15% compared to 2016.  If these 
estimates are correct, such an increase could put 
historically lackluster Latino turnout rates, usually 
hovering just shy of 50% since 2008, up around 
63%. Higher than normal voter enthusiasm among 
Latinos voters hint at abnormally high turnout 
rates, as well. Latino Decision/NALEO tracking 
poll suggests that 70% of Latino registered voters 
consider their 2020 ballot to be more important 
than 2016. Among Latino registered voters, 48% of 
survey respondents reported that they had already 
cast their ballot as of November 2nd. 41% of those 
remaining said that they were “almost certain to 
vote.” A majority of Latino early voters (54%) cast 
absentee ballots through the U.S. postal citing 
strong trust in the system.  
Vote choice and issues
In 2020, Latinos voted overwhelmingly in support 
of democrat Joe Biden at 70%. Far from a mono-
lithic voting bloc, 27% of Latinos voted for Donald 
Trump. Latino support for Trump increased by 9% 
over 2016. This may have resulted from the Trump 
campaign’s pivot away from immigration policy to 
pandemic related issues. Moreover, Latinos in 2020 
were less likely to say that President Trump was 
“hostile” to Latinos (26%) and more likely to say 
that he simply “didn’t care” about Latinos (47%) 
than in 2016. In 2016, these numbers were 55% 
and 29%, respectively. 
A comparison with non-Latino whites 
provides strong evidence of a widening racial and 
ethnic political divide in U.S. politics. The Latino 
Decisions Election Eve Poll showed a majority of 
non-Latino whites (56%) voted for Trump. Only 
41% supported Joe Biden. There is question as to 
whether Latino support for Democratic candidates 
has increased as part of a larger shift towards the 
democratic party or if it is reflective of unfavorable 
Republican candidates. 
Favorability ratings for Joe Biden (70% 
favorable) among Latinos were higher than for 
other democratic contemporaries. For example, 
among Latinos, Nancy Pelosi received a 54% 
favorability rating. Two important points emerge 
from this comparison. First, democratic party 
identification does not ensure a sky-high favora-
bility rating among Latinos. Second, Latinos 
genuinely seem to like Joe Biden as a favorable 
choice for president. 
Election 2020 & COVID-19
The election of 2020 has been widely discussed as 
a referendum on President Trump’s COVID-19 
response and Latino political behavior supports 
this perception. Latino survey results reveal 
that 70% of Latino respondents disapproved of 
President Trump’s handling of the pandemic, the 
same percentage reporting a vote for Joe Biden. 
A look at the impact of COVID-19 by race and 
ethnicity help explain their feelings of disapproval. 
According to the CDC, Latinos are 2.2 times more 
likely to contract COVID-19 than non-Hispanic 
whites, 4.6 times more likely to be hospitalized 
and 1.1 times more likely to die as a result of 
COVID-19. Latinos are also shown in tracking 
polls to be most likely to experience a COVID-19 
related job loss than non-Latino whites by 9% or 
or experience a reduction in hours or pay due to 
COVID-19 by 14%. In light of these statistics, the 
top election issues for Latinos are not surprising: 
(1) Covid-19 response, (2) health care costs, and 
(3) Improving wages and job creation. This is sharp 
shift from 2016 when the top issue for Latinos 
were: Immigration, the economy and education. 
In sum, Latinos proved decisive in election 
2020. The growth in the Latino voting population 
turned strongholds into battlegrounds. Their en-
thusiasm for voting may have finally “awoken” the 
proverbial sleeping giant that has effectively lain 
dormant for decades. The question now becomes: 
will the giant stay awake in coming elections?
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Trump won the senior vote because they thought 
he was best on the economy – not immigration
Voters aged 65 and over have chosen the Repub-
lican candidate at every United States presidential 
election since Al Gore became the last Democrat to 
win them, in 2000. Many pre-election polls showed 
Joe Biden might buck the trend: YouGov’s final poll 
had Biden ahead among seniors by 4 percentage 
points, for example. The pandemic provided 
a potentially strong reason for seniors to pick 
Biden, given the increased risk from COVID-19 
for older people. But the early post-election polls 
showing that despite his wins in the popular vote 
and the Electoral College, Biden lost senior voters 
by 51-48% nationally.This was an improvement 
on Hillary Clinton’s 52-45% loss among seniors 
in 2016, but Democracy Corps, which carries 
out post-election polls following every national 
election cycle in the U.S., found an even wider 
margin among senior voters in the battleground 
states, 57-43% in favour of President Trump over 
Joe Biden.
The pandemic had some impact on older 
voters, but not enough to swing them decisively 
to Biden. The Democracy Corps poll asked people 
who voted for or considered each candidate what 
factors (from a given list) drew them toward that 
candidate, and pushed them away from the other. 
For seniors, the single biggest factor that drew 
them to Biden was “to deal with COVID”, but it 
only attracted 30% of them, a smaller share than 
for any other age group. Similarly, 32% said that 
Trump’s handling of the pandemic put them off, 
but again this was a smaller factor than it was 
for voters under 40. A direct comparison of the 
candidates in terms of their ability to deal with a 
pandemic showed a majority of seniors actually 
favoured Trump, although a smaller majority than 
that which voted for him.
Seniors picked Donald Trump largely because 
they thought he would be best for the economy. 
47% of seniors who chose or considered Trump 
said it was because he created a strong economy 
and could end the recession. No other factor was 
picked by more than 25% of these voters. Fur-
thermore, when asked to compare the candidates’ 
ability to handle the economy, seniors said Trump 
would be better than Biden by an even bigger 
margin than they ended up voting by. 
Smaller factors helping Trump among senior 
voters were law and order, and his stance toward 
China. Being tough on China was the second-most 
popular reason to pick Trump among this group, 
and in a direct comparison of the candidates they 
again favoured Trump’s stance on China over 
Biden’s by a bigger margin than his vote share. 
Similarly, Trump outscored Biden on law and order 
among this group by more than his vote share.
Trump’s 2016 candidacy and the early years of 
his presidency were characterised by an emphasis 
on immigration, including his proposed border 
wall. Yet this was not such a significant factor this 
time for the senior voters who picked Trump. 
While they favoured Trump over Biden to deal 
with immigration, this was by a smaller margin 
than their votes for Trump; and further, only 
20% picked his border wall and tough stance on 
immigration as a reason to vote for Trump. 
Overall attitudes toward immigration and 
diversity among senior voters should also dis-
courage the view that they picked Trump for these 
reasons. By a margin of 64-26%, senior voters in 
the Democracy Corps battleground poll picked 
the statement “Immigrants today strengthen our 
country because of their hard work and talents”, 
rather than “Immigrants today are a burden on 
our country because they take our jobs, housing 
and health care”. They also picked a statement in 
support of racial and ethnic diversity over one 
criticising it by a margin of 76-15%. Only on a 
pair of statements about racial discrimination 
against Black people did seniors equivocate: equal 
numbers (44%) picked each of: “Racial discrimi-
nation is the main reason why many Black people 
can’t get ahead these days” and “Black people who 
can’t get ahead in this country are mostly respon-
sible for their own condition”. This is in contrast 
with other age groups, all of which endorsed the 
statement blaming racial discrimination.
Seniors have been a solid voting bloc for 
Republican presidential candidates this century, 
and despite indications that that would change 
this cycle, Trump managed to retain a majority 
among them. His exploitation of law and order 
was a factor, but the key to his over-performance 
among this group was the economy and their belief 
that he had the credentials to get the U.S. out of its 
recession. This dominated any reservations they 
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In our analysis of the 2016 Presidential election, we 
showed German Americans paved Donald Trump’s 
road to the White House through Iowa, Wisconsin, 
Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania.  We argued 
the failure of many polls to accurately predict the 
2016 elections, especially in so-called American 
Heartland, must be attributed to the failure of 
recognizing the distinct electoral behavior of the 
overlooked German Americans. IN 2020, the 
Midwest was again a contested battleground and 
again, analysis of the electoral behavior of German 
Americans allows better understanding voting 
patterns in critical swing states.
The German American Experience
Forty-four million Americans claim German 
ancestry. They constitute a large heritage group, 
and the largest by far in the Midwest. Between 
1850 and 1890, Germans arrived in the millions 
to settle, transforming the frontier wilderness into 
farmland and fuelling the Midwestern industriali-
zation with manpower and entrepreneurial spirit. 
Politically, they were never a unified voting bloc. 
Many were freethinkers, fighting against slavery 
and for women’s suffrage. They founded news-
papers and led labor movements. Others were 
leading Evangelicals, forming the Missouri Synod, 
one of the most conservative religious bodies of the 
country. For decades, political parties vied for the 
vote of this heterogeneous immigrant group.
Things changed in the wake of two 
world wars. To avoid stigmatization, German 
Americans stopped speaking German, anglicized 
their names and became outwardly more American 
than any other European immigrant group. As a 
result, most contemporary German Americans are 
barely recognizable and are perceived as “white” 
or “rural” voters. Yet, despite their low political 
profile, German Americans have shown common 
voting patterns for decades. 
 
‘Ghost Pain of the Past’
Today’s German Americans are more conserva-
tive than their ancestors. Most counties of heavy 
German American heritage are rural and vote 
Republican. We suggested in 2016 the steady 
economic decline in agriculture and domestic 
manufacturing in the Midwest made German 
Americans receptive to populist messages with 
racist overtones, a view implied by other political 
scientists and sociologists. A new, empirical 
study suggests German Americans’ support of 
Trump in 2016 was not a simple outcome of party 
affiliation or an articulation of racism. Rather, 
German Americans were enticed by Trump’s iso-
lationist agenda, an ideological preference their 
communities had developed long before 2016. 
In fact, presidential candidates with policies of 
protectionism and anti-interventionism have con-
sistently benefited from the German American 
vote. In the 1992 race, third-party candidate 
Ross Perot opposed NAFTA and the first Gulf 
War. He shared many views on trade and foreign 
policy with Trump and performed better among 
German Americans.
Interestingly, the tendency to support anti-in-
terventionist presidential candidates even extended 
to Obama, who proved more successful than 
any Democrat among German American voters, 
Obama proposed a foreign policy agenda that 
contrasted sharply with that of John McCain, who 
offered a continuation of George W. Bush’s inter-
ventionism in the Middle East. German American 
support for America’s first African American 
president reached close to 60% in many counties of 
America’s heartland, making it very unlikely that 
racism was the primary force behind the swing 
toward Trump in 2016. Rather, this shows a con-
sistent attraction to isolationist candidates rooted 
in the first half of the 20th century. That’s when 
German Americans vehemently opposed U.S. 
military intervention in Europe while being forced 
to rapidly assimilate. 
But can past traumas still influence voting 
behavior? Research on the persistence of histor-
ical legacies such as voting behavior in former 
slaveholding counties in the South shows political 
attitudes can be passed down over generations 
even while the experiential link to their origin is 
lost. It appears German American attraction to 
isolationism is a ghost pain of the past.
 
What happened in 2020?
Considering German American’s attraction to 
isolationist candidates, Trump faced few vulnera-
bilities as a result of his “America First”- doctrine: 
He abolished NAFTA, withdrew from the Paris 
Agreement on climate change, pulled out of the 
Iran nuclear deal, started trade wars, snubbed 
military leaders and announced troop withdrawals 
from NATO allies. However, a central tenet of 
isolationism is a strong desire to stay out of trouble 
through non-involvement. Trump’s inability to 
deescalate domestic crises and his incendiary 
response to Black Lives Matter protests, in particu-
lar, led to a polarization of Midwestern German 
Americans along the lines of the rural and urban 
experience. Trump attracted even larger numbers 
of German American voters in rural areas than in 
2016 while urban German Americans withdrew 
their support. In a rare scenario, Iowa and 
Wisconsin parted ways in their preference. Judging 
by the margins, German Americans were highly 
relevant to the outcome in the Midwest as Cuban 
Americans were in Southern Florida. This election 
again showed the inefficacy of coarse concepts 
such as the “white vote” and the “Hispanic vote” 





The emotional politics of 2020: fear and loathing in 
the United States
We usually expect presidents to be in command 
of their emotions. By contrast, Donald Trump 
has always been characterized by his emotional 
volatility and unreliably, often compared to a 
tantrum-throwing toddler. Marina Hyde, reflecting 
on the president’s response to his impending 
election loss in a Guardian article on November 6, 
2020, suggested that for “parents of small children, 
Donald Trump’s latest meltdown is extremely, 
totally, instantly recognizable.” At the time of 
writing, the hashtag #trumptantrum is trending 
on Twitter, with users sharing memes and video 
clips poking fun of the president’s refusal to accept 
defeat in the election.
Trump’s emotional register, however volatile, 
has always been dominated by anger. This is signif-
icant because the recent history of U.S. politics has 
been largely characterised by emotional regimes 
of positivity. In particular, presidents often draw 
on the positive and forward-looking emotion of 
hope. For example, Barack Obama’s “Hope” poster 
became iconic in his campaign, while Bill Clinton 
branded himself “The Man From Hope” – conven-
iently, of course, he originally hailed from Hope, 
Arkansas.
By contrast, although Trump’s mantra, “Make 
America Great Again,” embodied hope for a 
transformative future, this was countered by his 
consistently and essentially angry rhetoric.
Trump’s anger has been put to good use and 
could be seen as essential to his brand of politics. 
I have previously made the case that we can see 
Trump’s brand of “angry populism” as an indica-
tion of a change in the “emotional regime” – or 
the dominant ways of talking about emotions in 
public which underpin political regimes. Trump’s 
anger propelled him to office because it allowed 
him to voice the discontent of voters who have felt 
left behind by globalization, economic transforma-
tions and cultural change. But in doing so, it also 
signaled the salience of an angrier form of politics 
more generally – a shift we have seen played out 
over the past four years.
While Trump’s angry populism clearly 
continues to resonate with his core voters, with 
more than 70 million casting their ballots for 
him, it also appears to have lost some of its shine 
amid the profound crises facing the world and the 
United States in 2020. Perhaps most obviously, it is 
easier to be successful as an angry challenger than 
an angry incumbent. 
However, more importantly, there is evidence 
to suggest a shift in the emotional regime as a 
result of the coronavirus pandemic. While there is 
no doubt that the Black Lives Matter protests were 
driven by anger at the injustice of police violence, 
the overwhelming mood of 2020 has been one of 
fear. People are afraid of the virus itself, as well as 
of its economic and social consequences. Although 
theorists of emotion often view fear as an emotion 
driven by irrationality, in this case the fear could 
be seen as both reasonable and justified given the 
frankly terrifying circumstances. 
And here, the responses of Trump and Biden 
to this fear have reflected an important and funda-
mental difference between their responses to this 
fear. Trump’s strategy has been one of denialism. 
From the very earliest days of the pandemic, 
when he reassured citizens that the disease would 
disappear “like a miracle,”  to his insistence, after 
returning from hospital treatment for coronavirus 
at the Walter Reed Medical Center, that Americans 
shouldn’t  “be afraid of it,” he has consistently 
sought to minimize the severity of the pandemic 
which has so far killed 237,000 citizens.
By contrast, Biden has made the coronavirus 
the key theme of the election, leading to a surge 
in support among older voters who have been 
justifiably concerned about Trump’s handling of 
the pandemic given their greater vulnerability. He 
has consistently emphasized the need for a clear 
plan for handling the pandemic, tackling the fears 
head on.
Biden may not come across as the most 
charismatic and energetic presidential candidate, 
but much of his appeal can be ascribed to the fact 
that he is not Trump. As such, he has benefited 
from another negative political emotion – loathing 
of Trump.
Fear and loathing do not offer a promising 
starting point for an optimistic vision for the 
future. But the ambition of facing the fears – and 
taking action to solve its causes – offers a more 
hopeful emotional politics, and possibly the best 
way forward. The scenes of celebration on the 
streets of New York, Philadelphia and Washington 
D.C. following on from networks calling the 
election for Biden also highlight the importance 
of positive emotions – including joy and relief. 
While Biden’s path ahead is rocky given the intense 
polarization and division of the U.S., whipped up 
by the force of angry populism, it also holds the 
possibility of a future of overcoming the fears that 
has for so long seemed out of reach.
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Character and image in the U.S. presidential 
election: a psychological perspective
My latest book is on a topic a million miles from 
politics, but not a million miles from Donald 
Trump, it seems. It’s on the psychology of trophy 
hunting - men and women who kill the majestic 
‘Big Five’ (lion, elephant, rhino, buffalo and 
leopard) so that they can sit beaming at the camera 
with the dead animal at their feet. They pose with 
their rifle or cross-bow, the instruments of killing 
in a little iconic tableau representing power and 
dominion, representing their authority.
They have narratives about the hunt, of course, 
about how they love the animals, about how 
hunting allows them to get close to nature, about 
human bonding and, of course, the evolutionary 
‘naturalness’ of killing large prey. But it’s never 
about this; it never has been. Killing large prey 
was never about providing food for the family, it 
generates too much meat to even share in a recip-
rocal exchange, it has always been about display 
-  display of knowledge, cunning and resolve. 
Social scientists evoke ‘costly signalling theory’ 
and talk about its evolutionary implications. And 
it is display that drives trophy hunting today – but 
now it’s about the display of wealth and resource 
(trophy hunting is a very expensive activity).
It’s all about the image; everything else is 
secondary. Image is especially important in 
this narcissistic age of ours. Those with weak 
self-esteem can boost it with these images, their 
Duchenne smile of achievement on display, the 
fatal wound of the animal temporarily hidden. 
Most narcissists stick to parading in different 
clothes on Facebook and counting their likes but 
those whose personality fall within the Dark Triad 
of narcissism, Machiavellianism and (non-clinical) 
psychopathy seem drawn to it.  Indeed, a lack of 
empathy and a degree of callousness (characteristic 
of the Dark Triad) may be necessary conditions 
for trophy hunting, and trophy hunting and its 
depiction in images and films clearly facilitate the 
maintenance of narcissistic flow (another necessary 
condition). Such individuals don’t feel for the 
animal, the animal is secondary, it’s only a prop for 
the main actor. It’s all about the person with the 
rifle, the main man.
And so to politics - in an interview with David 
Frost in 1987 (now hastily rediscovered) when 
Joe Biden first ran for the presidency, he said that 
the most important attribute for any Presidential 
candidate is ‘strength of character’. We all know 
what he meant. He meant ‘strength of good 
character’. Character allows some attempt at truth 
and justice, and consistency. Bad character allows 
something else - winning at any cost, all about 
me, the flooded gurgling steam of narcissistic 
flow necessary to keep the fragile ego watered and 
intact. Like the trophy hunters, the narrative has 
to be different to make it palatable, to stop it being 
risible. ‘Make me feel great again’ becomes ‘Make 
America Great Again’.
And narcissists can be incredibly myopic - 
they only see what they want to see, to stop them 
getting upset. Trump never saw climate change nor 
Coronavirus and when I say ‘saw’, I mean it quite 
literally. In our lab, we have analysed individuals 
with particular personality characteristics as 
they read climate change articles. Optimists who 
suffer greatly from ‘optimism bias’ and believe 
wholeheartedly in the ‘power of positive thinking’ 
(written by Norman Vincent Peale – Trump’s 
favourite author, and his family’s pastor when he 
was growing up) skim over the articles and their 
longest gaze fixations are on any sections of the 
articles disputing the science. That’s the ‘good’ 
news that they like to hang on to, even if there’s 
little scientific basis for these critiques. But that’s 
all they see. And this biased pattern of fixation 
feeds into their perception of the threat of climate 
change - it won’t affect them – maybe other 
countries, maybe their children’s children, but not 
them personally. Therefore, they do nothing.
Connect up optimism bias with narcissism, 
and you have a nexus of traits driving attention and 
perception, only noticing certain things, fixating 
on this word rather than that, it is predictive and 
anticipatory. It maintains and reaffirms a mind-set 
but without necessarily any conscious awareness 
driving it. These gaze fixations are measured in 
micro-seconds but help establish a world view that 
most of us cannot recognise. 
So Trump lost, he misread COVID, he never 
saw it; he misread climate change, he never saw 
it. He spent too much time watching the iguanas 
fall from the trees in Florida when he was golfing 
at Mar-a-Lago in that cold snap of December 
2017 - frozen iguanas persuading him that climate 
change was a hoax, fake news. But the weather isn’t 
climate, cold snaps don’t contradict climate change, 
fragments aren’t the whole, moments aren’t the 
final story, they can’t be.
Images fade, no matter how desperately you 
want them to be indelible. They fade like footprints 
in the snow, as the season changes, leaving just 
dirty looking puddles behind. That was the 
indelible image of the U.S. Presidential election in 
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Branding and its limits 
The 2020 Presidential election shows the power 
and limitations of branding. Branding can 
overcome a struggling campaign organization 
(Trump), a divided party (Democrats) or a 
less-than-ideal candidate (Biden). Branding comes 
with significant limitations. First, the market can 
suddenly change leaving a brand badly positioned. 
Second, branding works if the product it is 
supporting works. Third, establishing a brand 
narrative, values and story allows competitors to 
position themselves as just being the opposite. 
Such an oppositional positioning strategy elected 
Biden because it let people vote against Trump who 
might usually vote for Republicans but it did little 
good for the rest of the Democratic field much 
of which lost after being successfully branded by 
Republicans as far left ideologues. 
Trump’s re-election campaign originally 
centered around the country’s strong economic 
performance and the promises he had kept during 
his first term and trying to brand his Democratic 
opponent as an unacceptable alternative. In 
February, Trump looked positioned to win relative-
ly easily but the world changed during that month 
when a novel coronavirus developed into a global 
pandemic. COVID could have been a showcase 
for the underlying product and boosted Trump 
to an easy re-election. Instead, it was a marketing 
disaster as the Administration’s slow and incon-
sistent response and its strict adherence to the 
highly targeted emotional brand that swept it 
into office undermined the Trump brand promise 
and limited its ability to attract new supporters. 
During COVID, Trump didn’t seem like the 
effective manager, strong leader and problem 
solver his brand promised and the crises COVID 
set into motion were hardly making American 
great again. Instead he seemed to blame others for 
the crisis and, as he said in his own words “take 
no responsibility” for the crises or decisions his 
administration made about handling it. Trump 
held regular briefings about the crisis that often 
went on too long while devolving from their stated 
theme into shouting matches and expressions of 
mutual disdain between him and the media. These 
events showed that the Trump product might not 
work as the brand had promised. Second, COVID 
undermined Trump’s brand by undermining the 
economy. Third, COVID amplified extant racial 
tensions and allowed Trump’s opponents to again 
question his racial attitudes thus tapping into 
questions of identity and equity that were raging 
in in the country during his term. Fourth, restric-
tions on public gatherings in most of the country 
limited Trump’s ability to hold rallies. Rallies 
served several purposes for the Trump campaign 
including 1) exciting the committed by bringing 
the brand to life thus generating positive buzz 
around the Trump brand 2) attracting the wavering 
and undecided by showing that it was OK to 
support Trump, 3) providing the campaign with 
live customer data and 4) giving the candidate and 
campaign a test bed for new themes and issues. It 
is no coincidence that late in the campaign, when 
Trump started doing live events again that the 
campaign’s messaging improved. Given the way 
that the voting rules had been relaxed to allow 
more early voting, it was too late by this point for 
Trump to show the wavering and undecided that 
it was OK to support him or that he was more 
competitive than the polls were saying as it turned 
out was so.
The Biden campaign was aided by environ-
mental conditions, by Trump’s performance and 
by Trump’s refusal to adjust the brand to a changed 
market. Biden’s campaign shows the importance of 
the power of having the right brand value com-
bination at the right time (competence, inclusion 
and empathy) plus an aspirational message about 
the future (build back better). The Biden camp also 
demonstrated the power of segmentation when 
it restricted the level at which new taxes would 
kick in to $400,000 meaning upper middle-class 
Americans appalled by Trump could vote for Biden 
unafraid of a tax rise.
Both campaigns and the brands that they 
developed are a testament to what the political 
scientist Alan Abramowitz has termed “negative 
partisanship”. Biden turned the campaign into a 
referendum on Trump by staying out of the way 
thus allowing Trump to become the face of the 
crisis. This elected Biden but it did not give him 
a mandate to do anything in office aside from 
not act like Donald Trump. This helped down 
ballot Republican candidates who presented their 
opponents as supporting their party’s left-wing 
figures and their agenda, especially those that the 
Biden team had endorsed. By campaign’s end both 
parties had given voters things to reject but little to 
support. Biden won, the Republicans held a skinny 
Senate majority, picked up House seats and did 
well at the state level; something that is important 
as House redistrict takes place within this term. 
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As elections become more driven by the 
marketability of the personalities of individual 
candidates, so increases the emphasis placed on 
their backgrounds. Personal narratives are brought 
to the fore, invoking a rich inheritance of adversity 
and triumph. For all that, there has been a lack 
of sustained attention given to the claimed and 
projected heritage myths around presidents and 
presidential campaigns. This gap in the literature is 
surprising, since national ancestry has frequently 
been a factor, not just in the image-building 
around candidates, but also in the negative mobili-
sation of ethnic and religious belonging. Examples 
range from the anti-Irish Catholic strains in the 
campaign against Kennedy to the racist undertones 
of the “birther” movement against Obama.
Biden in Ireland
In spite of historic anti-Catholic prejudices, 
scholars have long highlighted the power of 
the Irish American vote. In this context, the 
Democrat candidate Joe Biden has made a virtue 
of his Irish forebears, quoting Seamus Heaney in 
speeches and using the first presidential debate 
to assert an ancestral heritage characterized by 
tenacity. Indeed, his Secret Service codename is 
widely named as “Celtic.” Biden campaigners, 
moreover, established an “Irish Americans for 
Biden” committee, describing Biden as a “fellow 
Irish American” and “a friend of Ireland and 
Irish America”. In Ireland itself, obvious links 
with previous Democrats are highlighted, with 
journalist Niall O’Dowd predicting “the most 
Irish election since John F. Kennedy”. Also, a 
hook for a sidebar story was provided by a local 
relative eccentrically campaigning for Biden in 
his “homeland.” However, the bulk of coverage 
in Ireland centres on what importance may 
be attached to Biden’s “5/8ths” Irishness in 
securing U.S. votes, and the final weekend of the 
campaign sees the Irish Examiner emphasise the 
potential of the Irish diaspora in the potential 
swing states of Florida and Ohio, along with the 
ultimately significant Pennsylvania. In terms 
of its utility, Biden’s association with Ireland 
draws myths around self-betterment, social class 
and a culture of religious observation. These 
are discourses that reach beyond the Democrat 
constituency to appeal to elements of the 
conservative right, while remaining entangled 
within complex mythologies around the 
left-leaning fight for Irish self-determination.
Trump in Scotland
While incumbent President Trump’s ancestral 
association with Scotland is more palpable – his 
mother was born on the Scottish island of Lewis – 
the greater focus within Scotland is on his business 
interests in the local leisure and hospitality sector. 
While there have been strained links between 
Trump’s political style and the often rancorous 
politics of Scotland, the political consensus in 
Scotland is some way to the left of the President. 
While Trump has a minority of well-wishes – a 
recent poll found that 15% of Scots would give 
him their vote – Scots media tends to portray 
Trump disobligingly, as a cartoonish blowhard. 
In the public sphere more broadly, an iconic 
image of Scottish comedian Janey Godley bearing 
a handwritten sign insulting Trump is widely 
shared whenever there is deliberation of the presi-
dent’s character. The irreverent humour enabled 
by Trump’s singular personality and demeanour 
even extends to conventional news coverage, 
with local Scottish newspaper the Ayr Advertiser 
producing a parodic cliché of parochialism in the 
Trump-related headline “Turnberry hotelier tests 
positive for coronavirus”.
Conclusion
As attitudes towards Trump in Scotland tend to 
show, shared heritage does not necessarily equate 
with goodwill, and remains subject to deeper 
ideological commitments. Moreover, the previous 
focus by Trump on President Obama’s heritage 
points to a malign articulation between national 
origins and deeper cultural and racial prejudices. 
While discourses of Scots/Irish origins sit safely 
within a conservative United States mythology, a 
more diverse candidacy seem likely to generate 
more complex and dynamic set of alternatives. 
Future research should be alert to the shifting 
racial and ethnic hierarchies within which these 
heritage claims are circulated and reproduced. 
Celtic connections: reading the roots of Biden 
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Dr Michael Higgins 
Heads the Media and 
Communication programme 
at the University of 
Strathclyde in Scotland. He 
has published widely on 
political communications, 
conflict culture and 
populism. His most recent 
books are Belligerent 
Broadcasting (Routledge, 
2016) and The Language 
of Journalism (2nd edition, 
Bloomsbury, 2020), both co-
written with Angela Smith.
Prof Russ Eshleman
Head of the Department of 
Journalism at the Donald 
P. Bellisario College of 
Communications at Penn 
State University, USA, having 
formerly been a reporter 
and Pennsylvania statehouse 
bureau chief with The 
Philadelphia Inquirer.
57
Kamala Harris, Bobby Jindal, and the construction 
of Indian American identity in political campaigns
Democratic Vice President elect Kamala Harris’s 
public embrace of her multi-ethnic identity in the 
2020 presidential race starkly contrasts former 
Republican presidential candidate Bobby Jindal’s 
presentation (or rather, neglect) of his racial 
identity in 2015. Identity has had an increasingly 
important role to play in U.S. politics, contributing 
to the ever-expanding divide between Republicans 
and Democrats. The differing presentation of 
identity between these two Indian American 
candidates illustrates the divide in racial politics 
between the parties. As Lilliana Mason articulates 
in Uncivil Agreement, race is one of the many 
social identities through which American political 
parties have become sorted - “with Democrats 
now firmly aligned with identities such as liberal, 
secular, urban, low-income, Hispanic, and black” 
and “Republicans now solidly conservative, middle 
class or wealthy, rural, churchgoing, and white”.
One underrepresented, left-leaning ra-
cial-ethnic group that has had increased visibility 
in the 2020 election thanks to Kamala Harris are 
Asian Americans. Her appeals to the South Asian 
American community through references of her 
Indian immigrant roots in addition to the South 
Asian voter outreach efforts of the Biden-Harris 
campaign seemed to have energized this increas-
ingly politically active population. Towards the 
end of her presidential campaign, Harris released a 
video with Indian American celebrity Mindy Kaling 
in which they made masala dosas and bonded 
over their shared South Indian heritage. Harris 
performed various “isms” of Indian culture such as 
addressing Kaling’s father as “uncle,” and celebrat-
ing the fact that he stored spices in Taster’s Choice 
Jars (a unique commonality amongst Indians in the 
diaspora). Recently, Harris’s use of the Tamil word 
“chitti” meaning “mother’s younger sister” in her 
speech at the 2020 Democratic National Con-
vention sparked a wave of excitement, especially 
amongst Tamil Americans. It set off the creation of 
the Chitti Brigade, “a political sisterhood of 150-200 
members stretching across 20 states” committed to 
the election of Biden-Harris. 
In her 2020 study, Sara Sadhwani found that a 
co-ethnic candidate on the ballot stimulates Indian 
American voter turnout. If this is the case, then 
we should have expected more support from the 
Indian American community during the campaign 
of the only other Indian American to run for the 
White House, Bobby Jindal. However Sadhwani 
notes, “For Harris, if Indian Americans perceive 
her as sharing their identity as an Indian, she will 
probably see not only strong support but a boost in 
voter turnout from Indian Americans.” 
Jindal’s campaign did not include any direct 
appeals to Indian Americans that would enable 
them to perceive him as “sharing their identity,” 
nor did he promote his own Indian heritage. 
While Harris shared a sense of pride in her Indian 
roots, speaking frequently about her Indian 
immigrant mother and celebrating immigrants 
as an integral part of America, Jindal focused on 
the elimination of hyphenated identities, the need 
for immigrants to assimilate, and the belief that 
race does not matter in the election of a candidate. 
Jindal eclipsed his status as a racial minority in the 
Republican party by embodying a conservative, 
and very prominently, a Christian identity, that 
would appeal to his majority white base. Members 
of the Indian American community on both the 
Left and the Right criticized this dissociation 
with his Indian immigrant background. Celeb-
rities such as comedian Hari Kondabolu coined 
#JindalSoWhite, while comedian Hasan Minaj 
placed Jindal on the “Mount Rushmore of shitty 
Indians” in an episode of Patriot Act. Sampat 
Shivangi, a physician and founding member of the 
Republican Indian Council and the Republican 
Indian National Council said, "We were supporting 
him all these years because he's one of us. ... It 
hurts when somebody says that I am no more 
Indian-American. A lot of people felt that he used 
Indian-Americans to rise up to where he is. Once 
he got in, he just abandoned all of us.”
Given the existing literature on affective 
polarization and social sorting, it makes sense why 
Harris and Jindal approached their presentation of 
ethnic identity so differently. Scholars suggest that 
candidates attempt to take on the identity of their 
constituents to increase their chances of being 
perceived as a legitimate representation of their 
party. In considering the Democratic party’s more 
celebratory approach to diversity and immigration 
compared to Republicans, Harris is enabled by the 
discursive framework around diversity that is part 
of the Democratic party rhetoric but is unavailable 
to Jindal as a member of the Republican party. 
Nevertheless, Harris and Jindal present a case 
through which to understand the role of racial and 
ethnic identity in American presidential politics. 
More broadly, this presidential race highlighted 
the massive polarization in the American 
electorate, and elucidated the ways in which 
non-white candidates of each party are likely to 
present themselves in future elections. This will be 
increasingly important to examine as America is 
projected to move towards a non-white majority 
in the coming decades.
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During the first presidential debate in 2020, 
President Donald Trump raised eyebrows when he 
refused to condemn white supremacy but, instead, 
summoned its proponents to his defense. “Proud 
Boys, stand back and stand by,” he said, during 
an exchange with Joe Biden about public demon-
strations against police brutality; protests that had 
sometimes become violent. Trump’s entreaty to the 
Proud Boys hailed a known far-right and neo-fas-
cist all-male organization known for promoting 
political violence in the United States and Canada. 
It was hardly the first time he had engaged in such 
dog whistling.
We first wrote about Trump’s tendency to 
engage hate speech as a political tactic following 
his election in 2016. Hate speech is not merely 
language that can hurt someone’s feelings. Rather, 
we are concerned with words and phrases that, as 
Jae-Jin Lee writes, are “abusive, insulting, intimi-
dating, and harassing,” and “may lead to violence, 
hatred, or discrimination.” Our work includes 
language so coarse and provocative it becomes 
campaign strategy. Such “hate stratagems” work like 
tactics of war. Candidates use them like missiles 
to linguistically invade elections and destroy 
opponents using epithets, threats, and baseless lies. 
Trump and his team used hate stratagems 
throughout the 2020 contest. Mostly, these 
stratagems took one of four basic forms, first 
identified in earlier research: appeals meant to 
inflame the emotions of followers; denigrate the 
outclass; inflict permanent and irreparable harm 
on an opponent; and to conquer.
Inflaming the emotions joins arguments 
with moral sentiments to draw in people who 
share similar beliefs. When leaders use speech 
to generate anger or malice, something sinister 
happens: logic gives way. In June 2019, Trump, 
in a tweet, accused Democrat opponents of 
engaging “the ultimate act of moral cowardice” by 
not defending border patrol agents, their silence 
evidenced a lack of “character, virtue, and spine.” 
The president’s attack called his supporters to 
anger, but the signifier for their wrath was not 
entirely clear. From whom and for what were the 
Democratic candidates supposed to be defending 
the agents? Such silencing rhetoric is common in 
hate stratagems that inflame emotions. 
Stratagems that denigrate the outclass includes 
language that frames Black Americans, especially 
those in the inner cities, as lacking in values and 
virtue, and not taking personal responsibility for 
what happens in their lives. Going back to at least 
the Nixon administration, Republicans have run 
campaigns emphasizing a rhetoric of law and 
order. Trump takes this line even further, and 
divides the nation between (white) Americans 
who built the nation and represent its best values, 
and everyone else who poses a threat. During the 
summer of 2020 when cities in the U.S. erupted 
in violence following the police murder of George 
Floyd, Trump tweeted in support of law enforce-
ment, and against protestors, “These THUGS are 
dishonoring the memory of George Floyd, and I 
won’t let that happen… when the looting starts, the 
shooting starts.” By calling the protestors thugs, the 
president was marking them as “other,” suggesting 
they had reduced rights to speech and dissent as 
provided in the first amendment. Twitter marked 
the tweet as in violation of site conduct rules, a 
significant step to take against the President.
Stratagems that inflict permanent and irrepara-
ble harm: In the leadup to the second presidential 
debate, Donald Trump attacked the moderator, 
NBC’s Kristen Welker, as a “radical Democrat” 
who was “unfair” and “no good.” Such denigration 
of the media as necessarily bad for democracy is 
common to the 45th president, who famously began 
his tenure as president by calling the mainstream 
media “the enemy of the people.” Such language 
is delegitimizing past its moment of utterance. It 
requires the hearer to decide which side they are 
on, and discard the other. In such circumstances, 
no opportunity for discernment remains, only 
joining a bandwagon and holding on.
Stratagems that seek to conquer are about 
winning the election. One way to win is to go 
toe-to-toe on the issues. The other is to emphasize 
a difference in approach and personality. Trump 
did this successfully against Hillary Clinton in 
2016. In the days before his first debate against 
Biden, Trump doubled-down on this approach, 
tweeting “I will be strongly demanding a Drug Test 
of Sleepy Joe Biden prior to, or after, the Debate 
on Tuesday night. Naturally, I will take one also. 
His Debate performances have been record setting 
UNEVEN, to put it mildly. Only drugs could have 
caused this discrepancy???” This tweet gave Trump 
two avenues for victory, neither requiring him to 
prepare or do well in the debate. The first was that 
if Biden performed well, it had to be drugs, which 
would be proved by a test (that Biden almost surely 
wouldn’t take, a refusal that would also impugn his 
character). The second was that if Trump seemed 
worse than Biden, the answer was to be found in 
his abstinence, and so a bad performance was not 
due to his inadequacy or inferiority to Biden, but 
because the latter was juiced.
Hate stratagems work in campaigns when 
one side wants not only to win, but to rhetorically 
destroy the opposition. No one has used the 
technique with more mastery than Donald J. 
Trump. His defeat in 2020 leaves open the question 
as to whether a polarized electorate will continue 
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Campaign finance and the 2020 U.S. election
There is an old adage that “money isn’t everything.” 
However, in politics money equals success in 
elections. Without it, candidates cannot seriously 
mount a campaign, and certainly the candidate 
with the most money has an advantage. In fact, 
the issue of money in U.S. campaigns has been an 
issue for over a century. Ironically, while there is a 
level of money that permits entry into American 
political contests, there are limits to its impact. The 
2020 Election shows that full campaign coffers do 
not always guarantee victory. 
Pundits prior to election night predicted a 
“blue wave,” almost guaranteeing a repudiation 
of President Trump and the Republican Party’s 
policies over the past four years. What resulted, 
however, was a picture of the United States that 
showed a razor-sharp split between Republican 
and Democratic voters. While the winner of the 
presidential election is former Vice President Joe 
Biden (although litigation will continue for some 
time to come), what is clear is that the U.S. is split, 
more or less, evenly. We know that, not just because 
of the results, but because of the impact (or lack 
thereof) of the money spent in the 2020 election.
The money spent by Democrats on Senate 
and House races in the U.S. in 2020 demonstrates 
there was a clear cash advantage in several races. 
Democrats targeted Senate races in Kentucky 
(Mitch McConnell), Maine (Susan Collins), and 
South Carolina (Lindsey Graham), and spent 
hundreds of millions of dollars only to lose all of 
those races. Moreover, Democrats spent millions 
of dollars on House races, only to have Republican 
candidates pick up congressional seats. 
Democratic spending in the 2020 election did 
end up with some obvious successes. They held 
their majority in the House, won the Presidency, 
and have a chance to win the Senate majority. 
But taken as a whole these victories are not 
overwhelming, which begs the question what is the 
power of money in American politics? 
The answer to this question suggests three 
things about modern American campaigns. First, 
candidate message matters. Some Democrats 
blamed the Green New Deal and Defund the Police 
movements for Democratic losses in competitive 
districts. Likewise, President Donald Trump’s tone 
and combativeness is blamed for turning away 
traditionally Republican suburban voters, espe-
cially women. Messages can be amplified, spread 
and promoted, but message quality is ultimately 
free. Resonance of political message matters, and 
it is one of those intangible aspects to a political 
campaign that cannot be bought. 
Second, candidate quality matters. There were 
some very competitive House and Senate races 
in 2020. Senate races in Georgia, North Carolina, 
and Arizona were close, perhaps because those 
races were reflections of the Presidential election. 
Still, other races that were thought to be extremely 
competitive weren’t. Senate Majority Leader 
Mitch McConnell handily defeated a Democratic 
challenger who raised millions of dollars. Senator 
Lindsey Graham defeated his well-financed 
Democratic opponent. Senator Susan Collins, 
considered by many an extremely vulnerable 
Republican in a very Democratic state, retained 
her seat. What is the similarity in these three races? 
The incumbents had a longstanding relationship 
with the electorate. It appears that the voters in 
those states still liked them, and despite money 
amplifying the opponent’s message that was not 
enough to unseat them. 
Third, campaign finance as a political issue 
has lost the traction it once had. The 1990s and 
early 2000s was a time when money in politics was 
a major political issue. The McCain-Feingold Act 
(formally the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
of 2002), and the Citizens United v. FEC decision 
in 2010 were major political issues that garnered 
national attention. In fact, President Barack 
Obama chided the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Citizens United in his 2010 State of the Union 
speech, stating that the decision allowed “special 
interests” and “foreign corporations” to give money 
to campaigns. Famously, Justice Alito mouthed 
“not true.” However, the issue of campaign finance 
as a campaign issue is largely over. Parties have 
figured out the new norms of super-PACs and 
small donor funding online. While candidates may 
criticize each other over who their contributors are, 
the end result is that there is no current movement 
politically to change much of the way campaigns 
are financed. 
With the results of 2020 election still 
contested, and election litigation ongoing, what 
should we make of campaign finance? It seems 
that if 2020 has shown anything it highlights that 
admission to the campaign arena is expensive, but 
success requires something money cannot buy.
60
The Emperor had no clothes, after all
One of the most telling moments during the 
cumbersome U.S. election process, happened 
on Thursdafy, November 5. With the counting 
process well under way, President Trump held a 
press conference in the White House, denouncing 
what he considered massive electoral fraud. The 
most amazing thing, however, was that almost 
all the major networks simply cut away from the 
press briefing and went on with their own news 
program. Obviously, something had already 
changed. The change did not occur in the rhetoric 
of the president, since for a long time he had been 
complaining about mail voting and the counting 
process. Almost every one of his claims had been 
voiced before, without bringing in new evidence.
It has to be remembered that on that moment, 
President-elect Biden had not achieved a majority 
in the Electoral College yet, so formally President 
Trump was still fully in power. It took two more 
days for the media to feel sufficiently confident 
to project Joe Biden as winner of the elections. 
While the contest was still fully open, it was clear 
to everyone who kept an eye on the counting 
process that the Biden-Harris ticket would gather 
sufficient support.
The comments following the Trump statement 
were even more clearly devastating. Most reporters 
denounced the false claims by the president, and 
the dreaded word “lie”—something they had 
hesitated to voice previously—was now openly 
used. So, on Thursday evening, it was already clear 
that Trump was no longer treated with the respect 
and the decorum that one associates with a U.S. 
president. In the days following that statement, the 
announcement that the team of President Trump 
wanted to launch various legal procedures, was 
seen as irrelevant. It was clear for everyone that 
Donald Trump from now on could be considered 
as a loser and an outsider.
This abrupt reversal of a deferential attitude 
toward the incumbent president is extremely 
revealing about the dynamics of the Trump 
presidency. Former U.S. presidents are usually 
treated with respect. Even if their term in office 
was not an unqualified success, after a relatively 
short period they easily can dress in the cloak of a 
senior statesman, reflecting back on the political 
process. There is not much a former president 
can do wrong, given that visibility traditionally is 
highest when opening presidential libraries and 
attending funerals.
The very quick and abrupt withdrawal of 
respect for President Trump suggests that this kind 
of venerable future will not be self-evident for this 
president. The rapid fall from grace is much more 
a pattern we find in authoritarian regimes: once it 
is clear that the authoritarian leader no longer is 
able to cling to power, he rapidly loses every form 
of respect, and he is even singled out for mockery. 
This is a process we could clearly observe in 1989, 
when the authoritarian regimes of Central and 
Eastern Europe were toppled. The rapid fall from 
grace of Donald Trump fits this pattern; it is not 
the standard exit for a legitimate and democratical-
ly elected head of state.
One could say that the loneliest place in hell 
is reserved for former dictators: they do have 
followers as long as they are in power, but as their 
hold on power is based on fear, and not on loyalty, 
this vanishes from the moment they are expelled 
from the corridors of power. The fall from grace, 
therefore, illustrates the way authoritarian leaders 
exert power. The statements of Donald Trump on 
November 5 did not have anything exceptional: 
already years ago he made a habit of sending out 
twitter messages sowing doubts about the legiti-
macy of the electoral process. Already during the 
summer of 2020, The Washington Post estimated 
that, while in office, President Trump had publicly 
uttered more than 20,000 “false or misleading 
claims”. As long as he was well shrouded in regal 
habit, apparently these claims were faithfully 
reported by the news media. This tells us a lot 
about the dynamics of authoritarian regimes: even 
when it is very clear to everyone that the leader has 
lost any sense of reality, no one actually dares to 
voice that sentiment. Over the past years, President 
Trump has made a number of statements that are 
clearly wrong, and some of them even endangered 
public health. However, there was not a single 
news outlet that decided to stop repeating those 
misleading claims. 
The four years of President Trump have 
raised numerous questions about the stability of 
liberal democracy. To some extent, this might 
even be the most important question: the respect 
that is routinely attributed to political leaders, to 
a large extent renders them immune for normal 
intellectual scrutiny. Liberal democracy is based 
on a free exchange of ideas, but the system clearly 
was not designed to withstand a whole barrage of 
systematic misinformation, that is duly accepted 
as being within the norms of the acceptable. We 
all know that screaming “fire” in a crowded movie 
house can cause immediate harm. One could 
wonder whether that strict provision is sufficient 
to safeguard the future of liberal democracy, in 
an era of increasingly sophisticated misleading 
communication efforts, and the apparent readiness 
to accept such claims.
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The narrow margin in the 2020 presidential 
election underscores a now-familiar question: 
how to explain the enduring and stable support 
for Donald Trump, even in the face of economic 
distress, scandals, and global pandemic? Part of 
the answer lies in how he has crafted his political 
appeal over the last four years, but with an 
institutional cost. As approached by political com-
munication researchers, traditional issue framing 
contests involve partisans promoting policies 
that deserve political support in a deliberative 
arena, supported by political institutions and the 
journalistic routines that map onto them. But the 
press has been under attack, particularly during 
the last several years, and these contests are in 
disarray - resistant to conventional argumentation, 
freed from norms of restraint, and fed by a climate 
of weaponized misinformation. Trump has both 
helped create and exploit these conditions, while 
pursuing a strategy that hardened a remarkably 
stable base.
Reflecting on the 2016 election results, I 
argued in this report that Trump’s Make America 
Great Again (MAGA) slogan-frame was a logical 
xenophobic extension of the foundation laid by 
former President George W. Bush’s Global War 
on Terror (GWOT). But I anticipated that voters 
would eventually recognize Trump’s inability to 
deliver on his hyperbolic promises to restore the 
old mythical ways. But his failure to do so hasn’t 
dented his appeal to nearly half the electorate, who 
perceive he speaks for them. Indeed, if anything he 
has gained support, with an identity-based appeal 
that taps into something primal, allowing him to 
ward off the usual political consequences for his 
many transgressions (including impeachment). 
If the GWOT encouraged a fear of the non-U.S. 
“other,” geo-political security threats have been 
downplayed under “Trumpulism” in favor of more 
local fear-based appeals around immigration 
and border walls.  Underlying this strategy and 
built into MAGA was an appeal to preserving the 
general order of things, among those who feared it 
being taken away. Thus, the GWOT became turned 
inward toward the domestic political other. Social 
justice movements and their wide-spread recent 
protests were cast as threats to law and order, 
creating a self-fulfilling prophesy when, following 
its “protest paradigm,” delegitimating news 
coverage served to attract militarized responses 
from police and right-wing militia groups.
So, what now is the organizing principle that, 
as I’ve put it before regarding issue framing, helps 
to “meaningfully structure the social world”? 
Trump has aligned himself with certain policies 
(e.g., abortion, trade, deregulation), that can be 
located within conventional political narratives, 
but more powerfully encompassing is Us against 
Them. The tribe and the leader are the principle. 
Invoking political scientist Robert Entman’s 
widely-cited framing elements, Us vs. Them 
makes the very existence of the other side the 
problem definition. In addition, the frame carries 
an often-explicit moral evaluation. (Trump, for 
example, declared Democratic vice-presidential 
candidate Kamala Harris a “monster.”)  And it 
implies a causal interpretation, that electoral defeat 
means the loss of a way of life. The treatment 
recommendations are obvious:  not only must the 
unworthy other side be defeated politically but 
destroyed (or at least “locked up”).  
That approach may have made Trump’s base 
impervious to erosion these last few years, but 
it has come at a great cost to civic health and 
the machinery of governance, the traditional 
institutions designed to mediate conflicts over 
social visions. Such a polarizing and Manichean 
framework yields an asymmetrical contest, where 
one side, convinced of an existential threat against 
it, is willing to cast aside traditional norms (losing 
means the process was illegitimate, by definition), 
and encouraged to do so by a self-reinforcing 
counter-institutional media willing to do the same. 
Institutions require commitments, trusting that the 
overall interests of the community will be served, 
even if those of the tribe are momentarily not. Us 
vs. Them opposes these commitments.
The pandemic has helped further reveal that 
schism, with even the simple act of wearing a mask 
becoming politicized and a visible symbol for the 
divide. Like institutional commitment, masks 
reflect concern for others, protecting them against 
one’s own transmission, but to be effective the 
entire community must embrace them. No wonder 
they have become a tribal marker; they don’t fit an 
Us vs. Them, anti-institutional mentality. Trump 
has attacked the value of expertise and the press, 
rendering him and the country ill-equipped to 
effectively respond to this public health threat, 
an enemy he couldn’t humiliate or completely 
deny. And yet his base remained intact, as Trump 
attempted to declare victory by executive decree: 
“We’re rounding the corner.” The tribalist strategy 
was effective for Trump up to a point, but failed 
to win over a majority while taking a toll on the 
national political infrastructure. No matter the 
electoral outcome there would have been major 
repair work needed in the years to come.
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When journalism’s relevance is also on the ballot
The closing of the polls on Tuesday, November 3, 
2020, marked the opening of a campaign waged 
by Donald Trump and his allies to discredit the 
counting of mail-in and provisional ballots that 
were sure to erode—and eventually overtake—
Trump’s lead in in-person voting in several key 
states. By Thursday night, when Trump’s lead was 
nearly permanently gone, claims of election fraud 
reached a fever pitch among the primetime news 
hosts on the right-leaning Fox News Channel. Sean 
Hannity, on his eponymous program Hannity, 
launched a relentless diatribe delegitimizing the 
vote counting in deeply Democratic Philadelphia 
County in Pennsylvania. At one point, he inter-
viewed Newt Gingrich, a Fox News contributor 
and former Republican congressperson who had 
served as Speaker of the House of Representatives 
in the late 1990s. Gingrich did not mince words 
in describing the ongoing ballot counting: “No 
one should have any doubt, you are watching an 
effort to steal the presidency of the United States.” 
Gingrich added, “This is a genuine deep crisis 
of our survival,” and he called for the arrest of 
ballot counters and the dismissal of legitimately 
cast votes. Even with all the heated allegations of 
unfounded wrongdoing, Gingrich’s statements 
were frighteningly anti-democratic. But this is 
not some marginal figure appearing on some 
marginal media channel on the fringes of society. 
Instead, here was the former Speaker of the 
House appearing on a major news outlet watched 
by millions of people to discredit a democratic 
election and call for the arrest of government 
officials in charge of tallying ballots.
What does this rant, and its amplification by 
a news channel, tell us about journalism in 2020? 
We believe it signals how much our media culture 
has changed. That is, even if traditional journalistic 
practices remain more-or-less intact, the overall 
media environment has changed radically in 
recent times. This is true of the supply of media 
content, particularly through the right-wing media 
machine of Fox News, talk radio, and digital news 
sites like Breitbart and the Daily Wire, but also in 
the distribution of information generally through 
social media platforms that operate wholly outside 
traditional news channels—as in the case of 
Facebook groups promoting QAnon and an-
ti-vaxxer conspiracies. What is at stake, as we argue 
in a forthcoming book, Redefining Journalistic 
Relevance: The Struggle to Claim What’s True, is the 
very relevance of journalism in our contemporary 
media culture.
The relevance of journalism—in its main-
stream, neutral, evidenced-based form—is in 
danger in no small part because identity politics 
have weaponized what news we watch. Historically, 
our theories of media—especially around media 
consumption—have been based on characteristics 
of information. Give people good, relevant, accurate 
information about public affairs, this perspective 
assumes, and a vibrant democracy shall follow.
With ideological media machines in overdrive, 
however, journalism and political communication 
scholars have come to realize that the world is no 
longer defined by information, but by identities. 
Trump supporters see in their candidate their 
own unspoken—and, perhaps for many, unac-
knowledged—values such as fear that immigrants 
will steal their livelihoods. Central to this is a 
decades-long cultivation of a belief that mainstream 
news outlets spout liberal agendas littered with 
“fake news,” a term that Trump has so effectively 
deployed to capture many people’s pre-existing 
frustrations with journalists and to undermine any 
future confidence in the press. Trump supporters 
listen when he tells them to ignore journalists—the 
“the enemy of the people,” he calls them—and get 
their information only from him or his sanctioned 
sources such as Fox News.
Meanwhile, for those on the left, investment 
in mainstream journalism organizations became 
symbolic of their commitment to democracy, which 
they conflated with the Democratic candidate. 
For the first time in decades, the needle on media 
trust markedly ticked upward—but only for those 
leaning left. Recent surveys show that, in America 
today, your media choices are driven primarily by 
your ideology. And even while fears about online 
filter bubbles are mostly overblown, research shows 
how people overall inhabit increasingly divergent 
information worlds: you watch Fox News or you 
watch MSNBC, you listen to friends and family 
who think the same way you do and you dismiss 
everything else as fake news. And doing so makes 
us feel secure in our righteousness, secure in our 
sense of self. As Daniel Kreiss wrote in describing 
Tea Party members, “Fox News was less about 
‘information’ than ‘family’”—reinforcing the power 
of identity for understanding contemporary media 
and politics.
Even once the dust settles on Election 2020, 
this dynamic of “identity over information” will 
endure as polarization deepens. Journalists in 
recent years have tried to figure out how to better 
reach communities that seem beyond their grasp, 
from people of color to rural whites. But journalists 
will never rebuild trust among people who feel 
marginalized by news by simply offering more of 
the same—more helpings of “just good, accurate 
news.” Doubling down on high-quality information 
is not without merit, but it misses the essence of 
the challenge ahead: How does one do journalism 
in a way that appeals to people’s core identities, 
particularly as those identities fracture and diverge 
and confound traditional universals?
In hindsight, this election may be seen as a 
pivotal test of mainstream journalism’s relevance 
and the difficulty of doing news that matters in the 
emergent media culture.
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Beyond the horse race: voting process coverage in 
2020
In October 2020, a group of political communica-
tion researchers came together to form a scholarly 
network of experts, the Election Coverage and 
Democracy Network, with the intent to assist 
journalists with the difficult job of covering an ex-
traordinary election. The group produced a white 
paper detailing recommendations for covering the 
election, taking into account journalistic con-
straints. Among the recommendations included 
in this white paper was for journalists to elevate 
voters and election administrators, producing 
coverage that focuses on the process of voting. 
This sort of coverage, what I call voting 
process coverage, is valuable to news outlets as it 
features human-interest, showing everyday acts of 
civic duty, and also permits journalists to distance 
themselves from the partisan fray. Voting process 
coverage is also likely to appeal to news consumers, 
who are more likely to be voters. I define voting 
process coverage as coverage that includes a 
discussion of electoral administration, electoral 
institutions, and electoral processes. 
Voting process coverage might include 
interviews with poll workers, discussion of how 
ballots are counted, or footage of long lines at 
polling places. Such process coverage is likely 
featured throughout the election cycle but is 
more likely to be allocated airtime in the days 
immediately preceding Election Day and during 
early voting. This is particularly true for television 
news coverage, during which time there is more 
opportunity for compelling visuals to accompany 
coverage. Importantly, this coverage can also be of 
utility to news consumers as they prepare to cast 
their ballot. 
At least anecdotally, this sort of coverage was 
in heavy rotation during coverage of the 2020 
election. While national outlets like Slate covered 
how the AP will decide when to make calls, and 
The New York Times reported on estimated ballot 
counting timelines state-by-state, local news 
outlets ran features on the teams that process ballot 
drop boxes and poll workers. 
And yet, researchers have heretofore neglected 
the study of this subset of electoral coverage. I 
argue that voting process coverage is worthy of 
scholarly attention as it differs in important ways 
from the two types of electoral coverage that 
researchers focus on. First, unlike strategic game 
coverage, which discusses strategies and tactics 
and polls, putting campaigns and candidates 
at the center, voting process coverage centers 
citizens. Second, often issue coverage is lauded as 
the substantive alternative to the horse race, and 
yet research shows it makes up only a fraction of 
coverage, in part because it is unlikely to make 
journalists’ agenda. On the other hand, co-author 
Christopher Mann and I find that voting process 
coverage is substantial and more likely to be 
included in broadcasts in the lead up to elections. 
So how much of 2020 election coverage 
featured voting process? While it will take time 
to carefully parse the data, some insights can 
be gleaned from the Stanford Cable TV News 
Analyzer. This program analyzes a dataset featuring 
over 270,000 hours of television news program-
ming and commercials, including Fox News, CNN, 
and MSNBC. In tandem with a voting process 
dictionary, validated on a manually coded dataset 
of 2016 and 2018 national television news election 
coverage, I use their search function to query 
caption text, pulling all instances of search terms 
included in the dictionary on all 3 cable networks 
from January 1, 2020 to November 4, 2020.  As the 
default setting of the program captures only the 
utterance of the word and coverage includes more 
than just the term itself, I include in this query 
30-second windows around each term, or the 
screen time equivalent of 2-sentences. To put the 
amount of screen time into context, I also estimate 
the amount of coverage given the total amount 
of coverage on all 3 networks. This series can 
be found in Figure 1. This series shows the total 
estimated screen time dedicated to coverage of all 
search terms from the voting process dictionary
As the Figure shows, a substantial amount of 
airtime is dedicated to voting process coverage, but 
this is particularly true in the days leading up to 
Election Day. The ratio of voting process coverage 
was at its highest on November 3, 2020 (0.358), 
with the second-highest ratio falling on Election 
Day (0.354). 
These data underscore the argument made 
herein, that while horse race coverage has (un-
derstandably) been the topic of scholarly focus, 
this focus neglects a subset of coverage that is of 
empirical and normative interest: voting process 
coverage. While much analysis of the 2016 election 
focused on media failures, as scholars unpack the 
role of the media in the 2020 election, the story 
of voting process coverage may be a compelling 
example of democracy-worthy news practice. 
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Figure 1: Ratio of airtime on CNN, MSNBC, and Fox News 
dedicated to voting process coverage
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During the 2020 election, YouTube was a popular 
space for campaign-related news and information. 
While the platform houses videos on a wide range 
of topics—everything from cooking tutorials to 
music videos—Americans are increasing relying 
on YouTube as a way to get news. According to 
a recent Pew report, about one quarter (26%) of 
U.S. adults say they get news on YouTube, and of 
these people, seven-in-ten (72%) characterize it as 
“important” in their keeping up with news. 
Yet understanding the role YouTube plays 
as a news space, especially during an election, is 
marked by several contradictory factors. First, 
YouTube includes channels from mainstream news 
organizations as well as alternative media and 
hyper-partisan channels. Second, some YouTube 
news channels have a large number of subscribers 
with videos that garner millions of views, while 
other channels have a smaller audience. And third, 
YouTube is both a video distribution platform and 
a social space for commenting, liking, and sharing. 
These factors create a unique space for news 
and raise concerns about channels that propagate 
extreme political viewpoints and disinformation, 
and the potential for viewers to become more 
polarized, especially if algorithms recommend a 
steady dose of hyper partisan videos to certain users. 
Partisan media YouTube channels 
During the first six months of 2020, I examined 
video content from six partisan media channels (3 
conservative and 3 liberal) and one mainstream 
news channel (ABC News). I drew a random 
sample of 50 videos from each YouTube channel 
and coded the videos for several factors. Overall, I 
found that partisan channels have several charac-
teristics that facilitate political commentary and 
viewer involvement.  
For example, partisan channels overwhelm-
ingly use a “presentation” video format where the 
host(s) talks directly to the camera/viewers with 
no interactions with guests/experts (see Figure 
1). Across the six partisan channels, presentation 
videos accounted for 72% to 96% of a channel’s 
videos. This is in stark contrast to ABC News, where 
only 22% of videos were in a presentation format 
(a majority of videos were in a “hosted” format 
featuring conversations with guests/experts). 
Partisan channels were more likely to focus ex-
clusively on stories about politics and government, 
while ABC News had a wider set of topics they also 
covered (see Table 1). 
And lastly, partisan channels employ several 
practices to increase viewer involvement with 
video content (see Figure 2). Certain techniques—
like encouraging viewers to watch additional 
videos or to follow the channel on other social 
network sites—were common and not distinct to 
partisan channels. The same was not true for other 
techniques, like making direct appeals to viewers, 
telling personal stories/anecdotes, and providing 
comment prompts. Although these practices were 
not as frequent, they were more likely to occur 
within partisan channels, and particularly those 
with lower number of subscribers. 
These findings illustrate some of the ways that 
partisan YouTube channels differ in format, focus, 
and facilitating involvement. The 2020 election 
severed as a backdrop for these practices.  
The 2020 election 
During the 2020 election, YouTube faced pressure 
to quickly identify and limit the spread of 
election-related conspiracy theories. A notable 
case was the October 14th New York Post story 
about a recovered laptop that allegedly belonged 
to Hunter Biden (son of Democratic candidate 
Joe Biden) that contained information of shady 
business dealings involving his father. The story 
was criticized for a lack of verifiable evidence and 
for being part of a Russian disinformation effort to 
sway votes from Joe Biden. 
In response, YouTube did not take any direct 
action to remove the NY Post video story, but did 
reaffirm their commitment to taking down con-
spiracy videos that promote violence. This decision 
stands in contrast to the efforts of Facebook, which 
limited sharing of the Post’s story until third-party 
fact checkers could verify it, and Twitter which 
initially blocked the story and the Post’s main 
Twitter account. 
By Election Day, the Post’s YouTube video 
amassed only a modest 174,695 views, likely due 
to its limited circulation on Facebook and Twitter. 
Yet, the YouTube reach of the story is far greater 
than a single video. The story was fodder for many 
YouTube channels, particularly partisan media 
channels. By one estimate, over 1,983 videos about 
the “Hunter Biden laptop” story were published in 
the remaining weeks of the campaign. The most 
popular of these videos have millions of views, 
and, with the exception of the Daily Show, are 
from channels associated with a conservative 
perspective (see Table 2). 
Ultimately, many U.S. voters encountered elec-
tion-related news and information on YouTube. As 
the Hunter Biden laptop story shows, the potential 
for sharing and believing election disinformation 
is real, especially at the hands of partisan media 
channels that focus on political commentary 
and prioritize viewer involvement. However, this 
potential is not equal across all YouTube users, and 
reflects the complicated space that YouTube now 
occupies as a source for news. 
YouTube as a space for news
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Figure 1. The dominance of a ‘presentation’ 
format among partisan YouTube channels 
Note: L = liberal; C = conservative 
Table 2. Most popular YouTube videos about the Hunter Biden laptop story 
Channel Title Views
1. Sky News Australia EXCLUSIVE: Joe Biden’s son emailed shop owner about hard drive to 
‘get it back’: Former Trump chief
4,869,812
2. The Daily Show with Trev-
or Noah
Jordan Klepper Hits One Last Trump Rally Before the Election 4,495,002
3. Fox News Tucker exclusive: Tony Bobulinski, ex-Hunter Biden associate, speaks 
out on Joe Biden
3,645,258
4. Fox News Ted Cruz grills Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey for ‘censoring’ Hunter Biden 
story
2,464,575
5. Fox News Tucker: Hunter Biden documents suddenly vanish 2,058,828
6. StevenCrowder EXCLUSIVE: Giuliani Shows New Hunter Biden Evidence ON AIR 2,026,201
7 Fox News Tucker: Hunter Biden documents suddenly reappear 1,975,989
8. Fox Business DNI Ratcliffe: Hunter Biden’s emails are ‘not part’ of Russian disinforma-
tion campaign
1,376,583
9. Newsmax TV I looked through the Biden hard drive 1,372,033
10. Fox News Twitter CEO speaks out after tech giant suppresses NY Post’s Hunter 
Biden story
1,338,597
Note: from Oct 14 to Nov 3, 2020
Table 1. Political focus among partisan YouTube channels  
Percent of a channel’s videos 
about politics / government
ABC News 44%
The Young Turks (L) 78%
The Daily Wire (C) 74%
Next News Network (C) 82%
David Pakman Show (L) 82%
Common Sense Show (C) 50%
Niko House & The MCSC Network (L) 82%
Note: Channels ordered from highest number of subscribers to lowest;
L = liberal; C = conservative
Figure 2. Viewer involvement practices across 
YouTube channels 
Note: Channels ordered from highest number of 
subscribers to lowest  
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2020 shows the need for institutional news media to 
make racial justice a core value of journalism
“This is vindication for a lot of people who have 
really suffered...you know, the I can’t breathe? That 
wasn’t just George Floyd. That was a lot of people 
that felt that they couldn’t breathe...and you spent 
so much of your life energy trying to hold it together 
” – Van Jones, CNN 
After CNN called the election, commentator Van 
Jones, a Black man, choked up on screen, sharing 
his emotions and a narrative about how Black 
people in American felt more unsafe than ever 
before just going about their daily lives in Trump’s 
America – just going to Walmart, as he explained, 
might result in someone shouting a racist slur.  
Trump was not a spigot who turned on racism 
in this country, but he was the faucet that let it 
flow at full blast. Many other Americans breathed 
a sigh of relief because that hate will not come 
from the highest office of the land, in fact, with 
Kamala Harris, there is a Black woman in that high 
office as second in command. The fight is only just 
beginning…again. 
The most alarming point the U.S. needs to 
reckon with is that 71 million Americans voted 
for Trump, a man who went so far as to signal his 
support to white supremacists from the presidential 
debate stage. Institutional news media needs to 
lead the way: it is clear that the whiteness of the 
institutional news media, along with its heter-
onormativity, its fundamentally secular bent, and 
its belief in neutrality, leads to many blind spots. 
I argue this point in News for the Rich White and 
Blue, my forthcoming book, and suggest commer-
cial pressures are unlikely to pave the way for much 
reform in terms of diversity, equity and inclusion.  
Like many white Americans, I could not 
fathom how so many Trump voters could brush 
away his racism. Unfortunately, the Black voices 
(and BIPOC generally) who work at institutional 
news outlets are left explaining to white readers and 
viewers that racism doesn’t go away in a summer 
of national reckoning. These voices are still on the 
sidelines. Even though The New York Times is led by 
Dean Baquet, a Black man, voices that would argue 
that anti-racism is a core value of journalism are 
still not empowered to do so at The Times, unless it 
is a historical project, as with Nikole Hannah Jones’ 
1619, or as opinion contributors. 
This 71 million turnout of people endorsing 
racism is a reminder that the U.S. has not inter-
rogated its past and the institutional news media 
has largely avoided doing so. One explanation is 
the lack of power accorded to minority voices in 
newsrooms, where newsrooms, including televi-
sion, appear diverse but real power is still held by 
white decision-makers. Another explanation is 
the reluctance to see racial equity as a basic news 
value rather than as a political orientation. This is 
objectivity gone wrong. 
Just this summer, the AP style guide suggested 
capitalizing Black, and in 2019, instructed news 
organizations to avoid using ambiguous language 
like “racially-charged” or “racially-motivated” - 
pushing news organizations to make a call that 
something or someone is racist. Still, for journal-
ists working in institutional media, to endorse 
Black Lives Matter is to move from neutrality to 
political activity. This will be a lasting challenge 
for any effort for newsrooms that try to tackle 
systemic racism. 
 My colleague at Illinois, Pulitzer-winner 
Leon Dash, sued The Washington Post in 1972 
with six other Black journalists while working 
there for workplace discrimination. He told me a 
story about how at the time, he watched a Black 
reporter wearing a Black Power necklace get fired 
for refusing to take it off. I wonder about this - what 
was the Post thinking? Would the necklace come off 
and suddenly, the journalist no longer find Black 
injustice as part of his professional worldview? 
The sad fact is that Black journalists are still taken 
off coverage of Black Lives Matter because of 
their “compromised” objectivity. This is a mistake 
and a failure to reckon with white privilege in 
newsrooms. As transgender journalist Lewis Raven 
Wallace writes, “Obviously, I can’t be neutral or 
centrist in a debate over my own humanity.” 
The question that remains for me is this: how 
can U.S. newsrooms reckon with racism better and 
get to the not-so-deep underbelly of why 71 million 
Americans saw no problem voting for Trump? 
White newsrooms cannot keep having people of 
color doing it for them (and us). To do so requires 
interrogating core values and viewing racial justice 
not as politics but as a core value of journalism.
As Wendi Thomas, award-winning investi-
gative journalist and editor of social justice news 
outlet MLK50 wrote to me after I asked for ways to 
make this very argument to my other colleagues, 
“Newsrooms have always operated under some 
foundational truths: It’s good for people to have 
enough food to eat. Shelter is important. Quality 
education matters…..That expanding those truths 
- in the face of undeniable and incontrovertible 
quantitative and qualitative evidence that Black life 
is devalued and endangered in every way that can 
be measured - strikes the old guard as a violation 
of objectivity shows that the facts don’t matter as 
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The overwhelming majority of endorsements 
by large American daily newspapers in the 2020 
presidential race can be read as saying with 
urgency, ‘I told you so. Now, please listen this time 
before it is too late.’
What did the newspapers tell voters? The 
Tampa Bay Times in Florida reminded readers 
its endorsement of Democrat Joseph R. Biden in 
2020 -- that it warned in 2016, “Donald Trump 
is stunningly unprepared and temperamentally 
unfit for the presidency, and he has played upon 
our deepest fears and worst impulses with reckless 
rhetoric, wild promises and flagrant disregard for 
the truth” (October 8, 2020). 
The term “unfit” or “fit,” questioning candidate 
Trump’s aptitude and decorum for the presidency, 
was used at least 30 times in 2016 by large daily 
newspapers in endorsements of his opponent, 
Democrat Hilary Clinton, whom the newspapers 
found well-suited for the position. (I had access to 
most but not all of the newspaper endorsements.) 
In 2020, the terms “unfit” or “fit” were used at 
least 13 times, but the smaller number does not 
reflect less concern about Trump’s character and 
temperament. In fact, there was greater concern 
as newspapers now had a record of his behavior as 
president to focus on rather than largely descrip-
tions of his personality. 
That record led 47 of the top 100 circulation 
newspapers to endorse Biden for president in the 
2020 election. That number includes 15 newspa-
pers which did not make an endorsement in 2016 
but felt compelled to do so in 2020. Still, 47 was a 
decrease from the 57 that endorsed Hilary Clinton 
in 2016, partly because 8 newspapers in the top 
100 were a part of the McClatchy chain, which did 
not allow endorsements unless newspapers could 
interview both candidates. 
President Trump, who was endorsed by only 
two of the top 100 newspapers in 2016, saw his 
support among newspapers rise to 7. Another 26 
newspapers did not endorse, either as a matter 
of principle or chose none of the candidates, 
compared to 31 in 2016. 
In addition to their continuing frame of 
President Trump as unfit for the office, the 
newspapers favoring Biden framed the president as 
dangerous to democracy because of his propensity 
to ignore facts, spread falsehoods, and attack the 
press as well as his authoritarian proclivities. The 
words ‘misinformation’ and ‘disinformation’ did 
not appear in the 2016 endorsements, but appeared 
at least 10 times in the 2020 endorsements in 
reference to Trump’s loose way with words. 
The Los Angeles Times was so alarmed, it 
endorsed Biden on September 10, much earlier 
than newspapers typically endorse. In the editorial 
Joe Biden isn’t just ‘anybody but Trump.’ He’s the 
right fit for our polarized time, the newspaper 
observed, “Nothing less than the health of our 
constitutional democracy is at stake,” and there 
was nothing the president could do to change their 
mind. The Philadelphia Inquirer, in Biden’s home 
state, assailed the president’s “nonstop assault on 
American democracy” in the editorial Pennsylva-
nia needs Biden (October 11, 2020) 
and the Detroit Free Press proclaimed that 
the president represented “an existential threat to 
democracy itself ” in the editorial Joe Biden is the 
anti-toxin America needs (September 20, 2020). 
So concerned was USA Today for “the future of 
America’s democracy,” it broke tradition and for 
the first time in its 38-year history endorsed a 
presidential candidate in the editorial Elect Joe 
Biden. Reject Donald Trump (October 20, 2020). 
The newspaper accused Trump of making more 
than 20,000 false statements as president. 
As noted, the president had the support of a 
number of newspapers, although not unqualified. 
The Las Vegas Review-Journal, one of only two 
large dailies that endorsed Trump in 2016, ac-
knowledged in the editorial Endorsement: President 
of the United States that the president’s “impulsive 
and often distasteful rhetoric” can be problematic, 
which allowed Biden  “to make this race about 
presidential character” (October 3, 2020). The New 
York Post, which did not endorse in 2016, gave 
the president a full-throttle endorsement in The 
New York Post endorses President Donald J. Trump 
for re-election (October 26, 2020). However, in an 
unenthusiastic editorial headlined With misgivings, 
vote Trump for president and Inslee for governor, 
The Spokesman-Review, in the state of Washington, 
called the president “a bully and a bigot” as well 
as a “a wretched human being” but said vote for 
him anyway because his “policies and instincts 
for helping America thrive are generally correct” 
(October 25, 2020). It was the only newspaper to 
flip from Clinton in 2016 to President Trump. 
None of the endorsements supporting the 
president mentioned the criticism of him as a 
threat to democracy; rather, their sentiments were 
expressed by the The Las Vegas Review-Journal 
which stated, “For all his flaws,” vote for him 
anyway because he is moving the country forward 
“while embracing rather than destroying the 
principles of liberty and freedom that have made 
the United States a beacon for the rest of the world” 
(October 3, 2020). 
Just moments ago on this Saturday, after four 
days after tense vote counting, the question of pres-
idential fitness has been resolved and democracy 
restored. Maybe. Joe Biden has been declared the 
46th president of the United States. 
Newspaper endorsements, presidential fitness 
and democracy
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The promise of alternative media is found in their 
independent, adversarial voice. What happens 
when that voice changes?
When discussing alternative media, the propo-
sition has been a straightforward one: Alternative 
media are politically-outspoken, doing little to 
disguise their subjectivity. They are also ardently 
independent, seeing themselves as adversaries of 
traditional media. Particularly online, alternative 
media and their journalists see theirs as a better 
version of the news, free from the corporate 
pressures and proximity to power they say is 
corrupting establishment political journalism. 
These media, normally, push back on those in 
power – across all sorts of ways of understanding it 
– and see traditional media among those in power.
But is this still the case? At the close of 2020 
campaign, it’s this alternative-as-independent 
voice that appears to be faltering, and perhaps 
more so on the right than the left, as the distance 
between alternative and traditional conservative 
media narrows.
An entrenched conservative ecosystem
A first sign of a blurring distinction between 
alternative and mainstream content emerges in the 
conservative alternative media coverage of the end 
of the 2020 campaign, quickly making common 
cause with their corporate media counterparts. 
RedState defended Fox News, attacking CNN’s 
Jake Tapper for having “the actual chutzpah to 
try and dictate journalistic standards to a rival 
news network that CNN simply cannot touch”. 
Elsewhere on RedState, they attacked mainstream 
media through obsequious praise for Fox News’ 
Tucker Carlson, who “points out in his typical 
excellent fashion how terrible our intellectual 
betters in the media are at their jobs.” On that 
ground, this is familiar: alternative media attacking 
the mainstream. Indeed we expect partisan media 
to fire such pot shots, with MSNBC and CNN 
regular targets for right-wing sites like PJ Media, 
and Fox News regularly called to task by left-wing 
sites like Talking Points Memo.
Yet over and over, at the heart of much of this, 
is Tucker Carlson, who may be an arch-conserv-
ative, but certainly works for one of the largest 
media corporations. He is regularly treated as 
somehow ‘outside’ the corporate mainstream, 
lauded at Breitbart for “calling out” Sen. Lindsey 
Graham (R-SC), and elevated at Daily Caller (a site 
he co-founded) where a hypothetical Carlson 2024 
presidential campaign is acknowledged. In praising 
Carlson, a link between the alternative right-wing 
media and the conservative corporate media is 
made stronger. And a healthy distinction between 
‘alternative’ and ‘mainstream’ is weakened.
What do we see on the left at the same time? 
On blogs like Talking Points Memo, Daily Kos, and 
others, they certainly attack the conservative Fox 
News. But ‘liberal’ networks like MSNBC simply 
aren’t given the same sort of unabashed support on 
the alternative left. Instead, they are regularly crit-
icized, for being more corporate, more traditional, 
and simply, less-alternative. Daily Kos describes 
cable news networks as “milking this moment of 
heightened attention [the end of the campaign] 
for all the ratings points and ad dollars they can 
rake in”. On Jezebel’s politics site ‘The Slot’, they list 
‘terrible tweets’ skewering political commentators 
from both the left and right, including MSNBC, 
the never-Trump Lincoln Project, and Crooked 
Media founder (and former Obama speech writer) 
Jon Favreau. 
In other words, from the alternative liberal 
media we see both predictable attacks on ide-
ological enemies, and a willingness to critique 
ideological friends, including along alternative/
mainstream distinctions. 
Alternative to what?
At first glance, this signals a faltering alternative-in-
dependent voice among conservative alternative 
media. In substance, we see little distinction 
between their content and Fox News’, in part, and 
between theirs and Tucker Carlson’s, in particular. 
It’s fair to ask how much this abandonment of 
‘alternativeness’ among the right also reflects an 
ideological moment. The tie that binds seems to be 
an unflinching allegiance to Trump, in a further 
calcification of the conservative media ecosystem 
Robert Faris and colleagues identified in 2016. 
Conservative alternative media could be propping 
up other conservative media like the Wall Street 
Journal, New York Post, or Fox News to reinforce 
Trump’s all-out assault on news media that critique 
him (and lambast them when they don’t). It is also 
fair to wonder whether we’ll see a similar left-ward 
dynamic as Biden enters the White House (though 
the residue of progressive-centrist primary battles 
suggests this is unlikely).
What remains striking is not the ideological 
fraternity of right-wing voices, but the degree to 
which ‘alternativeness’ has been lost. Setting aside 
a cynical conclusion that like-minded media would 
naturally reinforce each other, these shifts suggest 
a more fractured media ecosystem where conserv-
ative media, whether alternative or traditional, 
operate according to their own logics. 
There is a compelling argument that a plural-
istic and heterogeneous media system composed of 
both mainstream and alternative voices is a boon 
to democracies. Disagreement between media can 
foster better journalism as a check on complacency 
and offer a wider public more opportunities for 
news content. But now? This pluralism is less 
apparent, and given conservative alternative 
media’s allegiance to both the sitting president and 
one of the largest corporate news companies, it 
certainly raises the question: Alternative to what?
Alternative to what? A faltering alternative-as-
independent media 
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When it comes to the 2020 United States 
Elections, newsrooms will likely see that there 
is a fine line between news innovation for the 
election and how the industry is pivoting during 
the pandemic. With the shift to digital and a 
shattering of silos across different types of media 
(e.g., web analytics tools and even products 
like podcasts to their offering or toolkits), news 
organizations have been tinkering, developing 
one-off types of innovation and rethinking how 
to best position themselves in the media market. 
Covid-19 and now the U.S. elections have made 
these dynamics even more salient. The political 
climate in the U.S., along with the pandemic, have 
created a crisis for newsrooms. Maria Konow-
Lund and colleagues argued that innovation 
occurs through crises, or moments of significance 
such as elections, particularly through shock, 
start-up, and transformation. Elections have 
always been spaces for digital news innovation 
such as with visuals or chatbots. Thus, with 
changes among audiences and new newsroom 
organizational realities, news organizations have 
been engaged in a range of innovation practices 
leading up to the elections. These include collabo-
ration, connections, and continuity in innovation.
Collaboration
Media organizations started rethinking how to 
collaborate either through cross-media industry 
or within their own organizations. For example, 
First Draft, a project to fight mis- and disinfor-
mation online, rolled out a 14- day text message 
course titled “Protection from deception.” This 
course helped teach journalists and others about 
tactics and techniques of disinformation, such as 
verifying images or media manipulation. Trusting 
News, a project of the Reynolds Journalism 
Institute housed at the University of Missouri, 
and the American Press Institute have similarly 
launched a free text message training focused on 
election coverage. Hearken launched The Citizens 
Agenda, an online guide for news organizations 
to ensure that citizens get information they need 
to vote. SOS Election fellowship matched students 
and recent grads with newsrooms across the U.S.
While media organizations admit that 
collaboration, which is central to the business of 
journalism, has been harder with the pandemic, 
during the election, news organizations have 
continued to develop water cooler opportunities 
through outdoor meetings, Zoom sessions, and 
Slack among others. Cross-media, especially 
through the influence of American media founda-
tions, and internal collaboration during the elections 
has been a dynamic process emphasizing some of 
the principles of cross-media collaboration such as 
content sharing, convergence and coopetition.
Connection
Although the types of news innovations can be 
incremental or project-based, across the industry 
or within R&D or product teams, the elections 
have shown innovation in terms of newsgath-
ering, format and storytelling (i.e., automated 
journalism, enhanced data visualizations, and 
automated fact-checking within and across media 
industry and platforms) as well as audience 
engagement centered on connection. Nuances and 
audience trust-building efforts have been central 
components of newsgathering and storytelling 
innovations. For example, after the 2016 criticism 
that FiveThirtyEight polling favoring Hillary 
Clinton winning over Donald Trump has been 
fraught, in 2020, the organization started fore-
casting uncertainty through simulation in their 
poll to represent a range of potential outcomes. 
FiveThirtyEight also took into account economic 
uncertainty, overall volume of important news 
which offset greater polarization, among other 
things. Buzzfeed news also recruited “Teen 
Ambassadors” to create election-themed TikTok 
and Instagram videos. In this sense, connection 
has occurred within a range of different influenc-
ers: from platforms, data-driven innovation to 
enhanced visualizations.
Continuity
Whether or not the 2020 election news innovation 
has been transforming the news industry or a 
continuation of how the industry has been adapting 
to the realities of the pandemic, news organizations 
have had to adapt themselves by finding new ways 
of collaborating and connecting within their own 
organizations and across the news industry. For 
example, Zoom news interviews of candidates are 
likely to remain relevant even in a post-election 
and pandemic world. But for collaboration and 
connection to be successful, newsrooms need 
buy-in and continuity beyond the elections and 
even the pandemic. Boundaries across news 
media organizations are dissolving just as what 
counts as news media does, thus, what factors and 
mechanisms facilitate the forms of collaboration 
and connections in innovation seen throughout the 
elections is going to be a good point of departure 
for understanding the competencies and operation-
alization of innovation in media industries and how 
through this trust in journalism can be rekindled.
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Learning from the news in a time of highly 
polarized media
It is not surprising that in in a highly polarized 
system, people seek out the media most congenial 
with their views.  Few people consume a 
“balanced diet.” The American right follow a diet 
consisting almost entirely of Fox News. Liberals 
lean heavily on a few outlets, such as the New 
York Times, NPR and MSNBC. Most people, 
however, are media omnivores, taking in local as 
well as network television news, news websites, 
social media and some newspapers. What kinds 
of messages and meanings are constructed and 
how and what does the public learn from news in 
this polarized media environment? 
President Trump is an active participant in 
the consuming and making of news, especially Fox 
News. He often quotes Fox News, calls directly 
into Fox shows, and is chummy with several of 
Fox News personalities. President Trump has three 
main outlets for his views – the “bully pulpit” of 
the presidency when he speaks directly to the 
American people as he does in news conference 
or coverage of his rallies, his Twitter account, and 
the bullhorn of Fox News. The presidency and a 
dedicated news channel are a powerful combina-
tion. The evidence is overwhelming that Trump/
Fox affects opinion, values, beliefs, and most 
importantly, the behaviors of their adherents. In 
the current pandemic, the Trump/Fox alliance has 
spread false information, underplaying the risks of 
COVID 19 with deadly consequences. The alliance 
has also mobilized followers in ardent support of 
the President. 
The President is on record, actually on 
tape, purposely down-playing the coronavirus 
pandemic.  Although a member of Trump’s 
inner circle sent a memo to the President about 
the potential seriousness of the disease, in an 
interview with Washington Post journalist Bob 
Woodward in January of 2020, the President 
admitted that he held back information from the 
public because he did not want to “panic” people. 
Initially he even praised President Xi of China 
for handling the Covid outbreak. In hindsight, it 
appears that President Trump was mostly worried 
about panicking the stock market which was 
running strongly – a good sign for his reelection 
campaign. In any case, President Trump ignored 
the virus and spent time travelling. Trump did 
not begin to communicate concern about the 
virus until mid- March, when he established 
a Covid Taskforce. Analysis of the President’s 
remarks during the Covid Taskforce briefings 
showed a consistent pattern of downplaying the 
seriousness of the virus and claiming credit for 
his administration’s handling of the public health 
crisis1. It is widely believed that the President and 
his Administration had little to be proud of in their 
1 Just, Marion, Joseph Saraceno and Ann Crigler. Forthcoming 
(2020). “Presidential Home Style: Trump in the Era of COVID-19.” 
The Forum 18(3).
management of the Covid epidemic.  States and 
municipalities were forced to compete for scarce 
personal protective equipment, testing was delayed 
and inadequate, and first responders faced severe 
risks. The U.S. has the worst record in the world for 
numbers of cases and deaths. The U.S. is currently 
in a third virus peak with no end in sight.  
The complicity of Fox News in downplaying 
the seriousness of the virus and denigrating the 
appropriate public health measures to contain it, 
especially social distancing and mask wearing, 
cannot be underestimated. The Fox audience was 
encouraged to ignore protective measures and to 
belittle public health mandates. It is not a surprise 
that there was a significant virus outbreak in 
the White House itself that eventually included 
the President and people at Fox News. A single 
Presidential gathering celebrating the nomination 
of Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court – 
with no social distancing or masks and topped by 
an indoor party -- turned into a “super-spreader 
event” -- affecting several members of the 
Congress and Senate, including key players on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee that was scheduled 
to hold hearings on the nomination. The viewers 
of Fox News more than any other media audience 
believed conspiracy theories about the virus, such 
as its origination in a Chinese laboratory and that 
it was purposely spread. Fox viewers believed 
that the other media exaggerated its seriousness 
and thought the President managed the Covid 
crisis well. They were the only ones to praise the 
President and Fox News.  
People do learn from the media, as we found 
in Common Knowledge, but what they learn in 
a polarized media environment is not the same 
thing. In a major pandemic, a minority who 
are encouraged by the President and a major 
news outlet to disregard expert advice are not 
only deadly to themselves but a great danger to 
everyone else.  
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The modern political era is defined by polarization. 
Democratic and Republican members of Congress 
are more likely than any time in the last century 
to vote in partisan blocks on legislation. Watching 
NFL or wearing masks signifies individual partisan 
loyalties. Maybe most troubling is that affective 
polarization—increasing animosity between 
members of different political parties—is at a gen-
erational high. Meanwhile, social media platforms 
continued their ascendance as powerful gatekeepers 
of political information during the 2020 election 
campaign. While many critiques about social 
media’s role in our polarized system are warranted, 
social media has wrongly become the bogeyman of 
polarized tribalism. 
Outrage about social media’s role in cam-
paigning can be traced to the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal and discovery of attempted Russian 
election interference via bot networks in 2016. 
However, there is little evidence these events had 
consequential impact on the 2016 election. Despite 
this dearth of evidence, the argument laid out 
by documentaries like The Social Dilemma and 
countless feature articles is social media’s algorith-
mic and social recommendations narrow users’ 
perspectives, trapping them in an echo chamber 
resulting in increasing polarization. 
On the contrary, the polarized 2020 election 
illustrated the reciprocal relationship between 
easily accessible partisan media ecosystems and 
their presidential candidates across platforms. 
The partisan systems on the right and left are not 
symmetric. The conservative media ecosystem 
centers around Fox News, but also includes 
online news sites, talk radio, and even fringe 
messageboards that proffer Q-Anon conspiracies, 
creating an environment ripe for polarization and 
misinformation. For example, conservative media 
amplified Trump’s messaging that Coronavirus 
would quickly disappear and absentee votes would 
not be properly counted. Thus, wearing masks and 
voting from home became polarized partisan iden-
tifiers. His observably false claims became central 
to the campaign and contributed to his defeat. 
Trump employed distinctly polarized rhetoric that 
demonized his political opponents, including some 
fellow Republicans. This echoed across the whole 
right-wing ecosystem.
The liberal media ecosystem included consid-
erably more diverse viewpoints. Many mainstream 
news organizations confronted Trump’s polari-
zation and demonization by abandoning norms 
of unbiased coverage and tacked leftward, clearly 
favoring Biden. Yet, these news organizations were 
more likely to adhere to journalistic norms of fact-
based reporting and made room for conservative 
viewpoints. This mirrored Biden’s more centrist 
vision of a science-based administration that would 
adhere to pre-Trump political norms. This less 
polarizing messaging eventually won the election.
While Trump used Twitter as his main 
communication platform, the vast majority of 
Americans do not read his tweets. Instead, most 
of his base learn about Trump’s Twitter messages 
through news coverage, from interpersonal 
communication, or on other online platforms. 
Twitter is a tool for Trump, but he could leave in 
favor of another social media site, message board, 
or website. Regardless of where he lands, the con-
servative media ecosystem could choose to amplify 
his voice. But, when Fox turned on Trump, as they 
did on election night by being the first to call Biden 
the winner in Arizona, Trump had a harder time 
getting national traction. 
Most Americans are apathetic to or even repelled 
by news and politics. The modern information 
environment, including the internet and social media, 
provides endless free and cheap non-news content. 
The lack of attention to journalism comes at a time 
when less polarized local news organizations have 
become victims of the fragmented media system, 
including the internet. This silent majority, detached 
from politics, encounter news incidentally in con-
versation or while browsing social media. However, 
people who momentarily linger on Fox News or 
MSNBC or speak with likeminded friends are far less 
likely to encounter opposing viewpoints than when 
they scroll through their social media newsfeed.
Social media plays a gatekeeping role by 
filtering users’ newsfeeds. Facebook and Twitter 
deserve some credit for making more effort to 
identify and label misinformation compared to 
2016. They were more active in identifying coordi-
nated manipulative bot networks. But social media 
can be problematic for polarization in many ways, 
including allowing politically extreme ideas to 
seep into public discourse and a lack of consistent 
application of their own moderation policies. They 
grant alarmingly little transparency to allow regu-
lators or researchers to monitor information flows. 
While these issues deserve attention and continue 
to play a role in electoral campaigns, they are not 
the central story of polarization in 2020. Even if all 
the important problems surrounding social media’s 
role in news dissemination were solved, we’d still 
be stuck with a partisan and polarized electorate 
and partisan media ecosystems would remain 
entrenched. The reciprocal relationship where 
partisan ecosystems produce their candidates and 
the candidates’ ethos echo back across the ecosys-
tems would persist.
The for-profit information economy, money 
in politics, rampant injustice and corruption, and 
growing inequality create an environment for 
polarization and tribalism to thrive. The polarized 
nature of our federal government is reciprocal in 
that it resists structural change and creates incen-
tives for further “winner take all” power to prevail. 
We need political leadership, not transformation of 
our social media, to exit this cycle.
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One of the defining moments of the media 
coverage during the 2020 U.S. presidential election 
came when several major U.S. TV networks 
decided to cut away from President Trump’s White 
House press conference on November 5th. 
NBC, ABC, and CBS all cut their feeds 
mid-way through Trump’s sixteen-minute speech, 
taking the decision to stop broadcasting it to their 
viewers because of concerns over baseless claims 
about election fraud. Other networks, including 
CNN and Fox, broadcast the whole speech, but 
reported afterwards that the President had offered 
no evidence for his accusations.
Some observers have applauded the decision 
to cut away, heralding it as the moment when news 
organisations finally worked out how to deal with 
false and misleading claims from politicians. 
But what do news audiences think about 
‘cutting away’ from news that could contain 
misinformation?
Before turning to that, we should note that the 
decision made by some networks to cut away was 
unusual, and so were the circumstances surround-
ing it. The stakes were extremely high, journalists 
suspected in advance that the speech would be 
used to question the legitimacy of yet-to-be-
counted votes, and the President, it seemed, would 
not be the president for much longer, rendering 
him somewhat less newsworthy and less powerful. 
And, last but not least, journalists were covering 
someone who—according to fact-checkers at the 
Washington Post—had made over 22,000 false or 
misleading claims since January 2017.
But this situation is not typical of much 
day-to-day political reporting. The circumstances 
are rarely as clear-cut or as heightened, journal-
ists can be caught off guard by what politicians 
say, real time fact-checking is very difficult, and 
completely ignoring important politicians cannot 
always be justified.
Rather, when reporting on statements from 
politicians that could be false, journalists often 
face a difficult choice between some version of: (i) 
prominently reporting what they say because it is 
important for the public to know that they said it, 
or (ii) not emphasising what they say because it 
would give them unwarranted attention. 
To understand how news audiences think 
about this dilemma we asked respondents in our 
2020 Reuters Institute Digital News Report—an 
annual online survey across 40 different markets—
which of the two options above comes closer to 
their view about what the news media should do 
when dealing with politicians that have made a 
statement that could be false? 
In the U.S., half (50%) said “report the 
statement prominently because it is important for 
the public to know what the politician said” comes 
closer to their view (see Figure 1), with only 22% 
selecting “not emphasise the statement because it 
would give the politician unwarranted attention” 
(the remaining 28% said “Don’t know”). (Impor-
tantly, we might expect this preference for reporting 
to be even stronger if statements are reported as 
false—but as said, this is not always possible.)
These results were largely consistent across all 
of the 40 markets surveyed as part of the project, 
including countries like Germany, Spain and the 
UK, which have very different media systems 
to the U.S. Furthermore, as I wrote in June, this 
general preference for reporting on potentially 
false claims “… appears to be consistent across a 
range of different socio-demographic groups like 
age, gender, and political leaning. Even in the U.S., 
where some might assume partisan differences due 
to different political styles, a majority of those on 
the left (58%) and right (53%) would prefer poten-
tially false statements to be reported prominently 
– though perhaps for different reasons.”
Many journalists and commentators may 
disagree with this preference, and others might 
reject the idea that journalistic practice be dictated 
by the audience. Furthermore, this binary choice 
does not fully capture the nuances of the different 
journalistic approaches, and it is certainly possible 
that people think differently about the specific case 
involving Trump’s speech on November 5th. Also, 
the role of platforms should not be forgotten—as 
they face similar decisions about labelling and 
content moderation. 
But the data from the Digital News Report 
reminds us that much of the public are generally 
uneasy about the news media taking the decision 
to keep information from them, even if the 
intentions are noble. 
Many welcomed the decision to cut away 
from Trump’s speech, and given the circum-
stances, a strong case can be made that it was the 
right thing to do—just as a case can be made for 
showing the speech in full and then fact-checking 
it immediately afterwards. 
But we should think carefully about whether 
this is a good precedent for political coverage more 
generally. We should ask whether it is something 
that journalists can realistically do in practice, 
but also whether it is something that audiences 
actually want them to do in the first place, and 
what they will ultimately think of news media who 
choose to do so—especially prominent politicians 
that millions of people, who are often already 
sceptical of the news media, have voted for.
What do news audiences think about ‘cutting away’ 
from news that could contain misinformation?
Figure 1. What should the news media do 
with statements from politicians that could be false?
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Broadcast networks made a revolutionary decision 
during the Trump press conference the day after 
the polls closed in the 2020 elections. As votes 
mounted to oust the president from office, Trump 
appeared for rambling, repetitive accusations of 
electoral fraud based on the flimsiest of evidence. 
One by one, many networks decided to stop airing 
the press conference. Instead, some returned to 
their studio announcers to criticize the president 
for lying. 
This is the moment when U.S. media norms, 
under enormous pressure from Trump-led disin-
formation, switched from full libertarian values to 
a stronger watchdog role. This was a seismic shift 
under enormous provocation, but the U.S. media 
rapidly adapted to a new reality. 
The U.S. media are defined by the libertarian 
system, first described by Siebert et al. in their 
1956 book The Four Theories of the Press. The 
scholars outlined the relationship between states 
and media systems, noting that the American state 
fosters a commercialized model of the media in 
which advertising funds the flow of information. 
There is little interference in the media sphere 
from the state and broad protection of freedom 
of speech. Unlike any other powerful nation, the 
United States has no dominant state or public 
broadcasting sector. 
While the work by Siebert et al. is certainly 
dated, the central principles of a libertarian media 
still hold in the United States. The advent of 
cable and the subsequent information explosion 
from the internet have stretched the notion of 
“let the audience decide” to breaking point. The 
enormous rise of disinformation under the Trump 
administration warped the system still further. The 
president often pushed or even invented conspir-
acy theories (such as that COVID-19 was not 
serious or injecting bleach would kill the virus). 
A rightwing echo chamber, anchored around Fox 
News, provided a significant amplification to a 
credulous, right-leaning audience.  
Trump’s inauguration in 2017, in which his 
spokesman refused to admit he was lying about the 
size of inauguration crowds, ushered in four years 
of turmoil for the American media still dedicated to 
libertarian principles. The concept of media liber-
tarianism dictates that journalists are conduits from 
information sources to the public. The problem 
was that key information sources such as the White 
House had become wellsprings of disinformation, 
setting up a paradox for serious journalism. The 
libertarian system dictated that they had to present 
the President’s words – even when they knew them 
to be inaccurate – to the public. 
While there was growing unease among jour-
nalists about the rising tide of falsehoods from the 
White House, responsible media outlets felt they 
had to cover what the president said. They tried 
to balance this by contextualizing the information 
and countering disinformation with reporting. Un-
fortunately, this had the joint effect of amplifying 
the disinformation while at the same time allowing 
the president to complain to his supporters that the 
media were “fake” and too critical.  
By the day after the 2020 election, three things 
happened to switch off the full libertarian model 
and usher in an era in which media networks felt 
comfortable switching off the president. 
First, journalists had come to realize that the 
game was rigged. Trump and his supporters were 
parasites in the libertarian media system, taking 
advantage of how they could assert disinformation 
and still get covered. What changed is that jour-
nalists realized that the libertarian model dictates 
that media must cover the news – but should 
avoid propaganda. By accepting and embracing 
that messages from the White House were now 
propaganda and not news, the networks were 
liberated to stop the flow of disinformation for the 
good of democracy. And protecting democracy, 
after all, is at the heart of the libertarian model of 
the media. 
More pragmatically, there were two other 
factors that no doubt contributed to shutting the 
cameras off. By the evening after the election, math 
made it clear that Trump was a lame duck president 
(whether he chose to accept this fact or not). The 
media, targets of a campaign of hate supported by 
Trump, had much less to fear from him. 
In addition, the journalists practice intermedia 
agenda-setting, meaning that once they saw one 
network cut off the president, they felt liberated to 
do the same. Not all media outlets cut away, but 
enough to make a strong statement that firmly 
moved the president from an important source of 
national information to a propagandist working 
against the interests of democracy. 
The day the music died: turning off the cameras on 
President Trump 
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Political differences—regarding the most 
important issues facing a nation and the role 
government should play in addressing them—are 
part and parcel of democratic systems, especially 
those as diverse as the United States. Elections 
are a primary mechanism for debating these 
differences and deciding, even if crudely, where the 
public interest resides. For this to work, however, 
it requires some agreement on the facts, and faith 
in the process by which those are used to shape 
debate and ultimately chart a collective course.      
For over four years, however, Americans 
have been living in different political “realities” 
that work against this process. For some, we are a 
country whose democratic institutions and norms 
are under siege, and whose progress towards 
greater social, political, and economic justice has 
been lost. For others, we are in the midst of a revolt 
against global and domestic trends that threaten 
their values, status, and livelihoods, and of a 
movement to “make America great again.” While 
more nuanced, sometimes overlapping camps 
based on class, race, identity, and ideology exist, 
the overall result is an unprecedented degree of 
political polarization, not only regarding opinions, 
but also the underlying facts themselves. Consider, 
for example, that Americans are more divided 
along partisan lines on how their government has 
addressed the health and economic ramifications 
of the coronavirus pandemic than citizens in other 
advanced democracies, that nearly 40 percent of 
conservative Republicans believe that the virus was 
developed either intentionally or accidentally from 
a laboratory (compared to 15 percent of liberal 
Democrats), and that over 70 percent of voters who 
consider wearing a face mask a matter of personal 
choice supported Trump (compared to the 64 
percent vote for Biden by those who consider it a 
public health responsibility).  
While there are many reasons for this 
bifurcation of beliefs and opinions, crucial is the 
media regime that has emerged over the last few 
decades.  Consisting of a mix of legacy, partisan, 
and online actors and media institutions, this 
regime has blurred distinctions between fact and 
opinion, news and entertainment, information 
producers and consumers, and mass mediated 
and interpersonal communication, creating an 
information environment that is both “multiaxial” 
(i.e., in which control of the public agenda emerges 
from multiple, shifting, and previously invisible or 
less powerful actors) and “hyperreal” (i.e., in which 
the mediated representation of reality becomes 
more important than the facts underlying it).
This information ecosystem has been fertile 
ground for the spread of misinformation, disin-
formation, and the selective use of facts from both 
domestic and international sources, including 
the President himself.  This, coupled with the 
new media regime’s high choice environment, 
allows citizens to be selective in constructing their 
media diets, creating “echo chambers” that largely 
reinforce existing views and beliefs. The use of 
algorithms by internet and social media services 
magnifies the effects of selection bias by fore-
grounding new information that is consistent with 
users’ political and ideological predispositions. 
The impact of the competing realities 
facilitated by this information environment is 
starkly evident in the 2020 election. For example, 
consumers of different information sources held 
widely different views on the likelihood of fraud 
resulting from mail voting, a view that played 
out in the actual behavior of Republicans (who 
voted largely in person) and Democrats (who 
voted largely by mail), and in Trump’s dangerous 
questioning of the legitimacy of the election 
outcome. According to exit polls, Trump and Biden 
supporters differed on the most important issues 
influencing their vote, with the former focusing 
on the economy and crime, and the latter on racial 
inequality, the coronavirus pandemic, and health 
care policy. They differed on the candidate qualities 
they deemed most important, with Trump voters 
looking for someone who was “a strong leader,” 
and Biden supporters someone who could “unite 
the country” and “has good judgement” (tellingly, 
they split evenly on the importance of someone 
who “cares about people like me”).  They differed 
dramatically on which candidate had the temper-
ament and mental and physical health to serve 
effectively as president. Perhaps most worrisome, 
the vast majority of both Trump and Biden voters 
said they would feel “concerned” or “scared” if the 
other candidate were elected.  
One might argue that the (apparent) defeat 
of a sitting president is evidence that the walls 
between mediated worldviews can be broken 
down. Perhaps. But as of this writing it appears that 
Biden’s victory resulted from increased turnout 
(the highest percent since the 19th century), and 
not the erosion of Trump support. Indeed, more 
Americans voted for him in 2020 than in 2016. 
The implications of this fragmented informa-
tion environment for U.S. politics and even U.S. 
democracy are still unclear. But, coupled with the 
wicked domestic and global issues the new adminis-
tration faces, there is certainly reason for concern.   
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“Can we please be done with polls now?” tweeted 
Molly Jong-Fast on the day after the U.S. presi-
dential election. “Ban election forecasts, or at least 
ignore them” read the subhead on a widely-circu-
lated piece in Slate. 
Over the course of a week-long slog in which 
much of the world livestreamed the counting 
of in-person, mail-in, drop-off, and provisional 
ballots, the most heated of hot takes about the 
apparent uselessness of pre-election polls and 
forecasts began to look premature. As results 
came into sharper focus, the election map began 
to resemble something that looked a whole lot 
like what the polls had predicted—albeit by much 
closer margins in some key states. 
To be sure, those margins were notewor-
thy—especially given how much they replicated 
similar errors in the 2016 results. After that race, 
thoughtful leaders in the opinion research world 
undertook extensive efforts to diagnose what 
might have contributed to “large, problematic 
errors” in many of these same places. The task 
force wrote reassuringly that despite many 
complex changes in modes and methods, the 
science of survey research remained largely sound. 
(On average, polls are, in fact, as accurate as ever.)
Many likely culprits were singled out 
about that election: historically large numbers 
of undecided and third-party voters, too few 
pollsters weighting samples for response bias by 
education, a lack of state-level polls late in the 
race when events caused significant movement 
toward Donald Trump. As of now, none appear 
applicable to this cycle. Even well-respected 
state-level polls from the New York Times/Siena 
College and the Washington Post/ABC News were 
off by double digits, making it hard to shake the 
feeling that the entire industry may be dealing 
with more fundamental, structural problems. Are 
conventional methods disproportionately failing 
to reach the disaffected, distrusting voters most 
drawn to Trump’s brand of right-wing populism, 
underestimating their likelihood of turning out to 
vote, or both? Knowing more about the campaigns’ 
internal polls, which may have used different as-
sumptions, along with final updated voter files will 
eventually help answer some of these questions. 
It should be underscored that some polls 
did hold up exceptionally well. On the eve of 
the election, venerated Iowa pollster Ann Selzer 
released results that previewed the eventual 
outcome almost exactly, showing Republicans 
holding on to a much larger share of voters than 
almost any other reputable pollster. Results were 
often explained away as an outlier; The New 
York Times told its anxious readers to “put it in 
perspective” as “only one poll.” Such advice may 
be eminently reasonable, but this year the flaws in 
that approach have been laid bare. 
“In averages we trust” has become a mantra 
for many political journalists trying to avoid 
overemphasizing any single error-prone survey 
estimate. But averaging polls only helps correct 
for random sampling-induced error; it does not 
help if results are collectively skewed due to faulty 
methods, modeling assumptions, or “herding.” 
In a polling landscape where best practices 
are legitimately in flux and where grifters and 
opportunists seek headlines to gin up publicity and 
exposure, averaging may lead to over-confidence 
about election outcomes that are in fact a lot more 
variable than suggested by sampling error alone.
“You don’t really have many reporters, in my 
experience, who are doing the work of looking at 
the methodology,” Ann Selzer pointed out in an 
interview with the Columbia Journalism Review 
five years ago. Doing that work will require greater 
transparency from public pollsters—perhaps even a 
push for pre-registration—and more attention paid 
by journalists and polling aggregators to individual 
pollsters’ methods instead of lumping results 
together. (Correcting for black box “house effects” 
or past predictiveness may not be nearly enough.) 
Election forecasters themselves will no doubt 
resist calls for any kind of reckoning of their own. 
They will point to the final tabulation as proof of 
having appropriately handicapped the flawed un-
derlying data they were provided. After all, as Nate 
Silver reminded readers on the eve of the election, 
his 89% forecast of a Biden victory only ever 
indicated that “it’s a fine line between a landslide 
and a nail-biter,” and the result, predictably, was 
somewhere in between.
But that of course is the problem. Forecasters 
must grapple with whether they seek to be anything 
other than a diversion for obsessed hobbyists. I 
don’t fault them for emphasizing how uncertain 
their predictions actually are. But there is something 
deeply unsatisfying about this form of prognosticat-
ing punditry, which simultaneously claims superior 
decimal-point precision while humbly insisting 
that its declarations should only ever be treated 
impressionistically.  As long as the main take-away 
really isn’t much more than ¯\_(ツ)_/¯, the future of 
election forecasting may not be bright.
Forecasting the future of election forecasting
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The ballots had barely settled in Pennsylvania 
when various interest groups scrambled to 
establish their preferred narratives. Many of these 
projections adhered to predictable patterns of 
emphasis and omission.
For example, regardless that American 
majorities support progressive positions—from 
nationalizing healthcare to raising taxes for free 
public education—some media and political elites 
heralded a confirmation that the U.S. was inherent-
ly a centrist nation. With the Senate remaining in 
Republican hands (pending the Georgia run-offs 
in early January), even the stock market seemed 
to react positively to the prospect of gridlocked 
government hamstrung in its ability to implement 
serious regulatory reform.
Falling back on false equivalences that 
the electorate had rejected both right and left 
extremes, this centrist narrative aligned with the 
oft-repeated truism that most Americans occupy 
the middle of the ideological spectrum. According 
to this view, Americans didn’t want dramatic 
change, but rather a return to “normalcy” and to 
re-establishing old norms. 
Relatedly, centrist Democrats pointed an 
accusatory finger at the party’s left flank, asserting 
that progressive activist slogans such as “defund 
the police” set up vulnerable moderates to be 
ruthlessly red-baited as socialists and consequently 
lose their races. For their part, many progressives 
convincingly pushed back against these storylines. 
At the same time, early analyses suggest that a 
groundswell of “Biden Republicans” never materi-
alized. While the so-called never-Trumpers behind 
the Lincoln Project and their slick, gut-punching 
ads made many liberals swoon, it was actually 
progressive groups, especially in states like Georgia 
and cities like Philadelphia, that arguably pushed 
Biden over the top.
Another major narrative assumes that, at 
least according to expectations set by pollsters, 
Democrats performed poorly in down-ballot 
races. Despite the lack of a “blue wave”, it’s 
noteworthy that the elections did see a wide range 
of progressive victories, including the resolution to 
increase the minimum wage to $15 an hour in the 
Trump-backing state of Florida.
The role of media
The media’s role in all of these relationships was 
contradictory, as always. In one historic moment, 
the major networks cut away from Trump during 
a major address as he launched into a tirade of lies. 
Some observers wondered if media organizations 
had suddenly, at this late stage, realized how best 
to handle Trump. Others noted that such an abrupt 
about-face actually demonstrated that media 
outlets could have been more adversarial all along, 
but the perceived shift in power finally embold-
ened them to be less timid toward the president. 
We shouldn’t be surprised. An abiding 
reliance on official sources and deference to 
power is historically a common cornerstone of 
professional journalism. This power relationship 
runs deep and is bound up with media firms’ core 
business model, driven by advertising revenue and 
the ultimate objective to actualize profits at any 
social cost. The fact that commercialism so often 
trumps democracy is also why scolding individual 
journalists and news outlets for being irresponsible 
often misses the systemic root of the problem. 
While it’s refreshing that many media organ-
izations have finally stopped deferring to Trump, 
we must look seriously at the role they have played 
in normalizing fascistic politics—as well as the 
structural factors that cause these institutions to 
predictably fail in advancing democratic aims.
The role of media scholars
Understanding these power relationships is 
necessary but insufficient. The point should be 
to change the current system. Low-quality infor-
mation runs rampant through many of our news 
and communication systems—from Facebook 
to Fox News—while actual journalism is rapidly 
disappearing. Media and political communication 
scholars ideally would help assist reform efforts 
toward restructuring these systems and creating 
new institutions.
One potentially growing undercurrent in the 
field of communication research appears to be a 
new variant of the “limited effects” model, which 
assumes that, lacking clear causal relationships, 
media have relatively little influence over political 
behavior, and therefore, by implication, are 
unworthy of structural reform efforts. 
Communication research needs a new 
normative framework that’s guided by social 
justice. Instead of accepting things as they are, 
I call upon my colleagues to seize this historical 
moment and help broaden our political imaginary 
as to what kind of media system is possible. We 
can dare hope for media institutions that serve 
democratic needs and not just corporate profits.
Ultimately, it’s likely that all of these forces—
both major political parties, media institutions, 
and even academics in their own way—will seek to 
resurrect an Obama-era status quo. But if the U.S. 
is to tackle the daunting problems it faces—climate 
change, deep structural inequalities, monopoly 
power, mass incarceration and other forms of 
systemic racism—the status quo should not be 
preserved; it should be radically changed. Whether 
Biden and his administration are up to the 
task—and whether progressives and other social 
pressures from below can help steer them in the 
right direction—remains to be seen. 
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During the 2020 election, media outlets and social 
media platforms assumed roles as “democratic 
gatekeepers.” In Steven Levitsky and Daniel 
Ziblatt’s influential book, How Democracies Die, 
they discuss the crucial role of institutions such 
as parties in keeping anti-democratic leaders 
from power. But parties, courts, etc. are not solely 
responsible. Media institutions have an important 
role. Kirsten Adams developed the concept of 
“civil gatekeepers” to analyze journalists’ roles to 
communicate “ideas about what is (and is not)” 
democratic to the public – a role journalism 
institutions largely failed to live up to in 2016. 
In 2020, haltingly, unevenly, but unmis-
takably, journalistic organizations and social 
media platforms became democratic gatekeepers. 
Journalists asserted their foremost democratic 
commitment to the public through coverage that 
cast President Trump as anti-democratic. Social 
media platforms for the first time affirmed their 
role in protecting democratic institutions through 
regulatory policies and enforcement actions on 
presidential speech, and more broadly on electoral 
disinformation.
This was new. In 2016, the Republican Party 
was beset with an avowedly anti-democratic 
candidate in Donald Trump and failed to keep 
him from political power. Media institutions, from 
journalism outlets to social media platforms, also 
failed to fulfill their democratic gatekeeping role. 
As Adams showed, rather than acknowledge and 
guard against Trump’s anti-democratic speech and 
actions, journalists turned to moral equivalence to 
preserve partisan balance. Platforms, too, failed to 
anticipate how their systems could be subverted 
to undermine the very democratic institutions 
necessary for their existence, such as allowing 
Trump to engage in a social media campaign to 
discredit Barack Obama’s birthplace, citizenship, 
and legitimacy as president, dating from 2011 
(when Obama was on the ballot) to 2014 (when 
Trump was planning to be) .
Journalists have long grounded their legiti-
macy in concepts such as balance and objectivity. 
Platforms, meanwhile, have generally grounded 
theirs in free expression. Neither journalists nor 
social media platforms have historically grounded 
their normative vision and legitimacy in terms of 
what explicitly promotes and protects democracy. 
Between the 2016 and the 2020 elections, slowly 
and haltingly, legacy journalists became more 
adept at covering the president, including 
adopting fact-checking and asserting their moral 
authority to protect democratic institutions and 
norms. This was on display during the period 
of early voting, Election Day, and the days after 
– where there was generally clear repudiation 
of the president’s many false, anti-democratic 
claims. Even Fox News checked the president on 
democratic grounds, condemning both premature 
assertions of victory and attempts to de-legitimize 
the vote count.
Platforms have faced similar challenges. How 
do they prevent election disinformation when it 
comes from the highest level of political office, 
aided and abetted by ruling party media such as 
Fox News and given legitimacy, validation, and 
amplification by Republican Party elites? The 
answer – up until recently – was not well. After all, 
it was just over a year ago that Facebook’s CEO, 
in response to growing public pressure to prevent 
politicians from lying on Facebook and criticisms 
of poor enforcement of existing rules against hate 
speech, embraced the notion of the platform being 
guided by “free speech” values. This “free speech” 
orientation subsequently proved unworkable as 
numerous crises demonstrated disinformation was 
causing imminent harm during the pandemic and 
2020 presidential election. 
 During these conflicts, Facebook reversed 
course many times – but in general moved toward 
a more robust defense of democratic institutions. 
Facebook, and its counterparts, implemented more 
stringent policies against electoral disinformation, 
began enforcing policies on elected officials 
through labeling dubious claims and, in some 
instances, taking down content, and even went so 
far as to ban new paid political advertising entirely 
(Twitter) or in the week before and after the 
election (Facebook) to prevent disinformation and 
premature declarations of victory. 
While some of these policies were counter-
productive and did not go nearly far enough, and 
there was significant variation among platforms 
with respect to the actions they took, their 
underlying logic was unmistakable. Platforms 
generally expanded their conception of themselves 
as communicative institutions that have a respon-
sibility to defend democratic processes. Election 
night bore this out – as the president posted 
unfounded allegations about a fraudulent election 
and claimed a lead, Twitter labeled these tweets, 
obscuring their content, and prevented liking and 
retweeting. Meanwhile, Facebook added a dis-
claimer to presidential posts about the vote count 
process and applied links to its voting information 
center. While these are limited actions – they are 
actions that have the clear normative stance of 
protecting democracy. 
Assertive press and platforms willing to defend 
the public’s right to hold its leaders accountable at 
the ballot box and beyond it is an important, and 
overdue, development. While they cannot fully 
solve the vast political problems facing America, 
especially the growing counter-majoritarianism 
and illiberalism of a major political party, they 
are buying us time. And, as foremost a political 
problem, securing democracy is not something 
these institutions can do on their own – but the 
public needs them to try.
Dr Daniel Kreiss
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Media and social media platforms finally begin to 
embrace their roles as democratic gatekeepers
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The 2020 election has once again laid bare a 
defining feature of American life: some citizens 
yield far greater political power and influence 
than others. Despite record voter turnout, there is 
evidence of persistent gaps in voter engagement, 
campaign donations and political advertisement 
targeting, across lines of class, age, gender, and 
race. These political inequalities are not only a 
product of systematic disenfranchisement, but also 
reflective of enduring social inequalities that often 
leave people from marginalized groups with fewer 
of the resources they need to engage in elections.
Yet the past four years have also taught us that 
groups that have been politically marginalized 
for centuries are exercising political voice and 
influence, often in innovative ways that are 
decisive for the American story. Think of the young 
people who mobilized around gun control after the 
Parkland mass shooting in 2018 or Black activists 
who led historic mass mobilization against racial 
violence in the wake of the police killing of George 
Floyd in 2020. At the center of these movements 
have been social media platforms, tools that have 
sometimes been positioned as a potential equal-
izing force in American politics. As campaigning 
increasingly shifts to social media, it is unclear how 
these technologies are shaping political inequality 
in electoral contexts.
Despite well-founded concerns about the 
often contentious, uncivil, and partisan nature of 
political communication on social media, research 
suggests that who engages on social media matters. 
Social media can be key sources for learning about 
elections and might serve as “gateways” to further 
participation in campaigns. In addition, social 
media are now where reporters go to gauge public 
opinion and where political campaigns go to 
target voters. Yet, when researchers have examined 
digital political inequality more closely, they have 
often found that those who already have political 
resources or interest reap the benefits. 
Our past work from the 2016 election tells 
a nuanced story of political inequality on social 
media. Across 2016 survey datasets, we find that 
Americans from traditionally marginalized groups 
(e.g., those with lower socioeconomic resources, 
or racial/ethnic minorities) are sometimes less 
politically engaged on social media. However, these 
trends are inconsistent and sometimes reversed. 
For example, in one survey, young voters (18 to 
24) with lower (vs. higher) socioeconomic status 
were more likely to express their political views on 
social media. Another survey found that racial/
ethnic minorities engaged in more symbolic types 
of political expression (e.g., hashtags, changing 
profile pictures) than white users.
Early data from the 2020 election paints a 
similar picture. For example, a higher percentage of 
white respondents reported engaging in traditional 
political behaviors on Facebook, while a higher 
percentage of racial/ethnic minorities reported 
using Facebook to get information about protests 
or to post about discrimination and injustice. 
Looking at the mixed evidence in this area, we 
offer three points to consider when thinking about 
social media’s role in shaping political inequality 
in the 2020 election. First, we need to acknowledge 
that those with the most political power and 
political resources continue to have advantages in 
expressing their voices on social media. As long 
as some groups (e.g., those with higher education, 
white people) disproportionally possess resources 
like political knowledge and interest, certain types 
of political behavior will continue to be unequally 
distributed on social media. Second, to see the 
potentially equalizing power of social media, we 
need to look more deeply at how marginalized 
groups use these technologies. When scholars have 
done so, they find that social media offer essential 
spaces for social movement organizing, building 
political solidarity, and sharing experiences of 
injustice. We take seriously the ways in which 
social media can help the politically rich get richer, 
while also urging that more attention be paid to 
how marginalized groups are using social media to 
reclaim political voice. Finally, it may be that social 
media’s impact on political inequality is more 
indirect than we suspect. For example, journalists 
and scholars might need to zoom out to see how 
movements like #BlackLivesMatter shaped the 
2020 election by framing racial justice as a key 
issue. Such indirect influence may be difficult to 
see if we only look at individual election-related 
behavior on social media.
The 2020 post-mortem is sure to cast social 
media in a primarily negative light; as engines 
for political misinformation, partisan conflict, 
and perhaps even electoral violence. As with 
any technology, we need not completely resign 
ourselves to social media being a net evil for 
democracy. Scholars like Ethan Zuckerman are 
already exploring ways to build more equitable 
social media platforms. Others are pushing for 
technology companies to take more responsible 
approaches to moderating political communica-
tion on social media. In these efforts, reducing 
inequality between the political haves and have 
nots should be central. Social media are not going 
anywhere. Our only option is to try to make them 
better tools for democracy. 
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Platform transparency in the fight against 
disinformation
22,247. That is the estimated number of false or 
misleading claims that President Donald Trump 
has made since assuming office until the end of 
August, 2020. The 2016 election of Donald Trump 
as President of the United States challenged 
journalists and fact-checkers in numerous ways, 
especially when it comes to sorting false from 
correct information. During the final stretch of 
the 2020 election campaign, Donald Trump has 
increased the amount of false or misleading claims, 
averaging 50 false claims a day. There were so 
many claims that the fact-checkers have not been 
able to track all of them and have raised questions 
about when to decide to fact-check. In the eye of 
the public, the 2020 election will partly be remem-
bered by the rise of new actors, tools, and practices 
in coordination to re-imagine the intensifying fight 
against mis- and disinformation. For scholars and 
practitioners, questioning the role of these actors 
and tools is becoming even more pressing.
Since introducing the meaningful social 
interaction algorithm (MSI) in 2018 Facebook, 
has reduced the overall visibility of news content 
on their proprietary platform. At the same 
time, people have been provided with more 
opportunities for convening and interacting in 
private spaces, such as mobile chat applications 
like WhatsApp groups and Signal that are not 
public facing but rather so-called “dark social”. 
Creating tools to fight disinformation, journalists 
and fact-checkers are seeking to adapt by finding 
new ways to help communities make sense of 
mis- and disinformation. At the same time, 
scholars have sought to unpack these reconfigured 
power dynamics and how mis- and disinformation 
may be best tackled to have an impact on public 
perceptions of truth and truthfulness. But this 
election has intensified new forms of power 
dynamics in the disinformation ecosystem — and 
shown the hard limits of what fact-checking can 
accomplish without greater support from platform 
companies for the researchers, journalists, and 
fact-checkers seeking to understand and limit the 
spread of harmful misinformation.
The 2020 election shed light on dis- and 
mis-information becoming a beat particularly in 
legacy news organizations such as NBC, the New 
York Times, and the BBC. But these beats wouldn’t 
be legitimized without the help of platforms 
non-proprietary to them that dictate the ways in 
which information may be understood from and 
shared to the public. For example, since 2016, 
fact-checking organizations have been working 
with Facebook to reduce disinformation. And 
Facebook has been requiring these organizations to 
be signatories of the International Fact-Checking 
Network’s (IFCN) Code of Principles, which value 
the principle of transparency at each stage of the 
fact-checking process.
As a result, platform companies such as 
Twitter and Facebook have become “arbiters of 
truth” and that is “without the methodology or 
transparency,” a position that these companies 
have avoided since their inception. Social media 
oriented platform companies have been engaging 
in content moderation for a long time, but for 
disinformation they follow community principles 
rather than abide by policy or law (with a few 
countries making exceptions). Twitter has been 
fact-checking Trump, and our analysis shows 
that out of 71 tweets Trump posted or retweeted 
between November 4 and 7, 20 are marked or 
hidden by Twitter for breaking the company’s Civic 
Integrity Policy. But the transparency asked from 
the IFCN has not always been followed by these 
platform companies. 
Disinformation has been intensifying during 
this election. They also show that the fight against 
disinformation has involved a plethora of actors 
seeking to “do their best in fighting disinforma-
tion” that have different incentives and complicate 
the public’s understanding of what might be the 
closest thing to facts. 
When considering recent digital innovations 
in automated fact-checking for the identification, 
verification, and correction of disinformation, 
similar ethical questions come to mind. Such 
innovations do not cover the judgement and 
sensitivity that human fact-checkers deploy in their 
practice. As in the case of content moderation, 
there is limited explanation of and transparency 
about authoritative and open-sourced data.
In sum, the power to decide what is true is 
mediated through platform companies online 
as media organizations and diverse other actors 
essentially are taking advantage of platform 
affordances, and their inefficiency or unwillingness 
to actively moderate such activities. Fact-checkers 
and journalists alike, have sought to find a 
meaningful footing. Going forward, platforms 
companies should be held to the same transpar-
ency standard many fact-checking organizations 
embrace, by providing a clear explanation of the 
principles and methods they employ to combat 
mis- and dis-information. Sharing information 
with researchers and fact-checkers about the 
spread of problematic content on social networks, 
and about the effectiveness of different interven-
tions, would provide a vital boost to their efforts.
In The Source Criticism and Mediated 
Disinformation (SCAM) project, we are seeking 
to look at key industry representatives in tech and 
platform companies, tech and media industry 
associations and fact-checking organizations 
around the world and examine how these actors 
experience the effects of digital technology on and 
develop new approaches to the critical evaluation 
of sources and information.
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It’s said that data speaks for itself. And ahead of the 
U.S. election, there was a lot of data from scientists, 
economists and pollsters that pointed to an uphill 
struggle for President Trump. 
The outcome wasn’t as clear cut, with no sign 
of the predicted blue wave sweeping the nation. 
But then, it is hardly surprising after a sustained 
campaign by Trump and his allies to undermine 
and discredit both the sources of the data, and the 
media reporting on it.
The ability of the public to make informed, 
conscientious and balanced decisions, an ideal 
at the core of deliberative democracy, has been 
consistently destabilized by the misinformation 
super-spreader formerly known as the president of 
the United States.
More broadly, the election cycle of 2020 
highlighted how the contested media ecosystem of 
the 21st century has evolved much faster than the 
institutions of state, the academy and the media 
have been able to respond. 
What the data said
In the months and weeks leading up to November 
3, data was making itself heard loud and clear. By 
the time Americans went to the polls, the number 
of confirmed cases of COVID-19 was edging 
towards 10 million, as tracked by John Hopkins 
University. As daily cases rose, Trump continued to 
falsely claim the country was “rounding the corner.”
More than 226,000 people had died from 
during the coronavirus pandemic. That’s almost 
four times the American lives lost in the Vietnam 
War and edging close to the 291,557 American 
lives lost in battle in World War II.
GDP was hit hard, down by 9.1 percent in 
the second quarter of 2020. According to the 
Brookings Institute, it was the steepest decline 
since record keeping began in 1947. 
It meant that millions of Americans lost 
their jobs as the pandemic hit in early 2020, with 
more than 20 million claiming unemployment 
insurance by May. Though that figure had dropped 
to 7.3 million by October, it was still well above 
pre-pandemic numbers. The economic shutdown 
hit women, non-white workers, lower-wage 
earners and people with less education hardest. 
Against such a backdrop, national polls point 
to a sweeping victory by Joe Biden. Learning 
their lesson from 2016, most media organizations 
handled the polling data with care. These ranged 
from offering qualifiers about variations from state 
to state or digging into the electoral college system 
to explain the scale of the challenge facing the 
Democratic contender. 
There were even warnings ahead of November 
3 that the results may not be clear on election 
night, as indeed turned out to be the case.
I want to believe (in Trump)
While millions of Americans listened to the data, 
millions more were deaf to what it was telling 
them. They chose not to listen to, and believe in, 
the message, be it scientific or economic reports 
from reputable institutions, or the messenger, the 
mainstream U.S. media. 
Instead they wanted to believe in the man 
in the White House. It is astonishing to note 
that Trump has made more than 22,000 false or 
misleading claims since coming to office. 
It is less astonishing that millions of 
Americans didn’t believe the data or the journal-
ists reporting it. After all, these are the journalists 
labelled as “enemies of the people” by Trump, 
reporting on inconvenient facts written off as 
“fake news.”
The persistent strategy of Trump and his allies 
has been to cast doubt on what have traditionally 
being respected and reputable sources of data. It 
is not just about sowing uncertainty about what is 
true and what isn’t, but also about undercutting the 
sources of the data. 
This is a leader who has dismissed journalists 
as “enemies of the people”, denounced incon-
venient truths as “fake news”, and has repeatedly 
lashed out at the country’s top infectious diseases 
expert, Dr. Anthony Fauci. 
The clarion call from Trump to his supporters 
has been that you can’t trust the source, and you 
certainly cannot trust the messenger. Rather, you 
can only trust the plain-speaking, tell-it-how-it-is 
leadership of me, Donald Trump.
Data faces a tough fight in the arena of public 
opinion. Data is always shaped by where it came 
from, who provided it, how it was communicated 
and by whom.
In this election cycle, data designed to inform 
the public was discredited, demeaned and doubted 
in political discourse. It was an attack on the 
message, as well as on the messenger – the “fake 
news” media of Donald Trump.
Data cannot have a voice when there is no 
trust in where it is coming from, who it is coming 
from and who is disseminating it to the public. 
Why Trump’s determination to sow doubt about 
data undermines democracy
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Advertising in the 2020 presidential cycle broke all 
kinds of records. While the bulk of the spending 
is still on television, the share of digital advertising 
continues to grow, and the sheer amount of money 
spent on digital advertising alone is staggering. 
According to the Wesleyan Media Project, 
Donald Trump’s campaign spent over $201 million 
(47 percent of his ad budget) on digital advertising 
between April 9 and October 24, 2020. Though Joe 
Biden’s campaign focused less on online platforms, 
it still spent about $116 million on digital, one 
third of his ad spending. To help put these figures 
in perspective, Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign, 
which was widely praised for its use of online ads, 
spent only about $8 million on digital advertising, 
and Donald Trump spent roughly $83.5 million 
between July and November in 2016 on digital.
The dominance of Facebook and Google
While Facebook (including Instagram) has been the 
dominant digital platform for political campaigns, 
the 2020 presidential campaigns spent almost as 
much on Google (which includes YouTube). Trump 
invested about $108 million on Facebook and $93 
million on Google while Biden spent $84 million 
on Facebook ads and $79 million Google ads. By 
contrast, even though the Biden campaign allocated 
more than $3.1 million to Snapchat advertising 
(which compared to only $0.2 million by Trump 
might have given Biden an advantage in reaching 
Generation Z voters), the total pales by comparison 
to spending on the big platforms.
Assessing unique content across platforms
It is widely understood that campaigns use 
different platforms for different outreach. To 
examine how the content on each platform 
differed by campaign, we conducted a preliminary 
analysis of the textual content of ads on TV, 
Facebook, Google, YouTube, and Snapchat with 
a method designed to determine the words that 
most distinguish one category from another 
(automated speech-to-text methods were used 
to transcribe video ads from TV, YouTube, and 
Snapchat and we collapsed to unique creatives 
across all sources by campaign).
For Biden, search advertising on Google 
revolves around appeals to vote, voter registra-
tion, deadlines, and voting by mail, including 
Spanish-language words associated with voting, 
suggesting a focus on get-out-the-vote and Latinx 
outreach. Biden’s Facebook ads, by contrast, feature 
references to Trump, defeating Republicans, and 
winning combined with donation appeals, which 
seem designed to stoke partisan identity and 
out-partisan animosity. In TV ads, substantive 
content is more prevalent, with references to 
healthcare, the virus, jobs, and families. Biden’s 
YouTube ads touch on similar themes, but seem 
slightly more upbeat, featuring emotive words such 
as feel, care, and love. Snapchat ads revolve around 
the Black Lives Matter movement, with references 
to civil rights, the police, and racism.
Trump’s ads follow a similar pattern. His 
Google search ads revolve around getting-out-
the-vote, but feature more requests for donations 
than Biden as well as campaign merchandise. 
His Facebook ads are not quite as focused on 
his opponent, but still feature attacks against the 
media, Democrats, and “Sleepy Joe.” Similar to 
Biden, fundraising appears to be the primary goal 
on Facebook. TV also provides Trump with room 
for more substantive content, with references to 
healthcare, illegal immigrants, taxes, and China. 
YouTube follows a similar pattern, touching on 
family, the military, God, and reopening schools.
What to make of it?
The sheer amount of money spent suggests that 
advertising remains a central way campaigns 
reach citizens even if ad effects are known to 
be small and fleeting, and the growing share of 
digital advertising reinforces the importance of a 
multimodal approach. Yet the variation in content 
underscores that digital platforms serve different 
purposes. Consistent with prior analyses, Facebook 
content is more partisan while Google’s search ad-
vertising seems devoted to get-out-the-vote efforts, 
which may have been heightened in a pandemic. 
Both large platforms appear to be used for fund-
raising, which yields funds for further advertising. 
Similar to TV, YouTube lends itself to persuasive 
arguments with more substantive content through 
audiovisuals - but with the advantages of the digital 
realm, and Snapchat serves younger audiences. 
Electoral success does not necessarily 
“vindicate” the winner’s strategy. There is much 
yet to unpack about the 2020 election results and 
their correspondence with the volume, content 
and targeting of TV and digital advertising, and 
the different ways that campaigns deploy their 
messaging across platforms. The COVID-19 
pandemic may have played a role in record 
spending, as money that might otherwise have gone 
into events may have been funneled into adver-
tising. Finally, the fact that both campaigns spent 
almost as much on Google as they did on Facebook 
is noteworthy and worthy of further exploration.
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Joe Biden ran – in part – on empathy. CNN 
anchor Jake Tapper called it the trait Biden kept 
emphasizing and the one Donald Trump struggled 
to communicate. A great example from the first 
presidential debate in September: after Trump 
bragged about all the jobs he had created, Biden 
faced the camera and said: “You folks living in 
Scranton and Claymont and all the small towns 
and working-class towns in America … how well 
are you doing?” While Trump later mocked that 
move as a gimmick, Biden used TV moments like 
that to demonstrate empathy. But one interesting 
aspect of his digital campaign was how well he 
(and his social media team) communicated that 
trait online. 
Take his approach to Twitter. Biden’s campaign 
made explicit references to the candidate’s 
empathy. In January, Joe Biden tweeted: “Empathy 
matters. I think it’s important — not only for 
leaders — but for everybody to treat people with 
respect.” And in October, Jill Biden tweeted: 
“Empathy is on the ballot.” Biden did not just talk 
about empathy though; he used his Twitter account 
to perform it. And he did that through the language 
of his tweets. In addition to “empathy words” like 
treat, people, and respect, Biden used second-per-
son pronouns to strike a conversational tone and 
signal his understanding of the problems afflicting 
voters. Take this tweet about Trump’s decision 
to stop negotiating a second coronavirus relief 
package: “If you are out of work, if your business 
is closed, if your child’s school is shut down, if 
you are seeing layoffs in your community, Donald 
Trump decided today that none of that matters to 
him.” Or this one from National Coming Out Day: 
“I want every member of the LGBTQ+ community 
to know you are loved and accepted just as you are 
– whether you’ve come out or not. I’ll fight every 
day in the White House to create a country where 
you can live open, proud, and free – without fear.” 
Trump, on the other hand, used most of his “you’s” 
to thank people for showing up to his rallies.
And that distinction, between Biden’s personal 
touch and Trump’s fan cult, was evident on 
Instagram too. There, Biden often posted the kinds 
of images that read as compassionate. Of the 249 
photos and videos his campaign shared in October 
2020, 11 featured kids, 12 featured Biden inter-
acting one-on-one with people, and 40 featured 
individual supporters instead of the candidate. 
These kinds of content reinforced the narrative that 
Biden knows voters. He also used a lot of “you’s” in 
his captions. On October 5, for example, he posted 
a photo of himself talking to a voter with this 
caption under it: “I’ve been traveling to different 
communities across the country to talk to folks 
like you. I want you to know that I’m listening and 
I hear you. Thank you for sharing your pain and 
loss, and your hopes and dreams. You inspire me 
every single day.” Now compare that to Trump’s 
Instagram account: 55 of 143 photos and videos 
the campaign shared in October showed the 
massive crowds at Trump’s rallies, but none showed 
Trump interacting one-on-one with voters. Just 
one featured kids, and only two featured individual 
supporters instead of the candidate. Trump’s 
captions were also short and impersonal. And 
some posts had no caption at all. While Trump’s 
account depicted him as a “rock star” candidate, it 
also evoked a sense of detachment. Biden’s, on the 
other hand, emphasized his personal connection 
with voters.  
Well, so what? Trump was not running on 
empathy anyway. He had different goals – like 
bolstering his populist image – to achieve on social 
media. And he used different tactics to get there. 
But comparing his approach to Biden’s is useful 
because Trump’s amateurism on social media, and 
the perceived success of that approach in 2016, 
highlighted one of the potential drawbacks of 
professionalized accounts in political campaigning: 
the perception of inauthenticity. For example, 
Hillary Clinton’s campaign took some heat in 
December 2015 for a social media post some 
people read as pandering to Hispanic voters. 
Biden’s effective use of professionalized accounts 
to communicate and enhance one of his character 
traits shows that candidates’ social media can be 
professional and authentic. It also highlights a 
potential drawback of amateur accounts: missed 
opportunities to promote qualities that appeal to a 
lot of voters. 
We do not have a sense yet if or how the 
digital campaigns affected public opinion; exit 
polls will not be weighted to reflect the general 
electorate for a while, so we will have to wait to 
find out who voters thought cared more about 
them, and – even then – we will have to take those 
results with a grain of salt. But we do know that 
Biden used the affordances of social media far 
better than Trump did to communicate empathy. 
And that could be instructive for other campaigns. 
How Joe Biden conveyed empathy
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Debates are now a regular feature in political 
campaigns. Candidates facing off draws a crowd. 
But do they have an impact on the flow of 
communication in the election? Campaigns are 
times when citizens share their thoughts about 
the candidates. Does what they share change from 
before to after the debate?
In the first debate of the U.S. presidential 
election the rather standard questions were 
asked. “If elected, what would you do about one 
domain of policy after another?” When Biden 
was answering questions Trump did something 
unusual. He kibitzed -- loudly. He talked over 
Biden as Biden was answering questions. That 
received quite a lot of attention in the news media 
along with answers to the questions.
We look at what citizens did by collecting 
their communications on Twitter. We did separate 
searches, for Biden and Trump, two days before 
the debate, the day of the debate, and two days 
after the debate. The total was roughly 1,200,000 
tweets per day. Seventy percent of tweets are 
re-tweets, which is persons encountering a tweet 
and deciding to share it with their followers. We 
are using the 20 most re-tweeted messages a day 
for analysis. The number of times a tweet was 
re-tweeted ranged from 2,000 to 20,000 with an 
average of 5,000 times. The followers who would 
have access to the re-tweets numbered in the 
millions, ranging from 5 million to 40 million per 
re-tweeted tweet. These tweets were widely shared 
in the campaign.
September 27 (two days before the debate): 
The most re-tweeted message in both the Trump 
and Biden collections was the endorsement 
of Biden by former Department of Homeland 
Security Secretary and Governor Tom Ridge 
(R-PA). Three of the top 20 re-tweets in the 
Trump collection and five in the Biden collection 
mentioned this. Five of the top 20 in the Trump 
collection addressed the president’s taxes. Twelve 
of the top 20 in the Biden collection were positive; 
18 of 20 in the Trump collection were negative 
toward the president.
September 28 (one day before the debate): The 
most re-tweeted message in the Trump collection 
was from Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez noting the 
$70,000 in hairstyling fees Mr. Trump wrote off 
on his taxes. Again, the most re-tweeted messages 
in the Trump collection were negative, typically 
focusing on his tax returns. Only four were 
positive; two were ambiguous. In the Biden collec-
tion, a claim that Biden’s Texas political director 
was harvesting ballots was most re-tweeted, and it 
was the focus of two other top 20 re-tweets. Only 
two of the most re-tweeted messages were positive 
(with one ambiguous). The attacks on Biden were 
multi-pronged, including charges of corruption, 
nepotism, incompetence in dealing with the 2009 
swine flu, and election cheating.
September 29 (debate day): The most re-tweet-
ed messages included several focused on the 
debate. Ten of the top 20 re-tweets in the Biden 
collection were positive, 8 in the Trump collection. 
In both collections, the most re-tweeted message 
was from the candidate. Re-tweets referencing the 
debate were found only in the Biden collection.
September 30 (day after the debate): The tone 
of tweets turned more negative in both collections 
(7 of 20 were positive or pro-Trump in the Trump 
collection and 6 positive in the Biden collection). 
Tweets about the debate were prominent in both 
collections (13 of 20 in the Biden collection and 
11 in the Trump collection) including the most 
re-tweeted message in both collections. Two of the 
top five most re-tweeted messages in the Biden col-
lection were from Joe Biden, including one calling 
out the president’s “racist dog whistles” and saying 
Mr. Trump would not know the suburbs unless 
he took a wrong turn. One re-tweeted message 
pointed out that the president’s debate demeanor, 
widely seen as noxious and belligerent, coincided 
with Trump’s best hour of fundraising ever.
October 1 (two days after the debate): Debate 
tweets were still present in the top 20 (6 in the 
Biden collection, 5 in the Trump collection). 
Half the messages in the Trump collection were 
positive, but the only positive ones mentioning the 
debates were criticisms of the moderator.
The debates clearly became part of the election 
conversation, both in real time and in the days that 
followed. What is remarkable is what is not present 
in the conversation: the candidates’ plans for the 
next four years. Only two of the most re-tweeted 
messages addressed the coronavirus pandemic. 
None spoke to the beleaguered economy. Affirm-
ative rationales for supporting Joe Biden were rare 
and nonexistent for Donald Trump. Pro-Trump 
messages focused insinuations of voter fraud, 
claims of media bias, and personal attacks on 
Biden’s family. Pro-Biden messages targeted the 
president’s failure to pay taxes, his inability to 
condemn white supremacists during the debate, 
and Mr. Biden’s defense of his family. The tweets 
over these five days fully reflect the miasma of 
American politics in the Trump years.
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The 2020 Senate elections were some of the most 
closely watched in recent history. Everyone around 
the country has been glued to their televisions 
waiting to find out if the Senate, which is currently 
controlled by the Republican Party, would tilt its 
partisan control to the Democrats. There were 35 
seats up for grabs this year, with 12 of those ranked 
by the Cook Political Report as either toss-ups or 
leaning (on September 23rd). Democrats would 
only need to flip three or four of the Republican 
held seats to achieve majority status in the Senate 
(three if the next President was Joe Biden and four 
if President Trump won re-election). 
Massive turnout has resulted in closely divided 
Senate results, and we may not have an answer for 
which party controls the Senate until January, but 
exit polls have now revealed that voters cared about 
three key issues in this election: the economy; 
racial inequality; and COVID-19. Approximately 
60% of President Trump’s voters said the economy 
was their most important issue, while one-third of 
former Vice President Joe Biden’s voters said racial 
inequality was theirs.  
Given that voters cared about these topics, 
candidates should have cared about them too, 
especially to attract voters. One way that candi-
dates can signal their issue positions to voters is 
through their social media. To see if candidates 
were talking about these topics, we collected every 
tweet and re-tweet sent by all candidates running 
for these Senate seats for the last two months of 
the campaign (from September 3rd to November 
2nd). Our data includes all major and minor party 
candidates, and we collected these tweets from 
the campaign accounts for all candidates where 
possible. In total, we collected 31,065 tweets for 
89 candidates. We also collected demographic and 
district level information (gender, partisanship, 
and competitiveness).
First, our data reveal that, as expected, 
candidates in competitive races sent more tweets/
re-tweets during this election (371 on average 
compared to 333 for those in non-competitive 
races). Next, we searched these tweets for all 
mentions of keywords associated with the 
economy, racial inequality, and the pandemic. A 
list of those key words is given in Table 1. 
Our results show that, when it comes to 
these three issues, there were more tweets sent 
overall about COVID-19 (5.1%) and the economy 
(5%) than racial inequality (1.4%). As Figure 1 
shows, unlike COVID-19 and the economy, there 
were very few tweets about how to address racial 
inequality from anyone. When we split our sample 
into those in competitive races (N=36) and those 
who were not (N=53), we find that those in com-
petitive races paid more attention to all three issues 
than those in non-competitive races. Women 
and Democrats also sent more tweets about the 
economy and COVID-19, while racial equity was 
rarely discussed. Women sent approximately the 
same number of tweets about those topics than 
men, while Democrats sent fewer tweets about 
racial inequality than Republicans. 
When we explore our data further, we see 
that most of the tweets sent by Republicans about 
racial inequality were negative in nature, and were 
almost all against defunding the police. There was 
only one tweet from a Republican (Cory Gardner) 
that was positive about moving forward regarding 
race in this country. Democrats, on the other hand, 
only discussed positive steps that could be taken 
about racial inequality, but sent very few tweets 
overall about these key words/phrases. Only 15 
candidates in our dataset sent any tweets about 
Breonna Taylor, for instance, with most being from 
Democratic candidates.
Given that the public cast ballots this year 
caring the most about these three issues, it is our 
hope that our decision-makers in Washington will 
pay more attention to these issues, especially racial 
inequality. It is embarrassing that so few tweets 
were sent about these words and phrases in a time 
when citizens across the country felt like “I can’t 
breathe.”  Senatorial candidates need to do better.
Did the economy, COVID-19, or Black Lives Matter 
to the Senate candidates in 2020?
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Table 1: Words/phrases regarding the economy, racial inequality, and the pandemic
Search Terms
Economy Economy, economic, tax, deficit, debt, budget, spend
Racial inequality Racism, racist, Rayshard Brooks, Daniel Prude, Breonna Taylor, George Floyd, 
Trayvon Martin, Sandra Bland, Philando Castille, Tamir Rice, Eric Garner, 
BLM, #justiceforbreonna, #justiceforbreonnataylor, #breonnataylor, #sayher-
name, #sayhisname, #saytheirnames, #icantbreathe, #blm, #blacklivesmatter, 
#georgefloyd, #justiceforfloyd, #nojusticenopeace
COVID COVID, Coronavirus, Pandemic, Virus
Figure 1: Number of tweets about the economy, racial inequality, and COVID-19
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From ‘Crooked Hillary’ and ‘Crazy Bernie’ to ‘Mini 
Mike’, ‘Sleepy Joe’ and many others, Donald Trump 
has coined concise memorable nicknames which 
carry character-destroying meanings. This trend 
begun in the 2015-16 Republican primaries, it 
continued during his first presidential campaign 
and it did not stop in the 4 years of his admin-
istration. Unsurprisingly, the same strategy has 
been employed in the 2020 presidential campaign. 
The preferred medium for delivery has also been 
the same: Trump’s personal Twitter account, his 
favourite tool to communicate directly to followers, 
to by-pass the journalistic filters and with a final 
aim to build the agenda. 
‘Crooked Hillary’ soon became part of the 
general media discourse, ‘Sleepy Joe Biden’ is a 
widely known epithet. Table 1 provides numbers 
for this particular tactic: ‘Crooked Hillary’ 
remained in President Trump’s tweets and it 
has been even mentioned in the 2020 campaign 
(when she was almost completely out of daily 
politics). ‘Sleepy Joe’ already appeared in 2015 but 
was only during the 2020 Democratic primaries 
that it became consistently present in Trump’s 
Twitter feed. Rivals and preferred targets change 
and evolve throughout time: at the beginning 
there were ‘Lying Ted Cruz’ and ‘Lightweight Jeb 
Bush’, then several reporters popped-up for some 
of Trump’s recurring feud with media and news 
outlets. Finally, Joe Biden became the preferred 
target (although not as extensively as ‘Crooked 
Hillary’ four years earlier). Unpacking the 
frequency of Trump’s use of nicknames provides 
a timeline for his political enterprise: ‘Lying Ted 
Cruz’ and ‘Dope Karl Rove’ for the 2016 Republi-
can primaries; ‘Nervous Nancy Pelosi’ and ‘Shifty 
Adam Schiff ’ for the four years of dispute with the 
Democratic-controlled U.S. House of Represent-
atives; and the well-known ‘Crooked Hillary’ and 
‘Sleepy Joe Biden’ for the two presidential runs.
Why such a strategy? Because emotions play a 
crucial role in establishing an empathetic relation 
between the political leader and their audience. 
Trump is able to construct the character of his 
opponents using simple and short descriptions; 
setting the ground for informal, everyday language, 
and distracting the audience from serious issues 
and complex policies. He knows how to calculate 
words and how to play with social media and TV; 
how to cheer the audience and how to impress it; 
how to play with symbols and symbolic images. He 
is an experienced and skilled performer who aims 
to establish a relation of confidence and full com-
plicity with the audience. He has worked on TV for 
years and he knows the “rules” of the showbiz and 
of the infotainment. Every time he wants to show 
that he has nothing to do with old-style serious 
politics he jokes, he makes fun of his opponents. 
Average citizens have limits in assimilating data 
and information and fully react only to emotional 
acts. And Trump’s attempts to make opponents 
looking ridiculous serve him to offer voters with 
an experience of a sensation of full identification 
with the speaker, with simple solutions offered in 
a pleasant and funny framework, equipped with 
jokes, nicknames and mockeries. 
Candidate Trump and President Trump are 
speaking the same language: in disarticulating 
old-style political discourse, they are privileging 
slogans over thought, emotions instead of 
contents. With the crucial aid of his Twitter’s 
based disintermediated communication, Trump’s 
nicknames and inflammatory mockeries are 
invented to serve his populist strategy, to personify 
the ‘everyday man’ who fights against the elites. 
And that has been true for both presidential 
campaigns and for his full term as President. 
Trump’s hyper-simplified and politically-incor-
rect language is the language that millions of 
Americans speak at home, among friends, or in 
their families. When they hear a candidate (a 
president!) speaking like them, they feel at ease, 
comforted. It is the true language of populism. 
Trump’s rhetoric has never become presi-
dential and his political communication has been 
set into a comedy-style model, limiting the space 
for complex reasoning and complicated contents. 
Moreover, his ability to coin nicknames for almost 
every political opponent, disdained journalists 
and mainstream media has been picked up by his 
social media followers and conservative-aligned 
media such as Fox News. Literally, Trump has 
been able to build the agenda throughout his 
social media strategy of de-politicized, clown-
ing-style communication. 
Focusing on this ability to coin and impose 
ridiculous nicknames for opponents also opens 
up room for reflection on two relevant political 
concepts. The first one concerns Trump as the 
epitome of the modern notion of  permanent 
campaign. His inflammatory communication 
never changed: from candidate to President 
to candidate again (incumbent). The blurring 
boundaries between time of campaign and time 
of governing makes presidents being perceived as 
more partisan, less “presidential”. And this brings 
to the second long-term consequence: throughout 
this divisive rhetoric, once typical of election 
campaigns, Donald Trump represents a key factor 
in the increasing polarization of U.S. politics.
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Leadership through showmanship: Trump’s ability to 
coin nicknames for opponents on Twitter
Source: Author’s elaboration on Trumptwitterarchive.com (2020). 
Note: Total tweets from @realDonaldTrump. 
*Candidate 2016 period: June 16, 2015-November 8, 2016 (500 days: 7787 tweets). 
**Presidential period: January 20, 2017-January 20, 2020 (1095 days: 14242 tweets). 
***Candidate 2020 period: January 20, 2020-November 3, 2020 (283 days: 10424 tweets). 
Transition period (November 9, 2016-January 19, 2017) not included.
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Election countdown: Instagram’s role in visualizing 
the 2020 campaign
The photo-sharing app, Instagram, has become 
the hottest place to learn about the 2020 
campaigns, offering a visual connection between 
candidates and potential voters. As of October 
2020, Instagram boasted 140 million active U.S. 
users, with young people mainly engaged on the 
platform. To reach and interact with this popu-
lation, the 2020 presidential primary candidates 
employed Instagram to increase their visibility 
and garner engagement. A robust and organic 
reach is built upon a steady flow of engagement 
on Instagram, particularly likes and comments. 
Therefore, understanding the types of posts or 
messaging that not only are used but also enhance 
engagement during a campaign period is essential.
Between December and February 2020, a look 
at the Instagram posts among the remaining Dem-
ocratic candidates, Biden, Gabbard, Sanders and 
Warren, and the Republican incumbent, Trump, 
revealed three widely used messaging strategies: 
informational (i.e., posts discussing a candidates 
platform or educating the consumer); transforma-
tional (i.e., posts that evoke a sense of emotion, 
identify to the core identity of the brand, campaign 
events, and social issues); and interactional (i.e., 
posts about current events, personal posts with 
friends or family, creation of a sense of community, 
voter relation, and mobilizing posts). 
Interactional posts, specifically Instagram 
posts about current events, garnered the largest 
number of likes. For example, in January 2020, 
Warren’s timely post on the assassination of 
Soleimani received over 60,000 likes and Sander’s 
post on the high cost of insulin snagged over 
150,000 likes. Informational posts that educate 
and inform, such as posts illustrating recent 
polling results, also garnered more likes than 
other informational strategies, such as posts 
about a candidate’s platform or policy agenda. 
Interestingly, interactional posts on Instagram 
that focused on mobilizing, get-out-the-vote, and 
donations did not solicit a high number of likes. 
For instance, Gabbard’s picture of her with a group 
of supporters, along with a fundraising goal (and 
a “donate now” button) collected about 8,000 
likes. The most “commented on” Instagram posts 
were interactional, specifically personal posts and 
current event posts. Biden’s vintage family photo 
of him as a single parent of two boys collected 
over 3,500 comments, and Trump’s post of him 
playing golf for a little exercise exceeded 35,000 
comments. Candidates who Instagrammed about 
current events (i.e., interactional) and educational 
posts (i.e., informational) also were rewarded 
with more commentary. The least commented 
on posts covered the candidate’s platform (i.e. 
informational) and social issues. To summarize the 
2020 primary campaign on Instagram, candidates’ 
interactional posts – current events and personal 
pictures - elicited the most engagement.  Yet, what 
types of posts were used in the lead up to the 
November 3rd general election and which posts 
had the highest levels of engagement? Did Biden 
and Trump differ in their countdown approaches? 
A comparison of the presidential candidates 
Instagram accounts a week prior to the November 
3rd election revealed very different communication 
strategies. Most of Trump’s posts were primarily 
coded as experiential (i.e. transformational) 
and brand community (i.e. interactional). More 
specifically, his posts predominately focused on 
him speaking to large crowds and thanking them.  
Engagement rates for these types of posts ranged 
from approximately 400,000-800,000 likes.  There 
were a number of notable posts that deviated 
from focusing solely on crowds that received large 
engagement numbers. Several posts had high 
production levels that mimiced formulistic movie 
trailers (i.e. soaring or mixed music, professional 
narration, and aerial perspectives). The content 
contained within these videos highlighted Trump’s 
community of supporters, his achievements and 
American landscapes, as well as a “dystopian-like” 
world that a Biden administration would bring. 
These posts were coded as emotional (i.e. trans-
formational) and educational (i.e. informational) 
received engagement rates of 2.2 and 2.3 million.  
The most popular Trump posts included him 
dancing on stage with supporters to YMCA (4.7 
million views) and video of the Biden bus being 
surrounded by Trump supporters on a Texas 
highway (3.7 million views). Lastly, mobilization 
efforts were limited to reminding people to 
vote and played a secondary role in the account 
compared to the focus on large campaign events. 
In contrast, the Biden campaign communicat-
ed a much more diverse range of post content/types 
and varied in their aesthetic approach. Unlike the 
Trump campaign, mobilization (i.e. interactional) 
was the primary focus in the election countdown. 
These posts ranged from creative ways to spell out 
“vote” through food to detailed voting information 
(i.e. last day to vote early). While mobilization was 
the most popular type of post, the Biden campaign, 
with some exceptions, had a variety of content that 
touched upon most of the typology categories. The 
exception to this, was experiential posts – there 
were few posts that included crowds. Biden’s most 
popular posts included an emotion/voter relations 
video that summarized an interaction between 
Biden and a little boy (i.e. 2.1 million views), an 
educational video summarizing Trump’s bankrupt-
cies (i.e. 1.85 million  views) and humor/emotion 
video that had Mark Hamill reacting to Trump (i.e. 
1.9 million views). 
With the announcement of Biden’s win 
on November 7th, we can now examine how 
candidates use Instagram when entering a new 
office as well as say farewell to devoted to faitherful 
supporters during a post-election period.
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Candidates did lackluster youth targeting 
on Instagram
Presidential campaigns often hinge on which can-
didates are best at mobilizing those demographic 
groups who are the most predisposed to support 
them. For Democratic presidential nominee Joe 
Biden, young people were a key group to cultivate 
and lure to the polls. Among 18- to 29-year-olds, 
60 percent said they leaned toward Biden, while 
only 27 percent liked Donald Trump, according 
to a survey by the Institute of Politics at Harvard 
Kennedy School taken late in the campaign. Of 
course, young people are also the least likely age 
group to vote, so it takes a lot of effort to energize 
them enough to fill out a ballot.
One increasingly important way to reach and 
influence young people is on Instagram. With 
more than 400 million active users, the mobile 
photo-sharing application is larger than Twitter 
and trails only Facebook among social media 
platforms. Instagram is especially popular with 
young adults, who see it as the “go-to source of 
political news,” according to a survey by Business 
Insider. Recent research shows Instagram’s 
political influence. Young voters frequently turn 
to Instagram for information about candidates. 
Those who follow political leaders on Instagram 
say the posts can influence their views more than 
any other source, including friends and family. 
The main motives to follow political leaders on 
Instagram are for information and guidance, which 
helps to explain why followers are so receptive to 
the messages in leaders’ posts. 
While Instagram is a platform that Biden 
could have used to appeal to young people and 
convince them to vote, an analysis of his cam-
paign’s Instagram account shows the absence of a 
focused youth strategy. Of the 450 Instagram posts 
during the last two months of the race, fewer than 
5% visually or verbally targeted those in their late 
teens or 20s. Targeting the youth vote is defined 
as whether the posts showed 18- to 29-year-olds, 
verbally mentioned young adults, or discussed 
issues from the youth perspective. Trump’s 
campaign Instagram account practically ignored 
young voters, with less than 2% of posts focused 
on youth. 
Biden had some posts that attempted to 
target the youth vote. Examples include a video 
compilation of several young people excited to 
vote for the first time. The post, which is addressed 
to “First-time voters,” says, “Voting is a powerful 
tool for change.” Another video montage of young 
people is labeled “Students react to my policies. It’s 
so important that young people’s voices are heard 
this election. You are the future of this country.” 
Two other posts target young African Americans. 
In one, Biden says: “Historically Black Colleges 
and Universities are critical to the fabric of our 
education system. I’ll make it a priority to invest in 
the diverse talent at HBCUs, make college afforda-
ble for Black students, and work toward equity in 
education.” A similar post compares Biden and 
Trump on various issues, including education, and 
Biden says he will “expand access to Pell Grants 
for millions of Black students.” A few other posts 
included 20-something celebrities. In one, Biden 
has a conversation with 28-year-old singer and 
actress Cardi B. The posts reads: “You might be 
surprised, but @iamcardib and I have a lot more in 
common than our passion for talking about racial 
equality, free college, and affordable healthcare.” 
Their video conversation goes on to address these 
issues from the perspective of young voters. These 
examples show that the Biden campaign was 
capable of doing youth-targeted posts. They simply 
did not do many of them.
Of course, many issues mentioned on the 
candidates’ Instagram pages, such as the economy 
and the COVID-19 pandemic, matter to all ages. 
But voter targeting is common for other age 
groups, such as senior citizens, who frequently 
are shown in political ads while discussing Social 
Security, Medicare, and other age-related issues. 
The same effort could be put into targeting young 
people, but campaigns rarely bother. For example, 
U.S. presidential TV ads almost never target young 
voters, which promotes an interpretation among 
young viewers that political ads, and political 
campaigns in general, are not meant for them. 
Focus groups with college students indicate that 
young people want candidates to address them 
directly and create ads that stress the importance 
of voting in general. Doing so could boost the 
stature of the candidate making the appeal, as well 
as counteract political cynicism. 
The failure to reach out to young voters is not 
limited to U.S. candidates. Research shows that 
British candidates are equally guilty. British political 
ad makers say they rarely pursue a youth strategy, 
even though low youth turnout concerns them.  
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College students, political engagement and 
Snapchat in the 2020 general election
Snapchat has grown among young adults, with 
Snapchat now claiming over 90% of Americans 
between the ages of 13 and 24 as users. Usually, 
we associate Snapchat with entertaining filters 
and disappearing content. However, Snapchat 
provides a home for political activity among 
young adults, too. 
In 2016, we found that sending political 
pictures and political videos increased civic 
engagement among college students. Among 
other activities, civic engagement consists of 
persuading others why they should vote for or 
against a party or candidate, attending political 
meetings, and participating in political activities 
like marches or protests. 
The 2020 election has seen record voter 
turnout and political participation among young 
people, with records being shattered in Texas, Cali-
fornia, and Wisconsin. Does Snapchat deserve part 
of the credit for enhancing civic engagement? Did 
these politically-oriented activities on Snapchat 
increase civic activity among college students in 
2020 as they did in 2016?
To examine those questions, we performed 
a survey of students at a large midwestern public 
university (Southern Illinois University Edwards-
ville) in October 2020. Students at this university 
are reasonably representative of college students 
as a whole on several dimensions including their 
voting rates. 
Our results show that sending pictures and 
videos about candidates, political parties, or 
interest groups increased civic engagement levels, 
as shown in Figures 1 and 2. In both figures, the 
horizontal axis shows the frequency of political 
Snapchat activity and the vertical axis is the 
average treatment effect on the treated at the 
varying frequencies of actions on Snapchat. In 
addition, the solid line is the average treatment 
effect on the treated at each Snapchat activity level, 
and the dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals 
around these estimates.
These figures indicate that even rarely sending 
political pictures or videos is associated with two 
to three-point increases in civic engagement. 
Meanwhile, sending political pictures or political 
videos regularly on Snapchat both result in slightly 
over four-point increases in civic engagement. For 
context, a two-point increase in civic engagement 
is equivalent to participating rarely in two activities 
that one otherwise would not have engaged in or to 
moving from participating never in an activity to 
sometimes in an activity.
Meanwhile, a four-point increase is equivalent 
to engaging in one additional activity very often 
that one would otherwise not have participated 
in or participating sometimes in two additional 
activities that one otherwise would not have done. 
Yet, we did not find any evidence that monitoring 
what candidates for office, political parties, or 
interest groups post on Snapchat is connected with 
increased civic engagement.
We employed a statistical technique called 
matching to obtain our results. Matching allows us 
to isolate the impact of political uses of Snapchat 
among those otherwise similarly inclined to civic 
engagement. To do so, we considered many other 
factors connected with civic engagement, with a 
complete listing available in the online appendix.
To ensure confidence in our results, we 
need to address two potential limitations to our 
analyses. First, matching requires that we satisfy a 
series of stringent assumptions or else the results 
are not valid. Our dataset and analyses meet 
these assumptions.
Second, if the groups that engaged in Snapchat 
by sharing pictures or videos at varying levels differ 
from those who did not perform such activities, 
then we cannot determine a causal effect of these 
Snapchat activities. This means that we would 
not be able to differentiate between the effects of 
other, preexisting differences (like interest levels 
in politics) and activities on Snapchat on civic 
engagement. We checked to see if this occurred. 
After matching, there are no statistically significant 
preexisting differences between those who engaged 
in sharing pictures or videos at varying levels and 
those who did not. Thus, we can rule out the effects 
of preexisting differences.
Yet, what if we have specified our matching 
routines such that they conveniently produce 
the results that we report here? That’s known as 
p-hacking, and it’s a large, well-known problem in 
scientific research. To guard against this practice, 
we removed one of the factors that we discuss in 
the previous paragraph and re-ran our statistical 
model. We repeat that procedure for each factor 
and each level of monitoring what others say on 
Snapchat, sending pictures, and sending videos on 
Snapchat. Our results are robust to these alternate 
specifications, as 82.41% (or, 89/108) of the 
alternate specifications confirm our results. 
In sum, political expression on Snapchat is 
partly responsible for higher levels of civic activity 
among college students in 2020. While Snapchat 
may not be as frequently used as social media 
apps like Facebook and Instagram, it provided an 
important vehicle for increasing civic and political 
activity among college students in 2020. Thus, 
online political engagement increases civic activity 
away from the internet, too. We anticipate that this 
trend will continue.
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Figure 1: sending political pictures via Snapchat and civic engagement in 2020
Figure 2: sending political videos via Snapchat and civic engagement in 2020
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Advertising on Facebook: transparency, but not 
transparent enough 
In 2016, much concern was raised about adver-
tising on social media, especially Facebook. A 
Bloomberg story at the end of the 2016 election 
noted that the Trump campaign used Facebook 
advertising specifically to target pockets of Dem-
ocratic voters to demobilize them from voting for 
Hillary Clinton. Without any way to systematically 
monitor ads on Facebook, researchers were left 
with anecdotes to determine who was targeted and 
what was said. 
In 2018, Facebook created an ad library for 
journalists and researchers. Our project, Illumi-
nating 2020, tracked the spending, targets, and 
content of ad buys on Facebook and Instagram and 
created a dashboard to visualize the data. 
Using computational techniques to classify 
the content in ads, with at least 75% accuracy for 
each category, we find noteworthy differences 
in how the campaigns communicated on the 
platforms. Our research suggests that advertising 
largely reflected the demographic trends of the 
Republican and Democratic Parties and the 
rhetorical trends of the candidates. Unfortunately, 
because of the limitations of data reporting from 
Facebook, it is challenging to ascertain fine-
grained micro-targeting practices.
Overall Spending and Trends
Facebook advertising was a major focus of total 
overall ad spending by Donald Trump and Joe 
Biden. As much as $1.5 billion was spent overall 
on advertising, from television to radio to digital 
media, between April 6 and October 25. A 
major share of that spending was on Facebook. 
Our analysis suggests that, of the ads associated 
with their official campaign pages, the Biden 
campaign spent $76.9 million between June 1 
and November 1, and the Trump campaign spent 
$87.2 million. This amount is significantly more 
than the campaigns spent in 2016: Trump spent 
an estimated $44 million and Clinton spent $28 
million between June and November, according to 
a Facebook report.
Although the Trump campaign spent more 
on Facebook overall, between October 5 and 
November 1, 2020 Biden outspent Trump 4:3. 
Biden had his largest new ad buys on Facebook 
over the second presidential debate, which took 
place on October 22nd, spending over $10 million as 
compared with Trump’s $7.5 million (See Figure 1). 
Demographic Targets
When looking across the five months of the 
campaign, from June 1 until November 1, 2020, the 
overall targeting of demographic groups matched 
the demographics of the political parties. Biden 
overweighted women in his targeted spending, 
which reflects the gender skew in the Democratic 
party (See Figure 2). The two campaigns had 
distinctly different age targeting strategies. The 
Trump campaign prioritized ad spending to people 
45 and older, while the Biden campaign focused 
heavily on the 25-44 age brackets, mirroring the 
differences in age demographics of the two parties. 
Millennials are more likely to lean Democrat, 
while the Silent Generation is more likely to lean 
Republican. Neither campaign focused resources 
heavily on the youngest voters - those in the 
18-24 age bracket - even though this group most 
heavily uses social media, especially Instagram. 
Both campaigns heavily targeted the 65+ category, 
even though less than 50% of Americans in that 
age bracket are on any social media platforms. 
To us, that speaks to the power of social media 
advertising for micro-targeting the nations’ 
most motivated voters (See Figure 3). Lacking 
in Facebook data is information about education 
level, race and ethnicity, religion, and location data 
beyond the level of the state to ascertain micro-tar-
geting strategies.
Messaging
At a high level, Trump’s advertisements on 
Facebook looked much like his campaign rhetoric. 
He attacked his opponents - Biden, Harris, 
and the news media – and did so often with an 
uncivil tone. The Biden advertisements tended to 
emphasize his personality and ability to lead and 
were overwhelmingly civil. 
Nearly all ads call targets to action in the text 
- ranging from fundraising to polls to petitions. 
Beyond that, there are distinct differences in 
messaging strategy. Biden spent more on advocacy 
ads, while Trump spent more on attack ads. When 
Trump attacked, he was more likely to attack 
Biden’s policies, while when Biden attacked, he 
was more likely to attack Trump’s persona - his 
character, personality, and ability to lead.
We also analyzed whether an ad exhibited 
uncivil language. We operationalize incivility as 
hateful, disparaging, and derogatory remarks 
targeted at another individual or group. Nearly 
one-third of Trump’s ads contain evidence of 
incivility, while a fraction of Biden’s ads were 
uncivil in tone. (Figure 4)
Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that party demographics 
drove targeting strategy. We also found that the 
rhetoric in the advertisements largely matched the 
rhetoric by the candidates on the campaign trail. 
Trump’s ads show evidence of the same personal 
attacks and self-aggrandizement as his campaign 
speeches. The challenge for researchers is the lack 
of fine-grained targeting data to ascertain whether 
the campaigns undertook the same demobilization 
approaches in 2020 as reported in 2016. While we 
gain a high-level view, the extent of microtargeting 
is unfortunately left to guesswork. 
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Figure 1: Facebook ad Spending over time 
by Biden and Trump, June 1 to Nov. 1, 2020
Figure 2: Facebook ad spending by age category 
between June 1 and Nov. 1, 2020
Figure 3: Facebook ad spending by gender 
between June 1 and Nov. 1, 2020
Figure 4: Facebook ad spending by civility 
between June 1 and Nov. 1, 2020
98
Prof Michael Bossetta  
Assistant Professor 
in the Department of 
Communication and Media 
at Lund University. His 
research interests revolve 
around the intersection of 
social media and politics, 
especially political 
campaigning. He produces 
and hosts the Social Media 
and Politics podcast, 
available for free on any 
podcast app.
Detecting emotions in Facebook political ads with 
computer vision
Set against the backdrop of a pandemic and 
polarized political climate, this election was sure to 
be emotional. Therefore, we used computer vision 
to examine the emotions expressed by Biden and 
Trump in their Facebook political ads. Our aim was 
to see if the candidates expressed different emotions 
in images where they presented themselves versus 
how they depicted opponents in attacks.
Indeed, we found that Biden primarily 
expressed happiness in his Facebook ads, 
whereas his attack ads depicted Trump as angry. 
Meanwhile, the Trump campaign presented 
their candidate as a calm leader, while Biden was 
often shown expressing confusion. Overall, both 
campaigns’ Facebook ads largely focused more 
on promoting their own candidate rather than on 
attacking the opponent. 
To collect and analyze images in Facebook 
ads, we used two open science software tools that 
we developed. The first, FBAdLibrarian, assists 
researchers in collecting images from the Facebook 
Ad Library. The second, Pykognition, leverages 
Amazon’s facial detection algorithms to classify 
emotions expressed in faces.
We collected ads from the official Trump 
and Biden Facebook pages in the week before 
Facebook’s ad pause on October 27th. Due to 
controversies around this ad pause, the data we 
collected from Facebook may be incomplete, and 
it appears that Facebook removed all information 
about dates from the data.
In total, we obtained 202,000 Trump ads 
and 109,287 Biden ads. Using FBAdLibrarian, 
we collected 98,830 images from Trump ads and 
69,941 images from Biden ads. This means that 
in our dataset, 49% of Trump’s ads and 64% of 
Biden’s ads contained still images (the remainder 
were videos). 
We then removed all images that did not 
depict Trump or Biden. This includes ads that 
were infographics, promoting merchandise, or 
featuring other high-profile politicians. Many of 
the remaining images were copies, so we removed 
duplicates and ended up with a dataset of 634 
images for Trump and 1,148 for Biden.
We further divided these images into three 
ad categories used in previous research: Promote, 
Contrast, and Attack. Promote images show only 
the candidate, Contrast images show both the 
candidate and the opponent, and Attack images 
show only the opponent. We divided the images 
this way to see whether campaigns strategically 
change the emotions displayed by their candidate 
versus the opponent.
Emotion Classification Results
We ran all images through Amazon’s Rekognition 
API with our software, Pykognition. This process 
categorizes faces into eight emotional categories: 
Angry, Calm, Confused, Disgusted, Fear, Happy, 
Sad, and Surprised. Each face is classified with 
a unique identifier ("FaceID"), an emotion, and 
a predicted score for that emotion. In Figure 1, 
we show examples from the Biden page for each 
category: Promote, Contrast, and Attack. 
We manually checked the algorithm’s classifi-
cation for each image. In cases where we disagreed 
with the algorithm, we changed the emotion to 
the one we considered most accurate. Overall, we 
agreed with the algorithm in 73% of cases. 
Interestingly and unique to this election cycle, 
candidates (and Biden in particular) wore pro-
tective facemasks in response to the coronavirus 
pandemic. This proved problematic for the facial 
detection algorithm, which predicted pictures with 
facemasks to display emotions such as sadness and 
fear but with unreliable confidence. We therefore 
reclassified all images where candidates wore a 
mask into a new category: "MASK". With the 
images classified, we were able to link our coded 
data to all other ads in the dataset using the same 
image. In Figure 2, we present our overall results 
per candidate page and for each ad type.
Overall, we find that in terms of the number of 
ads sent, both campaigns emphasized promoting 
their own candidate rather than attacking the 
opponent. Biden was most often depicted as 
‘Happy’, and he wore a facemask in approximately 
10% of images. By contrast, the Trump page issued 
ads promoting the candidate as the ‘Calm’ leader 
and wore a mask in less than 1% of images. In 
Figure 3, we also report each category in propor-
tional terms, to better understand the distribution 
of emotions per ad type. 
For Biden, there was a clear distinction 
between his own portrayal as "Happy" and Trump 
as "Angry". For Trump, we see his page’s ads 
depicting him as "Calm", whereas Biden was most 
often depicted as "Confused" in attacks. 
Our analysis reveals how campaigns preferred 
to show their candidates in Facebook ads: Biden 
as warm and happy, and Trump as the calm leader. 
In addition, we see how the campaign’s broader 
attack narratives were also depicted in images: 
Biden attacked Trump as an angry despot, and 
Trump attacked Biden as a confused candidate in 
mental decline. 
It is important to note that we did not factor 
in the spending amount or number of people who 
saw these ads; we only studied the raw number of 
ads issued by the campaign. And, due to limita-
tions imposed by Facebook, we do not know the 
dates of when these ads were issued. Nevertheless, 
we encourage other researchers to use the open 
science tools that we developed to further analyze 
emotions in political images.  
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Figure 1: Promote, Contrast, and Attack ad examples from the Biden Facebook page
Figure 3: Proportion of emotion classifications by candidate and ad type
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On campaigns and political trash talk
Just before Election Day in 2020, President Donald 
Trump appeared at a campaign rally in Scranton, 
Pennsylvania. In characteristic fashion, he played 
to the crowd with familiar appeals to his own 
popularity and the alleged diminishing popularity 
of sports leagues such as the National Football 
League and the National Basketball Association. 
Echoing previous comments of his own and 
other conservative commentators, he turned his 
attention specifically to superstar LeBron James 
and the low ratings for the NBA Finals. “How 
about basketball? How about LeBron?” he primed 
his supporters. Concluding that James’ (and 
others’) activism was responsible for the decrease 
in viewership of sports, he added, “When they 
don’t respect our country, when they don’t respect 
our flag, nobody wants to watch. . . . You got to 
stand for our flag, you got to be really great to our 
flag and to our anthem, and if you don’t do that, 
we’re not watching!”
The crowd responded to the sports reference 
as though they were actually at a game, beginning 
a chant of “LeBron James sucks!” A pleased 
President Trump stood back and declared, “What a 
crowd! What a crowd!”
This moment was far from the first time a 
political crowd turned to enthusiastic chants 
either to praise their candidate or to mock their 
opponent. During the 2016 election, Trump 
supporters routinely shouted “Lock her up!” 
to confirm their contempt for Hillary Rodham 
Clinton. And, political communication scholars 
have long observed the parallels between politics 
and sports, best symbolized by the persistence 
of “horse race” coverage. Yet Trump’s frequent 
references to sports have coupled with increasing 
partisan polarization to extend the legitimacy of 
treating elections as little more than a game to be 
won. In such a climate, and amplified by social 
media, it is no surprise that partisans understand 
themselves less as citizens and more as fans, 
turning to a win-at-all-costs mindset and invoking 
forms of discourse that are characteristic of sports 
fans’ trash talk.
It is one thing when voters behave as though 
they are at a pre-game tailgate party or are 
shouting down their rivals from the stands. It is yet 
another when candidates for elected office similarly 
mimic these behaviors. In a notable convergence of 
politics and sports, former college football coach 
Tommy Tuberville was elected last week to the U.S. 
Senate in Alabama. Tuberville’s campaign unsur-
prisingly traded on his football background, most 
notably his ten years at Auburn University where 
he was especially successful against his principal 
rival, the University of Alabama. Tuberville thrived 
on the rivalry, emphasizing his own team’s unity 
and relishing the opportunity to taunt opposing—
losing—fans. This combativeness was featured in 
a campaign ad for incumbent Senator Doug Jones, 
in which Tuberville was criticized for his record 
of abandoning the teams he coached. The ad 
concluded with footage of the former coach while 
at the University of Cincinnati where, in 2016, he 
responded to one of his own team’s disappointed 
fans by yelling, “Go to hell! Get a job!” 
If we can agree that political polarization 
increasingly understands citizenship in terms 
of fan affiliation, then perhaps no candidate in 
2020 was better suited than Tuberville to mock 
his opposition when the outcome became clear. 
In a speech to celebrate his victory, Tuberville 
quickly thanked his supporters and then turned 
his attention to his rivals. “If you allow me to quote 
one of my opponent’s many campaign ads, they can 
all go to hell and get a job as far as I’m concerned!” 
Rather than signal to Alabamans a commitment 
to working on behalf of all citizens of the state, 
he instead seized the opportunity to reward his 
supporters by belittling his rivals.
Trump’s influence on U.S. politics has been 
substantial, but it is difficult to predict how much 
other Republican politicians will adopt his tone 
moving forward. Perhaps Tuberville will be content 
with his victory lap. Maybe tweeting, “Cry more, 
lib,” won’t be representative of Congressman-Elect 
Madison Cawthorn’s term in North Carolina. 
What is clear is that Republicans in particular 
seem to delight in this kind of political trash talk. 
This isn’t to suggest that Democrats are always or 
necessarily noble. Nevertheless, we might contrast 
the comments above with those of President-Elect 
Joe Biden, whose victory speech addressed the 
supporters of his rival directly, saying, “To make 
progress, we must stop treating our opponents 
as our enemy. We are not enemies. We are 
Americans.” Such words are not, by themselves, 
sufficient. However, they are a necessary first step 
in reimagining our political rivals as adversaries 
worthy of mutual respect rather than the subjects 
of ridicule and contempt.
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Modern politics in the United States has seemingly 
become akin to sport, as Americans affiliate 
themselves with the red/Republican or blue/
Democrat team. This shift is illustrated in the rise 
of Trumpism, as his supporters fly Trump flags, 
attend rallies similar to sporting events, and wear 
branded merchandise showcasing attachment to 
a person and brand. Succinctly stated, politics in 
2020 have ascended to fandom above policy, and  
sport can gelp ascertain what this could mean for 
democracy moving forward. 
Sport communication scholars often examine 
fan behavior through the concept of team identifi-
cation, explained by Daniel Wann as an emotional 
connection to a team where their performances 
become self-relevant. Essentially, team wins feel like 
personal victories, leading one to Bask-In-Reflect-
ed-Glory (BIRG), and team losses feel like personal 
defeats, leading one to Cut-Off-Reflected-Failure 
(CORF). Sport communication literature provides 
evidence that those who are highly identified with 
their team are more likely to BIRG during their 
teams’ success and less likely to CORF after losses. 
Unlike any U.S. President in modern history, 
President Trump has turned politics into sport, 
complete with blind and unadulterated fandom. 
So what can we learn about the 2020 election 
from sport fandom? First, let’s consider the role 
of cognitive dissonance and identity protection. 
Looking back to 2014, Devlin and Billings 
conducted a longitudinal analysis of highly identi-
fied USMNT fans during the 2014 World Cup. As 
the tournament progressed, the team failed to meet 
(unrealistic) expectations, resulting in decreased 
nationalism, or the belief that your country is better 
than another country, and smugness, the belief that 
your country is superior to all countries attitudes 
among a national sample. Interestingly, once the 
USMNT was eliminated from the tournament, 
smugness scores increased to their highest level, 
indicating highly identified fans not only refused 
to CORF, but instead, doubled-down and declared 
themselves the best despite evidence to the contrary. 
We are witnessing a similar effect occurring 
with political identity. For highly identified 
Trump fans, the electoral loss poses a personal 
identity threat that must be mitigated accordingly. 
Therefore, denying the election results and refusing 
to concede provides psychological insulation from 
the loss. Rationale for this can also be explained 
by social psychological findings suggesting a 
success/failure attributional bias exists, which 
helps internalize success and externalize failure. 
Sport communication research has found that one’s 
degree of team identification is major predictor for 
attributing a loss to external forces such as referees 
and opponents’ cheating, resulting in denial of the 
outcome, or worse, behaviors such as increased 
aggression. Leon Mann noted that when support-
ers of opposing teams were asked to recap a game, 
it seemed they witnessed two completely different 
events. Supporters of the losing team overestimat-
ed objective and measurable events, such as free 
kicks given to the opponent, and attributing the 
loss to external factors and dirty play rather than 
admitting their team’s poor performance.
This research mirrors what we are currently 
witnessing from Trump, who seems unable to inter-
nalize the electoral defeat, and instead, has refused 
to concede and is trying to cast doubt on the 
integrity of electoral process through unfounded 
claims of fraud, cheating, and subsequent lawsuits 
holding no merit. His fans are levying similar 
claims on various social media platforms while 
feeling spurned by certain platforms’ attempts at 
fact-checking their election claims. 
With reports that Trump hopes to continue 
contesting the election result with lawsuits 
and additional rallies, highly identified Trump 
supporters will continue to echo his claims. 
However, it is important to note that identification 
occurs on a spectrum, and not all supporters are 
highly identified (even if those highly identified 
supporters are the “loudest” on social media). Un-
fortunately, highly identified supporters are more 
likely to believe misinformation that confirms their 
in-group beliefs (political identity hypothesis) 
and form false memories of events. Additionally, 
those of populist leanings will continue to view the 
mainstream media as hostile toward their beliefs. 
While seemingly grim, there is one predictive 
insight to be gleaned if modern politics continues to 
mirror sport: a return to normalcy. Communication 
scholars have noted inconsistent findings regarding 
attributional bias, arguing that a responsibility 
norm exists for individuals to eventually accept a 
loss. Recently, research suggests the aforementioned 
bias phenomena was weaker among less identified 
fans, which is notable considering not all Trump 
voters are necessarily highly-identified supporters. 
Like sports fans, as more begin to believe that the 
game is truly over, Trump supporters will shift their 
attention to next season. 
Granted, in sport, there are no pep rallies after 
a defeat, no emails to fans requesting donations 
to contest the results, and no communication 
strategies intended to cast doubt on a final score. 
So, it remains to be seen how highly identified 
Trump supporters will react if Trump continues to 
dominate headlines and if the mainstream media 
continues providing attention surrounding rallies, 
misinformation, and lawsuit filings. 
Should the campaign continue to lose in 
court and should the media shift their attention 
away from Trump, Devlin and Billings’ work lends 
empirical evidence to a popular saying that “time 
heals all wounds.” Perhaps a similar pattern will 
emerge once the sensationalism of the election 
declines and the media ceases to give attention to 
former President Donald Trump. 
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Kelly Loeffler uses battle with the WNBA as  
springboard into Georgia Senate runoff
It was widely-known that Donald Trump’s status 
as the de facto face of the Republican Party 
had a tremendous impact on most of 2020s 
down-ballot elections. That impact took a bizarre 
turn in the summer of 2020 when Kelly Loeffler, 
an incumbent Republican candidate in one of 
Georgia’s two senatorial races, took political aim 
at the professional sports league in which she has 
co-owned a franchise since 2011. In June, with 
Loeffler running in a unique special election that 
featured opponents on her left and right flanks, she 
publicized a letter she wrote to Cathy Englebert, 
commissioner of the Women’s National Basketball 
Association. In that letter, published amid the civil 
unrest wrought by the police killings of George 
Floyd and Breonna Taylor, Loeffler argued that the 
league should distance itself from the Black Lives 
Matter movement. Given the history of the WNBA, 
and the context of the senatorial race, Loeffler’s 
maneuver was a politically motivated attempt to 
demonstrate her allegiance to a Republican Party 
that had aligned itself with Donald Trump.
At the time Loeffler published her letter, the 
WNBA was preparing for the start of its season, 
delayed due to the coronavirus pandemic, and 
the league and its players were not reticent about 
demonstrating their support for the Black Lives 
Matter movement. This support should not 
have surprised anyone familiar with the WNBA; 
over the last decade, the league has been more 
proactive in its political progressivism than any 
other professional sports organization in the U.S. 
Political activism is integral to its brand. Those 
who enter WNBA fandom therefore go into it 
knowing that does not hesitate to voice its support 
for disregarded communities.
Before being appointed by Georgia’s GOP 
governor to fill the state’s suddenly-vacated seat in 
the Senate in early 2020, Loeffler was a fast-riser 
at International Exchange, a Fortune 500 financial 
service provider. She had a history as an investor 
in her own right (a history that came under intense 
scrutiny for alleged insider trading not long after 
she took office) and built up enough assets to 
purchase a 49 percent stake in a professional sports 
franchise, the WNBA’s Atlanta Dream. In other 
words, Loeffler possessed at least a modicum of 
business acumen. To think that Loeffler might have 
been surprised or even offended by the political 
actions taken by the WNBA would be therefore 
naïve at best. In fact, as political scientist Audrey 
Haynes told Sports Illustrated, the WNBA’s brand 
“was part of [Loeffler’s] brand, too. And suddenly it 
isn’t.” Why did Loeffler, a noted women’s basketball 
fan, turn on her own league? The context of her 
senate race – and of Trump’s standing within the 
Republican Party – offers answers.
As a result of the senate vacancy left by Johnny 
Isakson at the very end of 2019, the Georgia 
state constitution allowed the state’s governor to 
appoint a temporary replacement until a special 
election could be held the following fall. That 
special election, which did not allow for a primary 
election to decide who would represent the major 
political parties, was a 21-candidate free-for-all 
that is now headed to a two-candidate runoff. 
Loeffler therefore found herself not only fending 
off Democrats like Matt Lieberman and Rev. 
Raphael Warnock but also fellow Republicans such 
as Doug Collins, who was initially passed over as 
Isakson’s replacement. Collins, a staunch supporter 
of President Trump, worked to cast Loeffler as 
not conservative enough. Others, like the Susan 
B. Anthony List, an anti-abortion organization, 
initially disapproved of Loeffler’s appointment 
(before endorsing her for reelection). Suffice it to 
say, Loeffler had plenty incentive to prove herself 
a worthy member of a political party that has 
become more divisive in its tone since nominating 
Trump for president in 2016.
To wit, when members of the Atlanta Dream 
pushed back against Loeffler by demonstrating 
their support for Warnock, Loeffler declared that 
it was a symbol of “cancel culture,” a tactic often 
employed by the Republican Party to delegitimize 
criticisms lobbed against the right and to create a 
boogeyman in the left. In addition, amid a global 
pandemic that has killed hundreds of thousands 
of U.S. citizens, Loeffler co-sponsored legislation 
that would have made it illegal for transgender 
girls to play girls’ sports. The bill, which would 
have needed to be approved by the Democratic-led 
House, had little chance to become law. Like 
her efforts to root Black Lives Matter out of the 
WNBA, however, co-sponsoring the Protection 
of Women and Girls in Sports Act was an act 
of political grandstanding that served no other 
purpose than to prove to the Georgia electorate 
that, like Collins, Loeffler was willing to align 
herself with Trumpism.
Finishing second only to Warnock in 
the special election, Loeffler appears to have 
successfully proved her bona fides among con-
servative Georgian voters. If she loses the runoff 
to Warnock, that same battle with the WNBA that 
might have vaulted her into the runoff might also 
cost her a seat in the Senate.
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On Sunday, November 8, U.S. media outlets 
called the 2020 presidential election for 
Democrat Joe Biden to mark the unofficial end 
of the chaotic term of Donald Trump, a playboy 
real estate mogul-turned reality TV host-turned 
polarizing politician. 
Moments after the call, WNBA superstar Sue 
Bird posted to Instagram a video from a month 
earlier of herself in ski goggles, draped in remnants 
of the basketball net, spraying Moet & Chandon 
champagne on teammates after clinching her third 
league championship. The caption read: “I’VE 
BEEN WAITING FOR THIS!!!!#BidenHarris2020 
LETS GOOOO @joebiden @kamalaharris”
The 40-year-old basketball legend had 
struggled to find her political voice early in her 
career, infamously remaining silent when same-sex 
marriage was on the ballot in the state of Wash-
ington in 2012, for example. But, Bird’s voice was 
loud and clear in 2020. She embraced a major role 
in leading the WNBA Players’ Association to the 
forefront of the activist stage in 2020. 
That stage, however, had many leading 
cast members. Before the season began, the 
Washington Mystics’ Natasha Cloud and Renee 
Montgomery of the Atlanta Dream opted out to 
focus on the fight for social justice. Cloud was no 
stranger to political activism. The season before, 
she staged a media “blackout,” refusing to talk 
about any other topic than gun violence. In 2019, 
the Mystics won the WNBA championship. Cloud 
signed an endorsement deal with Converse and 
prepared to defend the title. Then, the video of a 
white police officer kneeling on the neck of black 
man surfaced. The images of a Minneapolis cop 
killing George Floyd were too much for her.
She wrote in a May 30 Players’ Tribune essay: 
“Because right now……. there’s only one thing 
that’s on my mind. Right now, if we’re being really 
real? As a black person in America, there’s only 
one thing that could possibly BE on my mind. And 
that’s fearing for my life. It’s fearing for my life, and 
for the life of every other person who is guilty of 
nothing more than belonging to a race that this 
country has been built on oppressing. It’s wanting 
to stay alive — in a time where the reality for a lot 
of people is that my staying alive doesn’t matter.” 
Montgomery joined NBA superstar LeBron James’ 
More Than A Vote campaign, focusing her efforts 
largely on getting out the vote at Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). 
When COVID-19 pushed the WNBA 
season and its players into an isolated “bubble” 
in Bradenton, Florida in 2020, basketball took 
a backseat to vigils, strikes, t-shirts, public 
campaigns, endorsements, and strong words 
from the league’s most prolific athletes. Before the 
opening jump of the virus-delayed season, Bird’s 
Storm and the New York Liberty took a knee for 
the national anthem and recognized a 26-second 
silence in honor of Breonna Taylor, who was killed 
by Louisville police officers during a botched 
search. All season long, Taylor’s name was stitched 
under the players’ names on their jerseys. 
On Aug. 26, players for the Dream, Mystics, 
Minnesota Lynx and Los Angeles Sparks kneeled 
together in solidarity on the court as they refused 
to play in the evening’s scheduled games to protest 
the Milwaukee police shooting of Jacob Blake. 
Mystics players wore white t-shirts spelling out 
Blake’s name on the front with seven bullet holes 
printed on the back. (Police shot Blake seven times 
in the back.) That night, the entire league gathered 
for a candlelight vigil organized by WNBPA 
members. ESPN reporter Holly Rowe reported via 
Tweet from the vigil: “After games were boycotted 
Wednesday night, the entire @wnba bubble 
organized and participated in a candlelight vigil. 
People were encouraged to speak their heart. They 
are in this together.”
The activism didn’t stop after the Storm 
swept the Las Vegas Aces for the championship, 
either. On Oct. 21, the Storm franchise collectively 
endorsed Biden over Trump. The Connecticut Sun, 
whose season slogan was “Change Can’t Wait” and 
included many educational and political actions, 
used Instagram to post 10 GOTV posts the week 
before the election. Individual players endorsed 
Biden, as well as Rev. Raphael Warnock, a 
Democrat running against Kelly Loeffler, co-owner 
of the Atlanta Dream, in the U.S. Senate race. 
The demographic composition of the WNBPA 
is 100% women, 83% identifying as people of 
color, and a “substantial proportion” identifying 
as LBGTQ+. In other words, it’s a league of people 
whose very existence in the professional arena and 
whose very presence in the athletic world have 
been a fight to achieve. It was a no-brainer that the 
fight would continue beyond the out-of-bounds 
lines. And, as Bird revealed in her post, it was 
something to celebrate. 
Made for the fight, WNBA players used their 
platform for anti-racism activism in 2020
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The role corporate voices play in presidential and 
congressional campaigns often goes unnoticed by 
much of the public. However, given the killings 
of Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, and George 
Floyd, the efforts of corporate voices were under 
more scrutiny come election season. Weeks 
of protest and a summer of racial reckoning 
led several companies to release public state-
ments touting their support of Black Lives Matter 
and committing to action that would address 
institutionalized racism. Sure, we had been here 
before, experiencing periods of reflection after 
similar fatal incidents; but, this time seemed 
different. From Amazon, IBM, and Facebook to 
NASCAR, Adidas, and Nike, never before had 
we seen so many big-time corporate voices take 
a stand in the fight for racial justice in the United 
States. But was it genuine?
The National Basketball Association (NBA) 
has garnered much attention in recent years with 
regard to Black Lives Matter. Like many companies 
did in the wake of George Floyd’s death, the NBA 
and its member organizations communicated 
their anger and condolences. What made the 
NBA different from many other corporate 
entities during this time was that they already 
had programs in place to address social justice 
concerns. For example, take the league’s NBA 
Voices program, or other programs such as 
the Boston Celtics’ Playbook Initiative, and 
the Milwaukee Bucks’ Barbershop Mondays. 
Meanwhile, for the restart of their 2019-2020 
season, Black Lives Matter was painted on the 
NBA courts and players were also allowed to 
replace their names on the back of their jerseys 
with league-approved social justice messages.
However, what if I told you that the same league 
that is considered to be leading on social justice also 
has team governors (formerly called owners) whose 
actions don’t really align with the messaging coming 
from the league and its teams? For instance, there 
was not a consensus from all of the NBA governors 
concerning Black Lives Matter being painted on the 
court, as revaled by ESPN’s Adrian Wojnarowski on 
his podcast [around 25:40]: 
Not every owner in the NBA was enthusiastic about 
having ‘Black Lives Matter’ on the court. I know they 
all weren’t. Some are extremely supportive. Some less 
so. None of them publicly [critical].
In terms of the campaign, many of these same 
governors donated to Donald Trump, who has 
referred to Black Lives Matter as “thugs”, “discrim-
inatory”, “bad for Black people” and a “symbol of 
hate”, among other characterizations. Trump also 
called companies that support Black Lives Matter 
“weak” and that they are led by “weak people.” This 
would mean that he is criticizing the very same 
NBA governors who may have signed off on public 
statements in support of Black Lives Matter. John 
Gonzalez, a staff writer for The Ringer, highlighted 
the contradiction of governors sending one 
message with public statements but another with 
their giving: 
“Some of the owners who purport to be allies in the 
fight against systemic racism and police brutality 
have also contributed massive amounts of money to 
Trump and the GOP [Grand Old Party], a president 
and a party that stand in direct opposition to a 
specific position the players want to see advanced—
law enforcement accountability and reform…”
The Nation’s Dave Zirin further emphasized the 
contrast between statements versus reality in the 
NBA. In his article, he focuses on Detroit Pistons 
governor, Tom Gores, who recently resigned from 
the Los Angeles County Museum of Art (LACMA) 
Board of Trustees. His resignation came after 
mounting pressure from people and organizations 
about his role in profiting off of prisoners and their 
families. Rashad Robinson, president of Color of 
Change, stated the following in response to the 
news: “As owner of Securus, Gores has exploited 
incarcerated people and their families — who are 
overwhelmingly Black and low-income — with 
exorbitant fees for prison phone calls.” 
What’s more is that Securus was sued (and 
settled) for illegally recording 14,000 attorney-cli-
ent conversations, providing these calls to police 
and prosecutors. It doesn’t stop with Gores, 
though. Dan Gilbert (Cleveland Cavaliers), the 
Devos Family (Orlando Magic), James Dolan 
(New York Knicks), Tilman Fertitta (Houston 
Rockets), and Micky Arison (Miami Heat), among 
others have all given massive amounts to Donald 
Trump, the Republican Party and/or Trump super 
political action committees. EPSN and FiveThir-
tyEight did a breakdown of this giving across 
professional sports.
Yet, given the applause the NBA has received 
for their social justice efforts, it’s surprising that 
more attention has not been given to Gores and 
other team governors whose contributions are 
incongruent with messages coming from the 
league and its teams. These financial contributions 
and the means through which NBA governors 
underwrite their wealth should give us all reason 
to pause and ask critical questions. While public 
statements portray support of Black lives, their 
financial giving suggests otherwise. Yes, statements 
and current programs serve as great optics, but 
a look beyond the surface will keep observers 
skeptical as to whether the NBA’s efforts are 
authentic or merely social marketing.
Do National Basketball Association (NBA) teams 
really support Black Lives Matter?
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The template set by the historic Lincoln-Douglas 
debates was a battle of ideas. Modern American 
political debates, by contrast, occupy a stage where 
both candidates move to the middle and try to 
capture centrist or independent voters. 
President Donald J. Trump shattered this 
conventional frame in 2016, using his platform 
to deepen his base and to clearly articulate his 
ideological positions rather than using ambiguous 
language for fear of offending any potential voting 
blocs. Actor Rashida Jones aptly captured the mood 
of the debates in the preceding election cycle in 
her tweet: “His condescending interjections and 
interruptions and mansplaining are hitting the 
deepest part of my womanly frustration.” That 
may have been true for her, except for the fact that 
Trump carried half the white female vote. While 
Trump emerged as a bad hombre in jokes and 
memes, the annotated transcript of the debate with 
Hillary Clinton in The Washington Post sounded no 
less funny than the jabs hurled by satirists. 
In 2020, Trump continued following the script 
that had given him the earlier victory, while the 
media kept pursuing the frame they had got so 
wrong. In the first 2020 presidential debate, Trump 
successfully pushed Joe Biden to denounce his 
“far left” Bernie Sanders supporters, an important 
part of the base he needed to consolidate, while at 
the same time Trump declined to openly critique 
the white supremacists, telling the Proud Boys to 
“Stand back and stand by,” which has now become 
their logo. 
The second presidential debate was more 
restrained and substantive, with the media quickly 
declaring Biden the winner of this debate as well, 
and the polls reflecting a jump in Biden’s support. 
The fly on Vice President Mike Pence’s hair stole the 
limelight of the vice-presidential debate, as neither 
contender was able to articulate a comprehensive 
plan to mitigate the impact of the pandemic. Their 
proposed solutions fell into binary oppositions 
of masks versus no masks, or listening to science 
versus economic shutdowns, triggering ready-made 
parodies for mutually exclusive audiences. 
The media has always berated Trump for not 
being presidential enough, for lacking decency and 
decorum, and for bullying behavior. While these 
accusations may be true, Trump was never playing 
by the rules set by the media. He was projecting 
himself as a strong leader, always in charge and not 
afraid to fight, someone who would never abandon 
his supporters. This impression was not intended 
for anyone who was undecided or making a 
rational decision to vote, but rather the non-voter 
who might get passionately aroused and head to 
the polling booth. Instead of moderating the tone 
and tenor of his message, the tone and tenor was 
the message in both his campaigns.
Saturday Night Live presented a thorough 
critique of both candidates, ostensibly focused 
on mannerism and locution, while at the same 
time revealing the hollowness of their respective 
platforms. SNL’s exposés often contain extempora-
neous social or political introspection that escaped 
the radar of most media and popular culture 
venues. The argument about who built the cages 
and put migrant children there was at least allowed 
in satire, especially in tweets and memes, compared 
to the news media’s lack of political analysis of the 
systematic dehumanization embodied in asylum 
policy occurring over multiple presidencies. 
Trump constructed a distinctive brand in 
2016—anti-liberal elite, anti-immigration (both 
legal and illegal), anti-corporate power, anti-global 
war—which found takers in the loyal Republican 
base as well as new voters for whom the message 
resonated. Four years into power, some of the 
economic promises have been shattered by the 
tax cuts, trade wars, and global pandemic, yet the 
battle over culture has reached a pinnacle. The 
Trump brand of nationalism is carved out of the 
economic frustration of the working poor who 
feel left behind, as they seek to claim the cultural 
space from which they have been absent so long. 
The 2020 presidential debates reflected a renewed 
commitment toward Trump’s message that had 
worked in the previous election. 
Despite the abhorrent mismanagement of 
the pandemic and the resultant spike in deaths, 
tens and thousands of people attended the Trump 
rallies as the polls prior to Election Day kept 
narrowing. Biden eked out a victory based on 
razor-thin margins in battleground states, but 
the space for Trumpism in American politics and 
culture will be much harder to dissolve. Neither 
the news media nor satire had an explanation for 
passionate attendance at Trump rallies, except to 
denigrate them as superspreader events. A rare 
plausible analysis came from Tucker Carlson who 
focused on the needs of the attendees rather than 
Trump. Herein lies the abject failure of popular 
culture, whether serious or funny, offering a 
singular frame of dismissiveness toward Trump 
presidency, while missing the consistent paradigm 
of Trumpism.
The role of satirists should be to uncover 
neglected recesses that contain significant meaning 
for cultural or political life. The role of journalists 
should be to provide nuanced backstories to 
contextualize current events. But both journalists 
and satirists have been focused too much on  
Trump’s provocative statements and actions and 
their offending nature, disregarding the reason for 
the appeal of such statements to a huge segment of 
Americans. Trump has articulated the frustrations 
of a large group of people who feel disposable in 
the global economy, and they will continue to 
claim allegiance to a committed leader, whether it 
is Trump or a successor.
The presidential debates: the media frames it all 
wrong 
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The junior senator from the Golden State entered 
the political spotlight and America’s consciousness 
as the lone black female in the U.S. Senate and then 
as the lone black female in a deep pool of Demo-
cratic presidential hopefuls. The national notoriety 
pushed “Kamala Harris” further into the limelight 
on TV’s Saturday Night Live (SNL). 
Played for laughs (and an Emmy) by Maya 
Rudolph, the persona of Harris during the 
presidential primary season ranged from sexy and 
in vogue, complete with pop culture references, to 
the self-proclaimed “smooth-talking lawyer lady” 
delivering one-liners, embodying stereotypical 
sass, i.e. a sharp tongue and a lightning-quick 
ability to dress down verbal adversaries. Rudolph 
as Harris at the 2019 DNC Town Hall: “I’m 
America’s cool aunt. A fun aunt. I call that Funt. 
The kind of funt that will give you weed, but 
then arrest you for having weed. Can I win the 
presidency? Probably not. I don’t know. Can I 
successfully seduce a much younger man? You 
better funting believe it.” 
The description of political parodies, such 
as that of Harris on SNL, is represented on 
a spectrum of accurate evaluations to brutal 
takedowns. Parodies spoof subjects by means of 
satiric imitation. Caricatures are built from con-
sistent gestures and movements. Speech, both what 
was said and how it was said, is often targeted. 
Harris’s iconic “I’m speaking” declaration to an 
interrupting Vice President Mike Pence during 
the vice-presidential debate was recreated to great 
comic effect by Rudolph.
Left almost completely out of the SNL’s 
comedic takeoff is Harris’s diverse background, a 
Jamaican father and a mother from South Asia. 
The jokes aren’t found in those areas. The relevance 
of Harris’s life and her moment in the spotlight, 
however, is not completely ignored as a parody 
relies on social significance. So, the show’s writers 
clearly knew that Harris represented a number of 
historic firsts as a daughter of immigrants and a 
black (and Indian) woman vice president. It also 
would not be surprising if mentions of a Harris 
presidency had been thrown around the writing 
table. After all, it’s plausible that the aging Biden 
will serve only one term, leaving Harris as a 
front-runner for the 2024 nomination. 
For the most part, the jokes involving Harris 
are not rooted in monumental political outcomes. 
The funny stuff is mined from Rudolph presenting 
the politician as America’s cool aunt whose 
reaction faces are meme-worthy and who isn’t 
afraid to be seen with a martini glass. Leading 
up to Election Day, the character of Kamala 
Harris appeared regularly with jokes touching on 
race and racial realities in the United States. For 
example, this line from Rudolph as Harris at the 
2020 vice presidential debate: “Now I’d like to hear 
the vice president’s response, and while he speaks, 
I’m going to smile at him like I’m at TJ Maxx and a 
white lady asks me if I work here.”
Harris’s blackness is front and center as a 
matter of fact and as context for parody. The faces, 
the body language, and the pointed takedowns 
all fall in line with widespread representations of 
black women in entertainment media. Rudolph’s 
portrayal of Harris has garnered praise and 
overwhelming support as the former regular only 
returns to SNL to play characters for which she has 
a special affinity and, in this case, a similar look. 
Rudolph is also biracial. No claims of problematic 
stereotyping have been cast at SNL or Rudolph. 
Using the lens of race to view SNL’s parody of 
Harris, however, is an area that raises questions of 
intent and impact. If social commentary leading to 
public awareness is the intended impact, it would 
be difficult to say that SNL missed the mark. It is 
in the show’s DNA to make America look at and 
evaluate its leaders like Harris. Neither could you 
call Rudolph’s portrayal anything but a success, if 
belly laughs and memorable lines to repeat and to 
post on social media was the goal. 
Does the parody of the first black female vice 
president have significant influences on the black 
community? While Harris’s pick as Biden’s running 
mate was at least partially meant to engender favor 
with minority voters, the use of her as target of 
humor and social commentary was not a nod to 
the black community. It simply seems meant to 
acknowledge Harris as a presence on the national 
stage and give a favorite SNL actress a chance to 
get laughs. In terms of representation, a black 
woman has reached a level of political power and 
fame that few others have or will. Even as the show 
has caricatured the senator’s manner, it has mostly 
portrayed her in a positive light. For some, it will 
be aspirational, feuling daydreams and bolstering 
hope. SNL still captures America’s attention, setting 
the agenda for public discourse. In this way, the 





at the Department of 
Communication and 
Media at Lund University. 
Her research concerns 
young audiences of 
election satire in public 
service media.
Email: joanna.doona@kom.lu.se
At the World Economic Forum in early 2020, 
President Trump was asked about teenage activist 
Greta Thunberg. Should politicians listen to 
her more, recognize and act on climate change? 
His reply? She needed to work on her “anger 
management.” And: “How old is she now?” He 
then commented on her cover of Time Magazine 
(“she beat me out”) and said she should focus on 
countries that pollute more than the U.S. does.
This was typical of Trump – he’d tweeted about 
her anger before – but really, it’s typical of the 
adult world responding to young people’s political 
engagement. Other contemporary youth-dominat-
ed movements like March for Our Lives or Black 
Lives Matter are similarly dismissed. Paradoxically 
enough, responses can be quite childish. Thunberg 
is too angry, young, and popular, not to mention 
the whataboutism. And while most activists under-
stand that antagonism is part of the political game, 
it’s relevant for those of us interested in how people 
in general become politically engaged. What does 
such dismissiveness or even ridicule mean for the 
development and motivation of young citizens?
Young people become targets of our hopes for 
the future, yet are often considered silly, cynical, 
apathetic or conversely, overly emotional or 
annoyingly idealistic. But citizenship norms shift. 
While modern era citizen ideals echo those of the 
good student, who does as they were told, keeps 
quiet and trusts in authority and “the system,” 
these ideals are increasingly questioned: were 
citizens ever really that well behaved, and is that 
what we really want?
Whether it be the issues or ways they engage, 
young citizenship is studied persistently, prodded 
and policed at times, in different fields of research. 
The threat of losing young people to political 
apathy seems to co-exist with an essentialist 
dismissiveness based on their supposed naïveté or 
inexperience. When we lament how they engage 
– through citizen journalism, political entertain-
ment, social media, or slacktivism, movement and
identity politics – we might need to focus more on
understanding why these might be preferred, and
why we are so instinctively skeptical.
And in this process, factor in that age links 
to generational privilege and election politics. 
Born 1996 or later, “Generation Z” is more 
diverse and educated than previous generations. 
In the short-run, however, they’re especially hit 
by pandemic unemployment and uncertainty. 
According to the Pew Research Center, July 
marked a shift: more than half of 18-29-year-olds 
now live with their parents, surpassing Great 
Depression levels. In the longer run another 
important marker of adulthood, becoming finan-
cially independent, is shifting globally. Pew notes 
that in the U.S., the rate of financially independ-
ent 22-year-olds has dropped from 32 percent 
in 1980, to 24 in 2018. Such factors potentially 
influence young people’s political efficacy – their 
belief in “the system” and themselves.
In March, 70 percent of Gen Z said govern-
ment “should do more to solve problems.” Often, 
the issues concerning Gen Z and Millennials aren’t 
addressed in campaigns – further explaining their 
engagement in media and movements that do. My 
work on young adult satire engagement exposes 
an uneasy citizen negotiating between political 
criticism and idealism, performance anxiety 
and self-ascribed naïveté and cynicism. As Nina 
Eliasoph wrote in 1998, political or economic 
disenfranchisement can encourage “cynical chic 
solidarity,” where individuals distance themselves 
from politics to protect integrity. It signals “that 
they have not been fooled into wasting their 
time on something they cannot influence and 
cannot be held responsible for whatever happens.” 
Protecting integrity through various kinds of 
impression management is increasingly important 
in (and at) an age where identity is everything, 
and large parts of what we do or say is archived 
and searchable online. 
Contemporary expressions of young adult en-
gagement can be understood as symptomatic of the 
state of political efficacy. For instance, the use of 
irony and trolling in memes and satire can provide 
pleasure, protect integrity and efficacy, while 
processing opinions, trust, and criticism. During 
the 2020 marathon vote count, memes referencing 
topics like Trump’s “STOP THE COUNT!” tweet, 
the role of the media, or the election’s worldwide 
attention flooded online spaces.
There is reason to believe we sometimes 
lack the ability to separate young people’s lacking 
efficacy and criticism from cynicism or apathy. 
The ancient Greek distinction between cynics 
(fatalistic, disengaged) and kynics (subversive, crit-
ically engaged) is helpful in understanding young 
engagement. As we keep forgetting, young people 
are growing up in a world we created. When 
adults dismiss or ridicule their actual engagement, 
and simultaneously ignore the context they find 
themselves in, it’s not exactly encouraging.
This might be though: two days after the 
election, Greta Thunberg satirically engaged 
Trump on Twitter. Mirroring his recurring anger 
management comment, she retweeted his “STOP 
THE COUNT!” adding: “So ridiculous. Donald 
must work on his Anger Management problem 
(…) Chill Donald, Chill!”
Who needs anger management? Dismissing 
young engagement
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If the U.S. presidential campaigning is pop culture, 
as I claimed in 2016, the deployment of memes by 
Joe Biden and Donald Trump indicate the main-
streaming of the once-fringe, subcultural enterprise.
“We actually elected a meme as president,” 
ran a headline from The Washington Post, on 
November 9, 2016. The quote came, in a post 
accompanied by an image of Pepe the Frog,  
from 4chan. This reviled image board was, along 
with its uglier younger sibling 8chan, and r/
The_Donald on Reddit, the wellspring for the 
offensive memes and rhetoric that defined much 
of the online support for Trump, coming to be 
known as the alt-right. 
That 8chan and The_Donald subreddit have 
since been banned reflects not the rejection of 
memes as a means of doing politics, but rather its 
integration into the mainstream. Again, in 2016 I 
cited Stuart Hall, who wrote that popular culture 
“is the arena of consent and resistance. It is partly 
where hegemony arises, and where it is secured.” 
Those who enjoyed and gained an identity from 
operating in the resistant murky underbelly of 
the internet continue to congregate on 8kun and 
TheDonald.win, while campaigns around the 
world have consented to the use of memes as 
political communication.
While it is of course hyperbolic to claim that 
memes won Trump the presidency in 2016, they 
do help explain the enduring passion and nature 
of his support. Trump’s outsiderness worked 
well with meme culture in his 2016 campaign, 
carving out a new rhetorical space in the political 
landscape that in opposition to the Democrats 
but was outside the GOP, and in which his 
supporters could play and organise under the 
banner of MAGA. 
Crucially, Trump’s 2016 campaign, whether 
by design or thrift, did not create any memes of 
its own. Trump was merely an amplifier for the 
frowned-upon fringes, a malleable identity that 
could be adopted by anyone.
Funnily enough, it is perhaps the Clinton 
campaign’s explainer about Pepe the Frog that 
signalled both the power of this outsider status and 
its demise. Donald Trump Jr.’s infamous re-post 
of The Deplorables meme, with photoshopped 
heads from Trump’s inner circle (including Pepe) 
replacing the cast of the film, The Expendables, 
without any explainer demonstrates how the 
Trump campaign harnessed the power of political 
outsiderness, and twisted the meaning of institu-
tional labels (Clinton calling Trump supporters a 
“basket of deplorables”) to its own purposes. By 
taking seriously the effort to make Pepe the Frog a 
hate symbol, the Clinton campaign at once realised 
this effort and missed the joke. But not getting 
the joke also undoes its magic, and jimmies the 
methods of meme-making onto the conventions of 
traditional political communication.
This posture was not possible in 2020. Trump 
has been the most powerful man in the world, 
the U.S. president, for four years. His ineffective 
response to the coronavirus reflects a failure of 
governance that he cannot pin on someone else, no 
matter how hard he tried to spread, like a meme, 
“China flu.” 
Joe Biden had a previous (and positive) meme 
life during the early days of Trump’s presidency 
as Obama’s overzealous and avuncular defender, 
which remains in play even if 2020 opposition 
memes target senility and sexual misconduct. 
Biden’s earlier meme life gave his campaign a 
base on which they could generate their own 
memes, playing on a nostalgic, ironically knowing 
lameness that is nonetheless inflected by the 
integration of MAGA into the mainstream. To wit: 
The Occupy Democrats Facebook page (initially 
created in response to the Tea Party movement) 
created a meme page, Ridin’ With Biden. Just as 
Trump repurposed Clinton, the Biden campaign 
now uses Trump’s slogans in memes against him: 
“Get In, We’re Draining Trump’s Swamp and 
Making America Sane Again!” 
The MAD-like parity of the presidential meme 
wars is evident in each campaign spending roughly 
$83 million on YouTube advertisements. Perhaps 
as a legacy from his earlier meme success, but also 
reflecting the way he has continuously innervated 
his base, Trump’s channel gets over ten times as 
many views as Biden’s. But instead of amplifying 
the voices of supporters, the channel creates its 
own content, such as “Prevent a Zombie Uprising.” 
A thirty-minute loop of a ten-second ad, with 
Biden (the titular zombie) turning green, alongside 
zombie and ghost emojis, this melding of memes 
and traditional television advertisements cements 
the integration of meme culture into mainstream 
politics. The videos, and their thumbnails, are 
designed to look like those produced by young 
YouTubers. The close-up of an excited face, Impact 
font, bright, high-contrast colours, two or three 
emojis, are interchangeable with a video game 
review or an unboxing reveal. With its YouTube 
home page takeover on Election Day, the Trump 
campaign went from authentic and mischievous 
outsider to the familiar and mainstream insider—
and lost something. 
Meme war is merely the continuation of politics by 
other means
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Satire failed to pack a punch in the 2020 election 
In June, Joe Rogan welcomed former Daily Show 
host, Jon Stewart to his podcast, declaring “I miss 
you on TV, this is the perfect time for you. It’s kinda 
crazy that you’re not hosting that show anymore”. 
Rogan raised a valid point; we are in the midst 
of a global pandemic where well over 200,000 
American’s have lost their lives, and we have 
experienced a divisive election tainted by aggres-
sive partisanship and conspiracy theories. Stewart’s 
sharp-witted satirical monologues would have 
been the comedic voice of reason we all needed 
during these turbulent moments of 2020.  
Of course, since Stewart’s departure from TV 
satire an abundance of similar programs emerged to 
fill the void. But they have tackled a very different 
political landscape compared to Stewart and the 
result is that TV satire’s reporting of the 2020 
election has often appeared tired and uninspiring.  
This isn’t just an election problem. It started 
at the beginning of Trump’s presidency when 
questions were raised about whether America’s 
political system was beyond comedic criticism. 
For four years, this has posed a series of dilemma’s 
for late-night comedy hosts in how they approach 
their satirical take downs of the Trump adminis-
tration.  One of the most pressing matters was how 
could they use satire, a genre defined by its use of 
irony, exaggeration, and ability to expose stupidity 
and vices, to lampoon Trump when he embodies 
many of these characteristics in real life.  
Despite these issues there have been many 
examples of good practice in the last 4 years.  
My research on Last Week Tonight with John 
Oliver and Sam Bee’s Full Frontal found that both 
programs adopted advocacy reporting strategies 
in an attempt to engage their audiences in more 
meaningful forms of civic participation.  We 
saw Stephen Colbert embody the role of critical 
journalist when taking John Bolton to task for 
holding back criticism of Trump until he received 
a lucrative book deal. Similarly to Jon Stewart’s 
passionate activism for the Zadroger Act, current 
Daily Show host Trevor Noah became an advocate 
for the Black Lives Matter movement and regularly 
discussed the issue of systemic racism on his show.  
Given the craziness surrounding this year’s 
election, there was hope that TV satire would offer 
the same level of sharp analysis that The Daily 
Show’s ‘Indecision’ coverage delivered in 2000 
and 2004. These were defining moments that saw 
comedy become a serious contender in the world 
of political journalism.  According to The Wash-
ington Post, this is because Jon Stewart’s nightly 
analysis was able to cut through the election noise 
and offer thoughtful and accurate takes on what 
was happening. Unfortunately, satirical news 
coverage of the 2020 election was nowhere near as 
scintillating in its analysis of the campaign.  
Part of the problem was that many of the hosts 
became stuck in a perpetual cycle of calling out 
Trump’s lies and hypocrisies, with some perfected 
impressions thrown in for good measure.  This 
was once a successful reporting model for these 
programs but, more recently, the critical elements 
of this practice have since been adopted by the 
hosts of MSNBC and CNN, leading to huge ratings 
gains for the networks. Indeed, humor may be 
absent from cable news, but what TV satire offered 
was often limited to Trump parodies, an approach 
that reached saturation point and that’s why the 
humor fell flat.  Consequently, satire audiences 
have been stuck in a never-ending loop of political 
outrage like that found on cable news, albeit with 
the inclusion of tired Trump impersonations.   
The late-night host that fared best in their 
coverage of the election was John Oliver.  Because 
his program rarely followed the news values of 
the mainstream media, he was able to explain and 
dissect unreported topics like immigration policy 
that had very nearly disappeared from the election 
news agenda. There is no disguising the fact that 
Oliver was once a correspondent on The Daily 
Show as he approaches satirical storytelling with 
the same veracity that Jon Stewart and Stephen 
Colbert applied to unpublicised stories like the 
9/11 first responders bill and campaign finance 
reform.  But the disadvantage of Oliver’s show is 
that it only airs once a week, thus it fails to deliver 
what Jon Stewart did on The Daily Show which 
was offering nightly guidance and analysis to help 
audiences make sense of the election.  
Returning to the Joe Rogan interview, 
Stewart’s response to a TV satire come back was 
one of reluctance as he described the format as 
“redundant.”  Interestingly, he praised Rogan’s 
creative control over his podcast as he “gets 
to curate” the content.  Perhaps then it is the 
commercial imperatives of TV satire that have 
blunted the critical edge it once had. This is why it 
needs a dramatic reboot that takes into consider-
ation the flexible boundaries of the genre. Stewart 
succeeded in doing just this by incorporating 
political reporting and activism into his program-
ming.  Now is the time for TV satirists to show 
the same level of tenacity and creativity so that the 
genre can remain a powerful tool of critical insight 
and investigation.  
111
Dr Ryan M. Milner 
Associate Professor of 
Communication at the 
College of Charleston. 
He studies how online 
interaction matters socially, 
politically, and culturally. 
He is the author and 
co-author of three books: 
The World Made Meme, The 
Ambivalent Internet, and 
You Are Here.
During the 2020 Vice Presidential Debate, a fly 
landed on Mike Pence’s head and Twitter went 
wild. It felt like old times; like 2012, when Mitt 
Romney’s binders full of women and Barack 
Obama’s burn about bayonets heralded a verifiable 
meme election. Or 2016, when Ken Bone captivat-
ed the crowds and blobfish Ted Cruz kept the good 
times rolling through an election cycle that was 
supposed to be a laffer. That fly landed, Mike Pence 
let it just sit there, and all the old fun cascaded 
out. Pop-up Twitter accounts. Zany photoshops. 
YouTube remixes. Run-of-the-mill election 
memery. Same as it ever was. 
And yet all that old fun didn’t feel right. Not 
anymore. It was hollow. Brow-furrowing. At least 
it was for us. We’d both been giddy participants in 
the presidential memeing of 2012. By 2016, we’d 
grown increasingly wary of the pollution poten-
tially carried by the memes people share. By 2020, 
we had little laughter left, just gnawing exhaustion. 
Being confronted by this rare moment of silly retro 
internet fun wasn’t a reprieve. It was a reminder. 
We’re in an emergency, and what does it even 
mean to have fun in an emergency?
With hindsight, it’s clear that this emergency 
isn’t solely a product of the Trump era. Like vast 
swaths of the U.S. political landscape, internet 
culture fun has long been dangerous. At its worst, 
the memey fun of 2012, and certainly of 2016, 
was explicitly bigoted. A lesson many, including 
ourselves, learned the hard way.
Even when internet culture fun wasn’t explicit-
ly dehumanizing, it too-often ignored anything 
beyond the joke. For years, the only serious rule 
was to take nothing seriously. The hallmarks of this 
fun were irony, fetishization, and aloof antago-
nism, and they left no room for context, no room 
to consider the consequences for those outside the 
laughter. Context and consequences didn’t have 
to be addressed by the laughing us, because the 
laughing us tended to be protected from the harms 
inspiring their laughter and the harms that resulted 
from it.
Even as many have learned those lessons, 
fetishistic fun still exists in 2020. It remains a giant, 
billowing red flag, especially for those of us worn 
down to gnawing exhaustion. Laughter that acts 
like 500 immigrant children aren’t still separated 
from their parents; laughter that doesn’t carry 
the weight of the 230,000 Americans dead from 
COVID-19; laughter that ignores Kamala Harris’ 
stern rebuke of systemic racism because while she 
was speaking that fly landed right on the other 
guy’s head, lol. 
Still, there’s room—and for many, there’s need
—to be funny even when things are the opposite of 
fun. The problem isn’t laughter itself; it’s a specific 
kind of laughter that ignores context,  
consequence, and the life and death stakes for 
those struggling to survive. Approaches to Mike 
Pence’s fly illustrate this distinction. David Frum, 
writing for The Atlantic, leans into context in 
his response to the fly, pointing out just what it 
said about the Trump administration. The fly is a 
metaphor for inaction; it illustrates an utter lack of 
situational awareness. It is an apt vision of moral 
rot. This is humor that understands the weight of 
the moment, not fancy-free absurdity.  
Likewise, comedian Sarah Cooper has 
persistently resonated during the 2020 election 
cycle for her short pantomime videos lip-synching 
Trump soundbites. With little more than Trump’s 
own words, Cooper channels the theater of the 
absurd we collectively experience every day. Her 
humor doesn’t deny the depth or the consequences 
of this absurdity, it leans right in, reminding us 
that we’ve been living through multiple never-end-
ing emergencies, exacerbated, if not orchestrated, 
by a commander-in-chief who cares not one whit 
about making things worse. Cooper reminds us 
of one such emergency in an October 22 video 
about Trump’s climate change denial, a video she 
ends with a shot of a breaking glacier. Emblazoned 
words appear over the footage: “Climate denial is 
not a joke. Help us fight back.”
Cooper and Frum’s examples offer strategies 
for being funny when nothing is fun. In an 
emergency, even our humor has to convey the 
significance of the moment, and to avoid the traps 
of irony, fetishization, and aloof antagonism. In 
an emergency, context must be foregrounded, 
not denied. And in an emergency that has 
disproportionately affected the most at risk and 
marginalized, we need humor to punch up at the 
causes, not down at the recipients. We don’t need 
humor trampling those already trampled or humor 
pretending that power imbalances don’t exist at all. 
In the right tenor, when it works against the 
impulse to fetishize, funny can do a lot of good. 
Funny can be a razor-sharp indictment or a source 
of solidarity. Or a gadfly landing on the crown of 
oppression. We need funny more than ever; we 
just need to be careful that our funny doesn’t spoil 
things for everyone else.
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If the post-2016 story was about the content that 
was on social media platforms – from Russian 
bots to Macedonian teens – the post-2020 story 
is gearing up to be about what was not on social 
media platforms – or at least not all the way on 
them. For all their cautious line-toeing in the run 
up to the 2020 election, platforms like Twitter 
and Facebook showed a remarkable appetite to 
make moderation decisions from which they had 
previously shirked. Though they had resisted the 
label earlier, social media platforms became clear 
arbiters of political truth in 2020 – when they saw 
democracy at risk and acted to protect it (as well as 
their bottom lines). 
Before the election started, we saw lots of 
moves from platform companies how they would 
handle the 2020 election. First, Twitter banned 
political ads. Facebook said it would not correct 
false claims in posts or ads from politicians. 
Throughout the summer, protests against police 
brutality and for racial justice swept the nation – 
often encouraged through social media activism 
(#BlackLivesMatter) but also threatened by it 
(such as when the president tweeted threats of 
violence against protestors). Twitter first signaled 
its appetite for policy enforcement against 
the president when it took action against the 
aforementioned tweet. Then, as the president 
made crystal clear that he would not accept any 
outcome other than victory, stirred violence, and 
refused to commit to a peaceful transfer of power 
– platforms moved, almost swiftly, to proactively 
(if also perhaps belatedly) protect democracy. 
Twitter labeled – and limited the reach – of an 
unprecedented amount of the president’s tweets 
as they baselessly alleged voter fraud and falsely 
claimed electoral victory. It’s unclear as to whether 
Facebook limited the reach of the president’s posts, 
but it did append labels to them that pointed users 
in the direction of truthful contextual information 
about the election. Facebook also removed groups 
organizing around false claims of electoral fraud 
(“Stop the Steal” groups) – though more continued 
to pop up.
What is most remarkable about these actions 
is that they were taken specifically on the accounts 
of political leaders, especially the president himself. 
Finally, social media platforms acknowledged 
that political elites – both elected officials but also 
their surrogates – were the largest purveyors of 
political misinformation. What makes political 
misinformation from political leaders particu-
larly pernicious is that it often casts politics in 
identitarian terms – that media, and especially 
social media, are essential sites for constructing 
and conveying a politician’s identity as well as the 
groups of constituents they purport to represent. 
Though the information – about “stolen” ballots 
or electoral fraud – is indeed false, these posts are 
not about the information per se. Instead, they 
communicate whose votes matter, whom should be 
seen as citizens, wield power, and ultimately what 
types of people get a say in electing presidents.
Platforms are downstream from politics and 
political life. What animates our politics also 
animates our politics on platforms – and is shaped 
by platforms. While algorithms may put their 
thumb on the divisions in our country, they do 
not deterministically create them. Simply put: our 
social reality is reflected and distorted – no created 
– on social media platforms. We have a political 
problem in this country: right-wing misinforma-
tion, shorn up by making in-group identity threats 
salient and aimed at undermining public trust 
in institutions – the press, the electoral process, 
public health – is pervasive. Any attempt to craft 
these political issues as problems simply of social 
media and information risks centering another 
four years of academic, press, and press attention 
around the wrong targets.  
In the wake of 2016, the press and academia 
focused on the informational quality of posts on 
social media. We trained our eye towards whether 
information in these posts was true or false, 
toward how many people potentially encountered 
false information, and whether or not it swayed 
voters towards electing Trump. As my colleagues 
and I have argued – this attention is misguided 
and has clearly had an outsized impact on public 
opinion about the effects of misinformation. 
Research in this area should focus on how mis- 
and dis-information entrenches existing divides 
along the lines of our partisan identities. And it 
should embrace a focus on the very sort of elite 
communication against which the platforms 
– finally – took action. As Francesca Tripodi 
observed, “… there is reason to believe [Trump] 
and other conservative politicians are priming 
their constituents to think that Big Tech rigged the 
2020 election in Democrats’ favor.”
If the post-2020 story becomes informational 
in focus – not about what was on social media 
platforms, but what was moderated by social media 
platforms – we will again miss the mark. Another 
four-year cycle of public discourse, press attention, 
and research focus centered narrowly around 
platform moderation would be a mistake – this is 
not a platform problem, but a political problem. 
And Trump, the Republican party, conservative 
elites, racial structures, and more broadly – politics 
– should be at the center of and lead research on 
social media moderation.
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The speed of technological innovation moves at a 
very different pace from the speed of democracy, 
which can be frustrating. Technology changes fast, 
much like the hare. Democracy is more deliberate 
and methodical, resembling the tortoise. In the 
2020 election the steady and slower pace of our 
democracy proved to be resilient. We should be 
thankful for that. 
Historically, changes in technology caused 
great disruptions to our political system and 
democratic institutions. The shift from print to 
broadcast to digital communication reshaped 
the way that political elites and news organiza-
tions distribute political information and how 
Americans consume it. Since the 1960s the speed 
of computing power has grown at an exponential 
rate. Moore’s Law , which refers to the doubling 
of the components on an integrated circuit 
approximately every two years, accounts for the 
remarkable growth of computing power and 
technological progress for over a half century. 
Since the mid 1990s the internet, and specifi-
cally social media platforms, have consistently 
increased the speed, volume, and interactivity of 
political information and communication. These 
technological innovations have redefined how we 
interact with political information, communicate 
about politics and participate in the political 
process. News cycles have shifted from 24 hours to 
increasingly shorter periods of time. Major stories 
can emerge and fade in a matter of hours. The 
entire journalism industry has been disrupted. 
Meanwhile, Americans have grown to expect 
technology to be increasingly fast, user friendly, 
convenient, and affordable. And though they 
might want our democratic process to move at a 
similar pace, the speed of elections is slower. 
Despite advances in technology, voting in 
particular is still a very human process. Voters 
fill out ballots, which are collected in over one 
hundred thousand precincts across the United 
States, counted in hundreds of counties in all 50 
states, and then reported to media outlets who add 
them up and make decisions about if and when 
to call the elections. The presidential election of 
2020, arguably the most anticipated election of the 
past 50 years, was a great reminder that, however 
fast technology moves, democracy, if done 
thoughtfully and securely, cannot be rushed. Even 
though it is difficult we must be patient. 
Many have clamored for the ability to vote 
online for years, to make our electoral process 
easier and faster. However, experts in vote security 
note that online voting would open up far more 
avenues for potential vote manipulation and in-
terference in our electoral process and democratic 
institutions. It is simply not a secure method of 
voting, at least not yet. And decisions about how 
elections are conducted and what technologies can 
and should be used are far from streamlined. 
Throughout the history of the United States, 
elections have been run by states,  and each state 
has distinct rules around voter registration, early 
voting, and Election Day voting procedures. In 
the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, many states 
temporarily expanded absentee and mail-in voting 
in order to provide safe options for people to par-
ticipate in the 2020 election. Americans responded 
by voting in massive numbers. Nearly 160 million 
people voted, more voters than any election in 
American history, and at a voting-eligible turnout 
rate over 66 percent, a rate not reached since 
William McKinley was elected president in 1900. 
The voter turnout was remarkable not only 
because of the challenges posed by the pandemic, 
but by President Trump and his supporters, who 
attacked the legitimacy of the election and trust 
in democratic institutions. And yet, the elections 
themselves were successfully conducted with 
virtually no known issues of vote tampering, voter 
fraud, electoral interference, or disruption. 
The 2020 election reminded us that conduct-
ing elections remains a very human process, even 
during a pandemic. Election officials and poll 
workers do the work of conducting our elections. 
Their work is shared with news organizations 
who interpret these results and eventually call 
races. Americans have become accustomed to 
the immediate and updated political information 
and the ease of creating and sharing content that 
comes with consistent technological innovation. 
And while the speed of technology continues at a 
rapid pace, democracy moves slower, at a pace that 
requires patience, even if the American electorate 
does not have much of it. Fair democratic elections 
simply take time. And that is a good thing.  
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It is not hyperbolic to say that the 2020 election 
was one for the record books.  Estimates suggest 
that an unprecedented 158 million votes were cast 
in the general election, resulting in a presidential 
race decided by a thin margin in the midst of a 
global pandemic.  
Despite the fact that the policy framework of 
the United States contemplates in-person Election 
Day voting as the primary way citizens express 
vote choice, state-level initiatives and concern over 
COVID-19 led to a shift away from this practice.  
Almost 102 million voters cast ballots early or 
by mail in 2020.  This expanded, non-traditional 
voting brought worry of technological, logistical, 
and security challenges.  The country’s electoral 
system responded surprisingly well, with few 
reports of administrative dysfunction or security 
breaches. Yet, the decentralized nature of the 
process raises practical and legal questions about 
how the system will function in future elections.
A decentralized election system
The Elections Clause of the United States Consti-
tution operates to place the regulation of elections 
primarily in the hands of the states.  As a result, the 
legal framework that governs administration of the 
electoral process varies across the country.  
In part, this is by design.  The Framers of the 
Constitution purposefully constructed an electoral 
system that allowed for divergent, localized 
interests.  State-by-state regulation accommodates 
a range of citizen representational needs and can 
help diffuse political power.  
However, as the 2020 election highlighted, 
this local flexibility is not without cost.  The 
same state and local factors that a decentralized 
system accommodates can also result in variation 
in citizen experience with the electoral process.  
Disparities in the capacity of governmental units to 
administer elections raise legal questions that have 
consequences for the balance of authority across 
the political system.
Litigation showcases challenges for the future 
Between March and October, litigants have filed 
over 300 COVID-19-related election cases in 
federal and state courts across at least 44 states.  
This litigation largely was unsuccessful.  For 
example, despite President Trump’s repeated and 
unfounded claims of voter fraud in states like 
Pennsylvania, legal arguments that changes in 
election law create unconstitutional opportunities 
for voter fraud failed to persuade federal and state 
courts.  At the same time, Democratic arguments 
that the states who did not relax pre-COVID-19 
restrictions on mail-in votes created an unconstitu-
tional burden on the right to vote in the midst of a 
pandemic generally failed as well.
The one area in which legal questions remain 
is in election administration.  Sudden changes 
in policy often bring concern that, in their rush 
to promote new initiatives, policymakers fail to 
invest in the infrastructure required to administer 
the changes.  Courts’ responses to administrative 
variation in how and when states require ballots to 
be delivered and under what standards states verify 
the identity of registered voters have been mixed.  
These disparate judicial responses highlight two 
key questions in the elections system.  
First, who has the authority to change the 
rules?  The United States Constitution contemplates 
that legislatures would regulate elections.  Yet, over 
time, legislatures have delegated much authority in 
this area to administrators.  This reflects a general 
transfer of power towards the executive branch that 
the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated.  
There has also been a shift in the role of the 
courts.  For example, in the wake of Election Day, 
President Trump and the Republican Party filed 
lawsuits making a variety of claims relating to the 
counting and processing of ballots.  The move was 
unusual, as candidates typically do not involve the 
courts until after the counting has finished and 
the outcome is uncertain.  In part, this is because 
longstanding judicial precedent cautions courts 
against altering rules in the midst of the electoral 
process.  Doing so injects unelected judges into the 
political system.
Second, how will states administer countless 
other elections over the next several years?  The 
2020 election was a high-profile event, with the 
presidency at stake and officials such as Secretaries 
of States and election commissioners stepping 
into the spotlight.  In response, states funneled a 
tremendous amount of resources towards adminis-
trators to ward off criticism of their processes.
Decreases in state revenue due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic likely mean that states will 
have a hard time recovering and cannot afford 
to invest in election administration at such high 
levels.  Even in the best of times, elections offices 
tend to be underfunded and understaffed.  In fact, 
the most universal complaint from those who 
administer elections is a lack of resources.  
This is potentially problematic, as elections 
administration is inevitably a nuanced endeavor.  
Yet because election administrators rarely operate 
under clearly defined procedural processes or have 
effective training, there is often variation with 
respect to how administrators implement the law 
and interact with citizens.  It is precisely this lack 
of uniformity with respect to standards or criteria 
that can lead courts to intervene.  
Politicians recognize the importance of how 
seemingly apolitical solutions to administrative 
problems have real consequences.  “Hashing out 
the nitty-gritty” of administration is a political 
game, and the courts’ mixed responses to state 
election infrastructure in 2020 may add increased 
pressure to the system.
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The coronavirus pandemic exposed many 
problems with the voting process in the United 
States.  Many of these problems stem from the fact 
that U.S. national elections are administered with a 
good deal of local control and variation.  However, 
this situation can be changed, if the national 
government wishes to exert more control. Article I, 
Section IV of the Constitution begins by declaring 
that “The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”  
Importantly, this clause then goes on to give the 
federal government power to override the states 
with regard to election law by stating that “the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter 
such Regulations.” 
Had the 2020 election put the Democrats 
in control of the presidency, Senate, and House, 
they would have likely used the powers granted 
by Article I, Section IV to reshape how U.S. 
federal elections are conducted. The Democratic 
Party’s 2020 platform provided a long list of 
voting reforms that they proposed to enact into 
law.  However, Republicans adamantly oppose 
these changes. The strong likelihood (at the time 
of writing) that the Republicans will control the 
Senate means that the American electoral process 
will probably not be transformed anytime soon.      
The key changes the Democrats proposed to the 
voting process in their 2020 platform were as follows:
• Election Day would become an official 
national holiday.
• All states would have to implement automatic 
voter registration procedures, in which states 
automatically add people they know are eligible 
to the electoral roll.
• All states would have to provide for Election 
Day registration for eligible voters who are not 
already on the electoral roll.
• All states would have to provide early voting 
opportunities so that people can easily vote in 
person before Election Day, if they so choose.
• All states would have to provide a vote by 
mail option.
• All states would be required to restore voting 
rights for criminals at the end of their sentence, 
even if they still owe fees or fines. 
All of these provisions have routinely been 
criticized by Republicans as infringing upon the 
tradition of state and local control of elections.  
Democrats typically respond that allowing states 
and localities to have so much discretion with 
regard to election procedures has caused quite 
a mess – one that they hoped to clean up with 
national legislation in 2021.   
Campaign finance regulations are another key 
aspect of the electoral process that the 2020 Demo-
cratic Party platform promised to change.  Among 
the key changes to campaign finance proposed by 
the Democrats were: 
• Establishment of public funding for congres-
sional campaigns through a matching system 
for small-dollar donations.
• Legislation to ensure that SuperPACs are wholly 
independent of campaigns and parties.
• Legislation to require full disclosure of 
contributors to any group that advocates for or 
against candidates.
• A constitutional amendment that would overturn 
the Citizens United and Buckley v. Valeo 
decisions by clearly stating that Congress may set 
limits on the raising and spending of money by 
candidates and others to influence elections. 
Republicans object to all of these proposals, 
arguing that they impose unnecessary and un-
warranted restrictions on free speech.  One likely 
result of this overwhelming Republican opposition 
is that the chances of ever getting a constitutional 
amendment passed are virtually nil given the high 
threshold of support necessary for amending the 
U.S. Constitution.   
On the other side, Democrats are very 
committed to all the voting and campaign finance 
reforms that are feasible through federal legisla-
tion. Soon after taking control of the House of 
Representatives in January of 2019, they signaled 
that electoral reform was their #1 priority by 
making sure that their comprehensive proposal 
was the first bill introduced in the new Congress. 
Known as H.R. 1, “For the People Act,” this 709 
page bill passed the House in 2019, with every 
Democratic member voting for it. Many of its 
provisions would accomplish the goals set out in 
the 2020 Democratic Party platform. 
The House Democratic majority would 
certainly like to refocus on this issue early in 2021. 
Yet, they will recall that the 2019 bill died in the 
Republican-controlled Senate and realize that 
such an outcome is likely to be repeated as long 
as the Republicans continue to control the Senate. 
Had the Democrats gained control of the Senate 
in 2021, they could have voted to exempt voting 
rights bills from being filibustered and then passed 
the bill on a party-line vote. Finally, President 
Biden would certainly have signed such a voting 
reform bill.  
In short, voting reform was probably decided 
at the polls in the 2020 election. By narrowly giving 
the Republicans a majority in the Senate, voters 
probably sandbagged any chance of major electoral 
reform in 2021 and 2022.  
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In late October 2020, the Democratic and Repub-
lican Party candidates for Utah governor made a 
public service announcement that went viral on 
Twitter, attracting over 74 thousand likes and 26 
thousand retweets. In the 30-second video, the 
two candidates swap lines, explaining that while 
each hoped the audience would vote for them, “we 
can debate issues without degrading each other’s 
character. We can disagree without hating each 
other. And win or lose, in Utah, we work together.” 
The ad stood in direct contrast to the first presi-
dential debate a little less than a month earlier, in 
which both Donald Trump and Joe Biden used 
interruption, insults, and name-calling to derail 
any discussion of policy positions and issues. 
Most Americans see the sort of incivility 
present in the first presidential debate as a problem 
for American society, and they fear it will only get 
worse moving forward. That is likely part of what 
made the Utah gubernatorial candidates’ ad go 
viral—it seemed a stark contrast to the expecta-
tions of the average American. We claim to want 
more exchanges like that in the Utahan PSA but 
find ourselves getting more involved and fired up 
when our candidate of choice fires off a particularly 
good zinger. Civility cultivates mutual respect and 
decency while incivility prompts political engage-
ment; all are necessary for a functioning polity. In 
the end, we need to stop thinking about civility 
as the universal good to aspire to and incivility as 
a universal approach to be ignored. Both can be 
transformative for democracy. 
Take, for example, Biden’s primetime address 
on Friday, November 6. In it, he made a pitch 
for moving past the vitriol that characterized the 
campaign (and much of Trump’s time in office), 
saying “We’re certainly not going to agree on a 
lot of the issues, but we can at least agree to be 
civil to one another. Let’s put the anger and the 
demonization behind us.” Calls for civility are 
popular in the wake of campaigns, as candidates 
shift their rhetoric to appeal to the nation as a 
whole rather than their own partisan supporters. 
But is civility—at least the civility-as-politeness 
that Biden is referring to—really what can improve 
Americans’ trust in and support of U.S. institutions 
and elected leaders? Probably not. 
Civility is, after all, the shiny veneer that 
masked the very real divisions around race, gender 
and socioeconomic status in the mid-1900s, as 
Biden himself was reminded during his primary 
campaign. One can be polite and still be racist, can 
avoid calling names and shouting insults and still 
support policies and programs that are exclu-
sionary and unequal. Making democracy more 
accessible, more pluralistic, and more inclusive 
is necessarily going to mean more language that 
makes us uncomfortable and that forces us to 
reflect on our personal biases and the inequities 
that have been incorporated into American 
institutional design since the Founding. 
Don’t get me wrong, incivility, particularly 
incivility by elected officials, damages our trust in 
government. President Trump’s rhetoric, combined 
with the rise of cable news outrage and vitriolic 
echo chambers found on social media, have un-
doubtedly shifted norms about acceptable political 
and public speech in ways that feel counterproduc-
tive for governance. But in some situations, uncivil 
expression, difficult as it can be for some of us to 
stomach, is vitally important to our nation’s healing 
and to putting our national anger behind us. 
Bottling up our anger and frustration in the pretty 
packaging of civility won’t change the underlying 
affective polarization and sectarianism that are 
shaping contemporary American politics. 
The 2020 election did not end with the strong 
moral repudiation of President Trump that many 
Democrats had hoped for, suggesting that there 
is still much work to be done for each party to 
understand and collaborate with the other effec-
tively. Biden is right to encourage Americans and 
elected officials in particular to treat each other 
more warmly and behave in a nonpartisan manner; 
evidence suggests that this can reduce polarization. 
But calls for a return to civility--rather than 
decency, empathy and openness to other perspec-
tives—mask the very real divisions and inequalities 
laid bare by coronavirus, the movement for black 
lives, and the 2020 election. 
From ‘clown’ to ‘community’: the democratic 
potential of civility and incivility
Dr Emily Sydnor
Assistant professor 
of political science at 
Southwestern University 
in Georgetown, Texas. 
Her research focuses on 
political communication 
and psychology, and 
her book, Disrespectful 
Democracy: The Psychology 
of Political Incivility, 
explores how individual 
level predispositions towards 
conflict and an uncivil media 






Assistant Professor with the 
School of Communication 
Studies and the School 
of Emerging Media and 
Technology at Kent State 
University. His research 
focuses on political 
communication and online 
discussion quality using 




In the days leading up to the 2020 U.S. Pres-
idential Election, many voiced concerns that 
misinformation and conspiracy theories would 
circulate online, spread to the general public, 
and undermine trust in the voting process and 
results. There was a substantial fear that this 
misinformation, combined with a contested 
outcome and prolonged uncertainty, could spark 
protests and political violence. To determine the 
public’s engagement with pieces of misinformation 
and their information seeking for inflammatory 
claims and conspiratorial content, I collected and 
analyzed Google Search data from the U.S. during 
the week of the election.
It is well known that social media content 
is not representative of the public’s attitudes. A 
proportionally small amount of content from 
Twitter, Facebook, and online discussion boards 
spreads beyond these platforms to mainstream 
news. Although misinformation certainly spreads 
online and attracts engagement, it is historically 
contained within small networks of individuals. To 
prompt a public response, misinformation typically 
must cross an extremely high threshold of online 
activity or be promoted by elites and eventually 
spread through mainstream channels. However, 
2020 has seen widespread misinformation 
regarding COVID-19 and mainstream discussion 
of conspiracies like QAnon. These have resulted in 
unrest and threats of violence, and the tense and 
polarized political climate may be fertile grounds 
for widespread misinformation about the election.
Some questions about the integrity of U.S. 
elections have already moved from the realm of 
online conspiracy into the public sphere, in no 
small part because of persistent elite messaging. 
President Trump has been a key promoter of 
misinformation about electoral fraud and political 
opponents “cheating” the election. In January 2017 
he claimed that millions had voted illegally and 
appointed the Presidential Advisory Commission 
on Election Integrity. After pushback from states 
and a court order to share working documents 
with Democratic members, the commission 
eventually dissolved. Even though no evidence 
of wide-spread fraud was ever released, Trump 
continued to revisit the idea that substantial 
voter fraud had occurred in the 2016 election. As 
the spread of COVID-19 raised health concerns 
about in-person voting on Election Day, President 
Trump, again without evidence, regularly 
promoted the idea that early and mail-in voting 
would be fraught with fraud. 
Although President Trump’s repeated claims 
about election fraud may have damaged trust in 
institutional processes for some, it is unknown 
if the average citizen is now more susceptible to 
explicit and inflammatory conspiratorial claims.
One way to determine if a broad audience is 
interested in learning more about a topic is to track 
the Google Search frequency of keywords using 
Google Trends. By plotting the search frequency of 
different keywords, the prevalence of searches for 
topics can be assessed and compared.
Using the gtrendsR package and an R script 
written to scrape and combine Google Trends 
data across the search terms presented in Table 
1, I collected hourly observations of 41 keywords 
from the morning of Nov. 1 to the morning of 
Nov. 7 (all times are presented in Eastern Standard 
Time). I then plotted the search frequency of all 
the terms (Figure 1A) and then the frequency of 
only conspiratorial and misinformation terms 
(Figure 1B). This descriptive data is a first look at 
salient topics and is not intended to be exhaustive 
or representative of all the potential topics around 
the election. That work is ongoing.
The data show an increase in searches for 
specific pieces of misinformation and disinforma-
tion over the days after the election (Figure 1B). 
However, the overall frequency, even for topics that 
trended on social media, is very small compared to 
the rest of the terms. People do search for general 
ideas of voter, electoral fraud, and official activities 
like lawsuits, but even these topics attract a paltry 
amount of attention compared to information 
seeking for results and candidates (Figure 1A). 
These findings suggest most conspiracies are not 
widespread and the most incendiary claims go 
ignored. When a President and campaign message 
misinformation over the course of four years, the 
public wants to find out more, but the conspiracy 
of the minute is most likely to quickly vanish. So 
far, the American public seems accepting of the 
results and political violence has been avoided. 
Whether or not a former president and his allies 
can still drive attention to misinformation remains 
to be seen.
Table 1. Google Trends keywords and maximum normalized hourly search volume
Keyword # Keyword # Keyword # Keyword #
pennsylvania ballots 
found in trash
20 trump claim 182 election riots 1160 trump win 12,666
pennsylvania found 
ballots
32 ballot fraud 203 election fraud 2176 trump twitter 19,192
arizona ballot sharpie 60 arizona election 
sharpie
223 voter fraud 2263 senate results 19,959
election conspiracy 60 stop the count 256 did biden win 2303 facebook 45,293
trump claims win 74 election cheating 305 trump press confer-
ence
2901 cnn 49,900
steal the election 78 trump win penn-
sylvania
469 is biden winning 3546 us election 49,900
stolen election 80 election lawsuit 522 is trump winning 4514 fox news 76,769
late votes 87 dominion voting 
systems
545 did trump win 4606 biden 93,562
ballot dump 100 election protests 696 new york times 8444 trump 124,750
illegal votes 100 supreme court 
election




*Italics – misinformation/conspiracy; Bold – official action; news sources and platform included for reference
Figure 1A. Google Search hits  
across time for all keywords
Figure 1B. Google Search hits across time for 
conspiratorial and misinformation terms
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Political polarization in the United States is at an 
all-time high. The closeness of the 2020 election il-
lustrates this. Seeing opposing views in one’s online 
social network, according to Christopher A. Bail 
and colleagues, can deepen polarization instead of 
reducing it. A study just before the election found 
that individuals feel intense animosity toward 
those with opposing political views. This animosity 
outweighs their positive feelings toward those who 
share their views. This is a new extreme in our 
highly polarized country. 
The polarization we are experiencing does 
not magically go away with a president-elect 
Biden. We are faced with disagreements so 
extreme that family members and friends no 
longer speak to each other. Scholars of interper-
sonal communication and relationship science 
will have plenty of work to do for years to come 
as we attempt to understand how interpersonal 
relationships have fractured through the last four 
years. In part, our job will be to understand how 
to rebuild those relationships that have been all 
but destroyed. We particularly need to look at 
the work of rebuilding relationships across our 
differences: gender, class, ability and, perhaps 
most significantly, race and ethnicity. 
Race and ethnicity have played a signifi-
cant role in the last four years, as confederate 
monuments were toppled, Black athletes knelt for 
the National Anthem, and police officers continued 
to kill Black Americans. Black individuals did 
not fare better under Trump, despite his claims 
of being the best president for Black America 
since Abraham Lincoln. Research by Diana Mutz 
suggested that White Americans elected Trump 
in the first place due to status threat and fears of 
becoming a minority. Following the 2020 election, 
author Roxane Gay put it thusly: “There is no 
greater identity politics than that of White people 
trying to build a firewall around what remains 
of their empire as this country’s demographics 
continue to shift.”
Part of our great divide when considering 
shattered relationships is our ability—or, in many 
cases, our inability—to listen to one another. In 
research I’ve conducted with colleagues at Ohio 
State (Chip Eveland, Osei Appiah, and Olivia 
Bullock), we see when listening is difficult. Much 
of our research has shown divides in listening by 
race, including perceptions of others as listeners. 
We find that Black individuals imagine that they 
will have a harder time listening in a conversation 
with a White person when talking about a 
racial issue (including those listed above). Black 
Americans expect to have a hard time listening, 
we suspect, because they themselves don’t feel 
heard by White counterparts. We see repeatedly 
that Black people are tired of having to educate 
White people on racial issues; further, more White 
people voted for Donald Trump in both 2016 and 
2020, implying a lack of concern about racism. 
This sets a stage for difficulty in conversations 
between White and Black individuals about 
political issues, especially political racial issues. 
Black individuals feel they are doing the work of 
educating Whites, without Whites demonstrating 
that they have heard anything in these conver-
sations. The time has come to put in the work to 
listen actively and empathically. 
People don’t like conflict; Chip Eveland and I 
have additional data showing that individuals in 
conversations where they anticipate agreement also 
expect listening will be easier in those conversa-
tions. But we are in a time where agreement may 
not be the norm—partisan divides will perpetuate, 
and many issues from 2020 will not go away with 
a new president. Issues related to race, economic 
inequality, healthcare, and more will continue to 
challenge the country and infiltrate our conversa-
tions. We expect, in future research, to find similar 
divides in listening among minorities, classes, and 
gender identities. Relational listening will be an 
important part of improving our ability to listen to 
people who are unlike us, especially in conversa-
tions where disagreement is anticipated. 
Relational listening, according to Graham 
Bodie and colleagues, shows concern and 
awareness of others’ feelings and emotions. When 
we listen analytically, on the other hand, we focus 
on the details of an argument. We focus on the 
logic. For our interpersonal futures, we need 
to better emphasize and work on our relational 
listening. Relational listeners are more empathic 
(according to Bodie et al.), and empathy is critical 
to our future political conversations. Combative 
political conversations will only perpetuate our 
divides. Listening empathically can better equip 
us for constructive conversations and a deeper 
understanding of others. Even if we cannot live 
a shared experience, we can work to understand 
another’s lived experience.
Relational listening will not cure all our 
interpersonal ills from the last four years. It does, 
however, offer a starting point for our collective 
recovery, and a tangible, manageable start that can 
lay a foundation for the rest of the work to come. 
Relational listening as political listening in a 
polarized country
Dr Kathryn D. Coduto
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Committed QAnon supporters and a majority 
of Republicans who believe the unsubstantiated 
QAnon conspiracy theory is mostly or partly true, 
are not happy with President Donald Trump’s 
reelection defeat. Central to the QAnon theory is 
a belief that President Trump would bring about 
"The Storm," a day of reckoning in which his 
political enemies will be arrested and indicted at 
Guantanamo Bay, one of many predictions that 
have failed to come true. Similar to how Harold 
Camping, an apocalyptic radio preacher who 
wrongly predicted the end of the several times, 
continued to collect millions in donations from 
faithful followers following his failed doomsday 
predictions, the QAnon conspiracy theory will 
continue to transform American conservativism, 
despite President Trump’s reelection loss. 
What is QAnon?
QAnon is a loosely organized, far-right conspiracy 
theory that originated in October 2017 on the 
online message board 4chan. An anonymous post 
signed only by "Q," a reference to the highest-level 
security clearance in the Energy Department, 
alleged the imminent arrest of Hillary Clinton. 
Soon after, a number of conspiracy entrepreneurs 
began requesting donations to conduct "research" 
into the subsequent trail of "breadcrumbs," or 
coded messages, Q sends to supporters through 
"Q drops." This sparked the convoluted conspiracy 
theory in which believers "do their own research" 
in online echo chambers – significantly driven by 
social media content algorithms - and spawned 
easily refutable claims ranging from JFK Jr. faked 
his death and would reemerge from hiding to 
serve as Trump’s 2020 running mate to prominent 
Democrats forced to wear ankle-bracelets 
following indictments for child-sex trafficking to 
Covid-19 anti-mask beliefs, leading to the FBI to 
label QAnon a domestic terrorist threat.
The conspiracy theory’s popularity exploded 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, seeing a 200 to 
300 percent increase in online interaction on the 
largest QAnon related social media pages, leading 
to some platforms to take steps to moderate the 
theory. Offline, QAnon supporters took to the 
streets over the last six months in #Savethechil-
dren protests, in which supporters co-opted 
and obfuscated real concerns about human 
trafficking with fabricated claims of a Democrat 
and Hollywood-run Satanic pedophile cabal, and 
in the process, moved the conspiracy further into 
mainstream salience and deeply polarizing many 
Americans, including those who feel like they have 
lost a loved one to the conspiracy theory.
QAnon and the election
According to a recent poll, only 17 percent of 
people who intended to vote for Trump in 2020 
answered that they definitively did not believe that 
Democrats were involved in child sex trafficking 
rings. This overlap of conspiracy theory, openness 
to misinformation, and Trump-era conservatism 
should not be a surprise. Research suggests 
that people susceptible to believing in conspir-
acy theories have feelings of powerlessness and 
uncertainty – particularly related to intergroup 
conflict, a distrust of institutions – including the 
government and the media - and feelings of being 
locked out of or ignored by the political process; 
feelings  that resonate with some voters wooed 
by President Donald Trump’s anti-establishment, 
populist, and authoritarian appeals.
However, it is the failure of President Trump, 
those close to him, and a number of GOP figures 
to fully condemn and dissociate the party from 
QAnon and in some cases, offer support for the 
conspiracy theory, that raises eyebrows. President 
Trump has magnified the theory through his 
Twitter account, praised QAnon supporters 
who "like [him] very much" and "love our 
country," and refused to denounce the conspiracy 
theory’s unfounded claims during a live town 
hall. Likewise, Michael Flynn, former head of 
the Defense Intelligence Agency and National 
Security Advisor to the President, posted a video 
featuring QAnon slogans in July and in October, 
White House adviser Stephen Miller claimed that 
"Joe Biden would be the best friend that child 
smugglers and child traffickers have ever had in the 
White House," echoing unfounded QAnon claims 
linking Democrats to child trafficking. 
Across the United States, 25 Republican 
candidates with ties to QAnon appeared on the 
November ballot, with two candidates winning. 
Marjorie Taylor Greene - who received a $2,000 
campaign donation from House Freedom Caucus 
(HFC) chairman and Trump ally, Rep. Jim Jordan, 
$1,000 from HFC member and Rep. Andy Biggs, 
and thousands more from the House Freedom 
Fund, the PAC arm of the HFC – won in Georgia’s 
14th Congressional District and Lauren Boebert 
– who said, "[QAnon] can be really great for our 
country" - won in Colorado’s 3rd Congressional 
District. Both have also claimed to not be involved 
with QAnon.
While Donald Trump may be leaving Wash-
ington D.C. in January, QAnon will still have a 
voice in the halls of power – a voice that is being 
embraced with open arms - or at least not ostra-
cized - by many in GOP leadership. 
QAnon, the election, and an evolving 
American conservativism
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President Trump, disinformation, and the threat of 
extremist violence
Per The Washington Post, President Donald Trump 
and his administration have told more 22,000 lies 
while he has been in office, clocking in at a remark-
able 16.9 lies per day. Despite the astonishing rate 
at which Trump and his allies spread disinforma-
tion over the first three years of his Presidency, 
the runup to the 2020 Presidential Election was 
marked by an even more concerted effort to 
mislead audiences. In June of 2020, Trump made 
more than 700 false claims. In July, he made nearly 
900. By the end of the summer, the Trump admin-
istration was making more than 1,400 misleading 
claims per month. Over the last four years, it has 
become clear that the Trump administration has 
sought to weaponize disinformation to motivate 
supporters, frame his actions as unqualified 
successes, and in the leadup to the 2020 election, 
discredit and attack the then-Democratic-nominee 
and now-President-Elect, Joe Biden.
Of course, false claims and rhetorical attacks 
against one’s political opponents are not unique 
to Trump. So pervasive is lying in politics that 
researchers have produced models to explore its 
effects, written articles describing (failed) efforts 
to stop it, and authored reports documenting its 
modern history. Although political exaggeration 
is nothing new, the magnitude and character of 
Trump’s disinformation efforts have produced 
unprecedented effects. In addition to misleading 
audiences in reference to more traditional topics 
of political significance (e.g., economic policy, 
immigration), Trump has consistently sought to 
use disinformation to sow confusion and discord 
in relation to the 2020 election itself. 
Poisoning the well
In the months leading up to the election, Trump 
made deliberately false claims about the use of 
mail-in ballots and the potential for foreign actors 
to print and submit ballots, and his supporters 
spread baseless claims about the likelihood of a 
Democratic “coup” during the election. As a result 
of this disinformation’s proliferation and spread, a 
significant number of Trump’s constituents went 
into the election believing its results would be 
illegitimate. Worse, during the 2020 election itself, 
Trump made false statements concerning alleged 
widespread voter fraud, laid claim to several states 
in which he had lost, and falsely asserted that he 
had won the election before all the ballots had been 
counted. On Saturday, November 7, when Penn-
sylvania was called for Biden, he was projected to 
be the winner of the election. As of November 9, 
Trump had yet to concede, citing the unfairness of 
the electoral process.
Disinformation and growing aggression
The disinformation groundwork laid by Trump 
before the election, coupled with his unfounded 
claims of fraud and election interference following 
his loss, has resonated with a significant number 
of supporters. In the wake of Biden’s election as 
President-Elect, protests erupted in support of 
President Trump, characterized by unsupported 
claims of election fraud by protesters.
In addition to the protests, the disinformation 
perpetuated by the Trump administration has 
also triggered more nefarious responses. Some 
groups in the far-right have expressed an intent 
to mobilize – sometimes violently – on behalf 
of the President. In the wake of the election, the 
leader of Proud Boys, the far-right extremist 
group that President Trump infamously told 
to “stand back and stand by” during a televised 
presidential debate, said that “standby order has 
been rescinded” and that the group was “rolling 
out.” Meili Criezis, a research fellow at American 
University’s Polarization and Extremism Research 
and Innovation Lab, also found that Proud Boys 
Telegram channels erupted in excitement at 
Donald Trump Jr.’s argument that supporters 
should be ready for “total war” to fight the 
purported election fraud (see Figure 1 for a 
screenshot of one such channel).
Calls for violence also emerged on social 
media. In a review of a Facebook group entitled 
Stop the Steal, referring to the false claims that 
the election had been fraudulent, The Center for 
Countering Digital Hate found explicit calls for 
violence. Some members of the group argued that 
in the wake of the election, it was time to “clean the 
guns” and “hit the streets.” Others overtly said that 
they must “resort to violence if [they] have to.”
It has become clear that the disinformation 
proliferated by Donald Trump and his allies has 
transcended traditional political exaggeration. 
Trump’s claims before the election effectively 
readied his supporters to reject the results of 
the election, and his claims of fraud following 
his loss have reinforced the false notion that he 
and his administration are being cheated. As he 
continues to refuse concession and make false 
claims about the election’s integrity, it is likely that 
his more extreme supporters will grow increas-
ingly aggressive towards the election apparatus, 
including Democrats, the media, and election 
officials themselves.
Over the course of his presidency, President 
Trump has used disinformation to manipulate 
his supporters. In the case of the 2020 election, 
this manipulation looked increasingly as though 
it could result in violence as supporters look to 
challenge an electoral process that Trump has 
falsely characterized as fraudulent.
Figure 1 - Proud Boys
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Perhaps four years of anxiety were misplaced. 
Perhaps disinformation did not affect the 2020 
election after all. In the weeks and months leading 
up to Election Day, the biggest disinformation 
campaigns attempted to suppress voting in general 
and mail-in voting in particular. Yet, not only did 
Americans vote in record numbers, it was mail-in 
ballots — cast overwhelmingly by Democratic 
Party supporters — that reversed Donald Trump’s 
early leads in key battleground states and handed 
Joe Biden the victory.
Nevertheless, the disinformation campaign 
perhaps did have an effect. It was the Republican 
Party, and Trump in particular, who cast doubt on 
the reliability of mail-in voting. The same results 
indicate most of his supporters did listen to him 
and chose to crowd the polling booths in person — 
even as COVID-19 cases reached record peaks in 
the United States — to cast their ballot.
Political scientists would call this a 
“moderated effect”: the disinformation campaign 
did affect voting behavior, but the effect was 
moderated by party affiliation. Republicans were 
much more likely to be influenced by it than 
Democratic voters. Nor was this the first instance 
of such an effect: several scientific studies indicate 
a strong relationship between partisan bias and 
susceptibility to “fake news.”
Hiding behind anecdotes and statistics is a 
deeper truth about disinformation: its acceptance 
relies less upon the content of a campaign itself 
and more upon how closely it coheres with an 
individual’s beliefs about the world they live in—
beliefs that are increasingly built around partisan 
boundaries. Discrete pieces of disinformation do 
not carry any meaning on their own. They have to 
fit within larger partisan narratives about social 
reality, narratives that feature good and evil, heroes 
and villains, victims and oppressors, before they 
“make sense” to an individual.
Congruence with a narrative — for instance, 
an “oppressive” Democratic Party trying to snatch 
the election from Republican “victims” and 
Trump waging a “heroic” war on behalf of those 
victims — is what leads a particular disinformation 
campaign — for instance, mail-in ballots being a 
fraud perpetrated by the Democrats — to appear 
meaningful. Those who believe in this narrative 
buy into the disinformation and act accordingly. 
Those who believe in a different narrative, in which 
the heroes and villains and reversed, treat it as 
“fake news.”
Crucially though, this is not just true for 
disinformation but for information in general. 
Republican supporters considered the COVID-19 
pandemic to be a hoax because the mounting 
toll exposed Trump’s inefficiency as a president 
and Trump, the hero, himself played it down. The 
virus, arriving on the heels of the Democratic 
impeachment of Trump, simply did not fit into 
the Republican narrative of how the world works. 
What did fit, however, was the idea of the virus as 
another evil Democratic plot to bring down the 
good president.
Believing in and acting upon a piece of (dis)in-
formation, therefore, has little to do with truth and 
lies, right and wrong. Instead, it is closely related 
to people’s partisan identities and has become a 
form of identity performance — a ritual of who 
you are and where you belong in the increasingly 
fragmented body politic. But identities are always 
constructed in opposition to an “other:” distrust of 
and antipathy toward the “other” is fundamental 
to the conception of the “self.” That is the reason 
why so much of disinformation is accusatory of the 
“other” side or showcases one’s own side as a victim 
of the “other’s” perfidy — an instance of what 
political scientists call affective polarization.
Understanding disinformation and its effects 
in terms of identity performance has important 
lessons for the media. Over the past four years, 
so much of this effort has been directed toward 
“fact checking” discrete pieces of disinformation. 
But that does not take us very far. Disinformation 
is unlikely to influence those whose partisan 
narratives it does not fit — just like Democrats 
disregarding all the lies about mail-in voting. 
For whom it does, countering fiction with fact 
is unlikely to make them disbelieve. After all, 
four years of fact checking Trump has not made 
any dent in his credibility among his supporters. 
Indeed, such attempts may backfire and themselves 
be viewed as a means to censor their side — thus 
feeding into the cycle of polarization. For similar 
reasons, “media literacy” efforts to educate people 
to detect disinformation are unlikely to have the 
desired result either.
Acknowledging disinformation as a symptom 
of the deeper malady of affective polarization 
also carries lessons for politics and specifically for 
deliberative democracy. It exposes what Chantal 
Mouffe has called “a fundamental tension between 
the logic of democracy and the logic of liberalism”: 
while liberalism recognizes differences in beliefs 
and values, deliberative democracy requires “a final 
rational resolution” of those differences through 
deliberation. But when people are willing to die for 
beliefs and values they know to be based on false-
hoods, there is little hope for rational resolutions 
and consensus. Instead, democratic models need to 
gravitate away from deliberation toward agonistic 
pluralism, in which the “other” is not viewed as an 
“enemy” to be conquered but as an “adversary” to 
be accepted as a legitimate political voice, even if 
that voice disagrees with our own.
Dr Saif Shahin 
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As has been well-documented, local journalism in 
the U.S. is suffering greatly. Recent research found 
that the U.S. has lost over 2,000 local newspapers 
from 2004 through 2020 – a 25 percent decline. The 
coronavirus pandemic exacerbated the problem. 
And, importantly, online-only local news outlets do 
not appear to have effectively filled the gap.
On top of this, a troubling new trend emerged 
in the run-up to the 2020 election – the rise 
of partisan networks of local news sites, many 
of which are operating under a fundamentally 
corrupted model of local journalism.  
Partisanship in local journalism is certainly 
nothing new; however, as the number of 
newspapers serving individual communities 
contracted over the past four decades, the typical 
U.S. community was served by a single local 
newspaper. As a result, this newspaper would often 
try to appeal to the broadest possible readership 
by maintaining a degree of objectivity and political 
neutrality. This new generation of partisan local 
news sites operates very differently.  
First, these sites are typically run as part of 
far-reaching networks of sites by organizations 
or individuals with close ties to political parties 
or political action committees. However, these 
sites often go to great lengths to conceal their 
ownership and funding sources from readers. In 
some instances, these sites have even adopted the 
names of defunct local newspapers, in an effort to 
deceive readers.  
Second, as a recent New York Times inves-
tigation into Metric Media, the largest of these 
networks of local news sites, illustrated, during 
the 2020 election season Metric Media sites often 
accepted payment from political operatives, think 
tanks, and corporate executives to provide positive 
or negative coverage of specific candidates or 
issues, depending upon the wishes of the client. At 
this point, any pretense of being a news organiza-
tion is out the window, and yet these sites continue 
to present themselves as such. 
Finally, as our own ongoing research has 
shown, there is very little that is local about these 
sites. As much as the names of these sites might 
indicate that they are focused on individual com-
munities, each site within one of these networks 
frequently carries much of the same content as 
the other sites in the network, and much of this 
content is algorithmically generated or repurposed 
from other sources. 
In sum, many of these networks of sites represent 
not the next generation of local news outlets, but co-
ordinated networks of semi-covert political influence 
that have taken advantage of the vacuum left by the 
decline of legitimate local journalism.
The number of these sites tripled from just 
over 400 in late 2019 to over 1,300 in the months 
leading up to the election. As these sites spread 
across the country, they appeared to be particularly 
concentrated in the swing states of the election, a 
pattern that suggests that national political strategy 
has played a role in the distribution of these “local” 
news sources.  
Many of these sites have added an additional 
layer of degraded political news and information 
to a political news ecosystem that was already 
straining under the weight of algorithmically 
amplified disinformation, hyper-partisan cable 
news networks, persistent foreign influence 
operations, and blatant disinformation originating 
from our own elected leaders.
What, if any, impact these sites may have had 
on the election outcome is difficult to determine 
at this point. However, they obviously grew quite 
rapidly during election season. In addition, Metric 
Media has announced plans to launch 15,000 
additional sites, and has recently begun purchasing 
local newspapers, as part of what the company’s 
CEO Brian Timpone has described as an effort to 
“democratize community news.” 
Rather than democratizing community news, 
these developments suggest that a new template 
for disguising strategic political influence efforts 
as local journalism has been established during 
the 2020 election and could become the norm 
in future elections. The 2020 election may have 
provided just a small preview of what’s yet to come.
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